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Abstract 
 
Free choice tasks are tasks in which more than one response is considered correct, while in 
forced choice tasks only one response is considered correct. They are often used in 
conjunction to investigate differences between self-generated (free choice) and externally 
triggered (forced choice) actions. The general purpose of the present work was to investigate 
what free choice tasks are, both in themselves and in contrast with forced choice tasks. This 
was investigated over the course of three studies. Study 1 was a follow-up study to Naefgen, 
Caissie, and Janczyk (2017), which in turn was an investigation of the mechanisms behind the 
backward crosstalk effect (BCE). The BCE is an interference effect that appears in dual-
tasking situations and refers to the phenomenon that response times in the first task are 
influenced by whether the two tasks are compatible or incompatible on (theoretically) any 
dimension. Naefgen, Caissie et al. investigated the role of stimulus-response links in the BCE, 
finding reduced BCEs when one of the tasks was a free choice task. The alternative 
explanation for these results that Study 1 investigated was that this reduction was due to 
conflict adaptation in response to the presence of free choice tasks. As the BCE in Study 1 
was reduced neither in trials following free choice Task 1 trials nor with higher proportions of 
free choice Task 1 trials in a block, the alternative explanation was rejected. In Study 2, the 
common observation that free choice tasks have slower responses than forced choice tasks 
was investigated. Within a sequential sampling framework, in which evidence is noisily 
accumulated towards decision thresholds, the crossing of which causes a response to be 
emitted, the mean response time difference was sought to be attributed to either differences in 
the speed of evidence accumulation or differences in the time of non-accumulation time. This 
was done by manipulating the decision thresholds with proportions of catch trials in 
Experiment 1 and time pressure in Experiments 2 and 3. If the difference is due to different 
evidence accumulation speeds, the response time difference should change. As it did not, the 
difference was attributed to a difference in non-accumulation time, possibly suggesting that 
free choice tasks involve an additional process. In Study 3, the question whether free choice 
tasks are random generation tasks was investigated. This was done by manipulating the 
working memory load and observing whether the randomness of the choices changes in a 
manner consistent with random generation tasks. As both a manipulation supporting the 
working memory and one adding working memory load had effects consistent with random 
generation tasks, it was concluded that free choice tasks are at least similar to random 
generation tasks. The implications of the results of all three studies for free choice tasks and 
their uses are discussed in the General Discussion.  
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1 What are free choice tasks? 
“In ancient Rome there was a poem about a dog who had two bones. He picked at one, he 
licked the other. He went in circles till he dropped dead.” –Devo – Freedom of Choice 
When Berlyne used the terms free and forced choice task for two specific kinds of 
experimental task in 1957, he intended to use the tasks to investigate the role of conflict in the 
formation of responses. Specifically, he wanted to investigate four variables that he posited 
constituted conflict: The amount of choices, the absolute strength of the choices, the relative 
strength of the choices (and how equal they are in strength) and how mutually exclusive the 
choices are. To this end he ran three response time (RT) experiments. In all of them, 
participants were to react to lights of different colors (and sometimes positions) in different 
ways: If only one color of light appears, there was a specific response they were to give 
(called forced choice task). Multiple colors of light appearing at the same time, on the other 
hand, indicated that either of the possible responses was to be given (called free choice task). 
He varied the responses’ mutual exclusivity by manipulating whether responses were given by 
two switches with one position or one switch with two positions. He further varied the 
absolute strength of the stimuli by, in one condition, doubling the amount of lights that served 
as stimuli in one experiment, as well as by varying the luminosity of the lights in another. 
Lastly, he varied the amount of response options by either having two or four relevant 
response options in the third experiment. With the exception of the last one, all manipulations 
affected the free and forced choice task RTs differently: Having only a single switch with two 
possible positions elicited slower forced choice responses but did not affect free choice RTs. 
Doubling the amount of lights resulted in faster forced choice responses but slower free 
choice responses while for the luminosity of the lights brighter lights always resulted in faster 
responses, but this was less pronounced for the free choice tasks. Lastly, more response 
options resulted in slower RTs, but not differently so for the two task types. Overall, in all 
experiments, free choice tasks had slower responses than forced choice tasks. Together, 
Berlyne interpreted these results as confirmation of the theoretical assumption that higher 
levels of conflict (here in the sense of competition of response tendencies) lead to longer RTs. 
While the theoretical focus of Berlyne’s work was on the effects of conflict on RTs, 
the types of tasks and the terminology he used have been used in subsequent psychological 
inquiries of several types. The present work’s aim is to provide insight into the differences 
between free and forced choice tasks, both in a more technical sense of attributing the 
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descriptive RT mean difference between them to parameters within a sequential sampling 
framework and in a sense of searching for potential cognitive mechanisms underlying these 
differences in parameters. To that purpose, the rest of Chapter 1 is divided into two threads: 
Section 1.1 will provide a definition of free and forced choice tasks as the terms are used here, 
which will also include a rough overview over some of the different variants of the tasks. 
Section 1.2 will provide a short overview over tasks and terms that are similar but which are 
not the subject of this work. The following two chapters will be about situating free and 
forced choice tasks within the literature, including an overview over the purposes for which 
they have been used, criticisms of these uses (Chapter 2) and an overview over fundamental 
similarities and dissimilarities of the two task types (Chapter 3), respectively. Chapter 4 will 
summarize the research questions central to the studies summarized in Chapters 5 through 7. 
The answers to these questions, the wider theoretical implications of these answers as well as 
an outlook for future research are discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
1.1 What do Free Choice Tasks look like?  
The defining features of free choice tasks as they will be talked about here are to be 
understood in contrast to the more commonly used standard forced choice task. In these, there 
is an unambiguous mapping of each stimulus to one response (i.e. each stimulus contains 
complete information about which response is correct and which response(s) is (are) 
incorrect). In contrast, free choice stimuli are ambiguous. This means that two or more 
responses to the stimulus are considered equally correct. As there are many different ways that 
this can be achieved on an operationalizational level, here are just a few examples, which are 
illustrated in Figure 1: 
A. Two forced choice stimuli are presented simultaneously (e.g. Berlyne, 1957, using 
red and green lights, lit up separately for forced choice trials and together for free 
choice trials) 
B. A distinct third type of stimulus is presented after an instruction to choose freely in 
response to it (e.g. Janczyk, Dambacher, Bieleke, & Gollwitzer, 2015, using 
stimuli in two colors as forced choice task and a third color of stimulus as a free 
choice task) 
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C. Similar to the previous type, multiple stimuli (as opposed to only one) are to be 
responded to freely (e.g. Elsner & Hommel, 2001, with auditory stimuli that 
previously were action consequences and in the testing phase are the action 
triggers, i.e. stimuli demanding a response) 
D. Similar to type A, here the stimulus carries spatial information about the expected 
response and, for the free choice stimulus, multiple stimuli are presented. 
Participants are instructed to respond with the key(s) spatially (left, middle, right) 
corresponding to the highlighted square(s) (e.g. Janczyk, Nolden, & Jolicoeur, 
2015, Experiments 2+3) 
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Figure 1. Illustration of types of free and forced choice task stimuli. In panel A, forced choice stimuli differ in 
one stimulus feature (here: color) and the free choice stimulus is a composite of two forced choice stimuli. In 
panel B, forced choice stimuli again differ in one stimulus feature from each other and the free choice stimulus 
presents a third stimulus feature variant. In panel C, in the acquisition phase there is only a free choice stimulus. 
Different responses to this free choice stimulus lead to different action effects (here: high- or low-pitched 
sounds). In the test phase, high or low pitched sounds can either serve as forced choice stimuli, indicating the 
responses of which they previously were the effects, or they can serve as free choice stimuli. Note that these two 
uses in the test phase cannot happen in the same experiment. In Panel D, the stimuli carry spatial information 
(left, middle, right) about which response(s) are correct. If multiple boxes are highlighted, all corresponding 
responses are considered correct. 
 
As part of the instructions of a given experiment, participants may or may not be 
instructed to try to respond in similar frequencies with all response options to the free choice 
stimuli and that they should try to avoid responding with obvious patterns. Sometimes, 
participants may even explicitly be instructed to choose response options randomly. Other 
times, choosing spontaneously is emphasized. An overview over the different kinds of 
emphases that are given in instructions is provided in Table 1. It is somewhat ambiguous on a 
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conceptual level if tasks in which randomness is explicitly instructed should be counted 
among the variations of free choice tasks for the purposes of the present work. Arguably, 
intentional action (see Chapter 2) should be differentiated from mere random ‘action’. 
Therefore, at this point, tasks whose instructions emphasize random generation are excluded 
from the working definition of free choice tasks used here (but see also Chapter 7 for an 
investigation into whether free choice tasks involve a component of random generation).  
Table 1. Illustrative examples of different instructions for free choice tasks. (adapted from 
Naefgen & Janczyk, 2018a) 
Example of… Inclusion criteria Example 
Explicitly random responses Explicit mention of random-
ness as a goal 
“The subjects were in-
structed to choose the order 
of their movements at ran-
dom.” (Hadland, Rushworth, 
Passingham, Jahanshahi, & 
Rothwell, 2001, see also 
Waszak, Wascher, Keller, 
Koch, Aschersleben, Rosen-
baum, & Prinz, 2005; Elsner 
& Hommel, 2001) 
Similar to random response 
instructions 
Overlap between instruc-
tions and definitions of ran-
domness 
No explicit mention of ran-
domness 
“[…] participants were in-
structed to decide spontane-
ously to produce one or the 
other action effect without 
relying on any specific strat-
egy. They were told to 
choose each alternative 
about equally often, but it 
was stressed that the focus 
should be on spontaneous 
decisions rather than on a 
perfectly even distribution of 
responses.“ (Pfister & 
Kunde, 2013; see also Linser 
& Goschke, 2007)  
Emphasizing spontane-
ity/freedom of choice 
No mention of randomness 
No particular overlap in in-
structions with definitions of 
randomness 
Mention of spontaneity or 
freedom of choice as goal 
“Participants were instructed 
to […] decide spontaneously 
between the two response al-
ternatives in free choice tri-
als” (Pfister, Kiesel, & 
Melcher, 2010; see also Her-
wig, Prinz, & Waszak, 2007) 
None reported No explication of instruc-
tions present in the text 
“When lights of both colours 
appeared, either response, 
but not both, was to be per-
formed.” (Berlyne, 1957) 
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1.2 Which related tasks are not meant here? 
 There are several tasks used to investigate concepts related (either theoretically or 
operationalizationally) to free choice tasks as defined above. In order to clearly delineate the 
subject of the present work, this section will provide an overview over such tasks which are 
not the subject of this work, split into conceptually related tasks and tasks with the same name 
but no conceptual relation. 
To identify conceptually related tasks, an exemplary framework for action will be 
briefly described and free choice tasks as used in the present work will be identified within 
that framework, by extension excluding tasks falling under different categories within it. 
Examples of the tasks will be presented. 
The framework is the “What, When, Whether” model of intentional action by Brass 
and Haggard (2008). As the name suggests, this model identifies three different aspects of 
intentional action, which can be subject to choice: (1) The What component is concerned with 
the type of action that is to be executed. Brass and Haggard mention free selection tasks 
(which in the present text are called free choice tasks) here themselves already, but warn that 
they might be conflict resolution tasks instead of free choice tasks. This would be in line with 
Berlyne’s (1957) original conceptualization of free choice tasks (but see Chapter 2 for a 
discussion of the different uses of free choice tasks). (2) The When component is concerned 
with the point in time at which the action is to be executed. The perhaps most well-known 
example of a task in which this component is chosen (relatively) freely can be found in the 
Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983) study, in which participants could choose freely 
when to give a certain response while time was displayed in the form of a clock face. The 
actual timing of the response and when participants were aware of their choice showed 
discrepancies, spurring some debates on the nature of consciousness in action. (3) Lastly, the 
Whether component is concerned with the question if the action will be actually executed, 
after the What and When are decided. One example can be found in the study by Brass and 
Haggard (2007) in which they instructed participants to sometimes (without prompting) 
decide to withhold their response to a stimulus (as opposed to providing no-go stimuli, which 
by themselves forbid reacting). Within this framework, free choice tasks as used here are 
distinguished by their freedom of choice in the What component, as the specifics of When (as 
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soon as possible after the stimulus appeared) and Whether (always), but not of What (e.g., left 
or right response) are defined by the stimuli. One further specification to this is that not all 
tasks in which the What component is not completely specified by the stimulus necessarily 
fall within the category of free choice tasks as used here. One category of tasks that shows 
this are cued random generation tasks in which a random number is to be generated in 
response to a stimulus. Heinemann, Pfister, and Janczyk (2013) for example used a random 
generation task in which, in response to a stimulus, a number between 1 and 9 was to be said 
out loud. While this task is clearly not a free choice task as defined here (as the emphasis was 
on random generation as opposed to freely choosing a response), even if, hypothetically, the 
instructions did not emphasize random generation and emphasized free choice instead, it 
would still be somewhat problematic to fit into the particular framework used here: There is a 
spectrum between providing a specific set of responses (which would be a free choice task) 
and leaving the responses completely open (which would not be a free choice task as defined 
here) with higher numbers of response options shifting the task from the former more towards 
the latter. Of course, nine response options are still far away from an unlimited set of response 
options, like, for example, naming any positive whole number would be. 
Other tasks with a similar name but no close conceptual relationship with the free and 
forced choice tasks discussed in the rest of this work include: 
- The two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task (e.g., McKenzie, Wixted, Noelle, & 
Gyurjyvan, 2001) needs to be distinguished from forced choice tasks as used here. 
2AFC tasks require that there are always two stimuli presented for each trial of 
which the correct one is to be selected while for a forced choice task only one 
stimulus needs to be present at any given time and where different stimuli 
correspond to different correct responses. In some ways, the 2AFC task could be 
argued to be a special case of a forced choice task, as the two stimuli presented in a 
2AFC trial could be conceived of as one composite stimulus to which only one of 
two responses is considered correct. And indeed, often in the literature the two 
terms are used somewhat interchangeably, despite the different specific definitions. 
Nevertheless, the terminological distinction as it relates to this work should be 
noted. 
- In various fields the term “free choice” is used, but often in a more informal 
manner. Two examples are ethology and education. In ethology, tasks in which 
more than one choice is presented might be called free choice tasks. One example 
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can be found in Arvola and Forsander (1961), who compared alcohol consumption 
to water consumption ratios when both are offered between six different species, 
calling the offering of both “Free-choice experiments” (p.819). Another can be 
found in Stevens, Rosati, Ross, and Hauser (2005), who presented cotton-top 
tamarins and common marmosets with a single food reward option in a “forced-
choice session” (p.1859) and let them choose one of two food reward options in 
“free-choice session[s]” (p.1859). In education, for example instances in which 
learning material is sought out outside of formal educational contexts can be called 
free choice learning, as can those in which materials within such contexts are 
freely chosen. One instance of this can be found in Kola-Olusanya (2005), which 
is about how and when children learn about environmental issues in settings in 
which learning opportunities are presented for the children to choose from, for 
example, museums, zoos etc. Another can be found in Wood (2014), which is 
about the choices children make while playing in early education and how they 
relate to power structures and national educational frameworks. While the 
differences to the type of free choice the rest of the present work will be about 
might seem obvious or even trivial, it is interesting to briefly consider where the 
contrasts lie exactly. In the ethological examples, the parallels to the present text’s 
free choice tasks are potentially fairly large, with the critical exception that the 
choices presented are qualitatively different. As such, they are used to investigate 
preferences. This potentially operationalizes some ideas about self-generated 
action (which will be elaborated more in Chapter 2) better than the free choice 
tasks in which the choices are, essentially, interchangeable, as the qualitatively 
different response options would allow an expression of self and personal 
preferences. The educational example, especially those in which educational 
opportunities are sought out deliberately and on the subjects’ own initiative, also 
potentially ‘operationalize’ (the term applies, but this is not an experimental 
context) similar aspects of self-generated action better than the free choice tasks 
talked about in this work. 
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2 For what are free choice tasks used? 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview over the different uses free 
choice tasks have seen, mostly in conjunction with forced choice tasks in some way, including 
brief introductions into the relevant theoretical concepts as well as arguments for and against 
these uses. Three broader categories of purpose will be presented alongside examples for each 
and, if applicable, criticisms of these uses. The first use is probably the most common one: 
Operationalizing self-generated and externally triggered actions. The other two uses that will 
be presented here are free choice tasks as conflict tasks and free choice tasks as tasks without 
inherently clear stimulus-response links. 
 
2.1 Self-generated and externally triggered actions. 
In the research literature on action there is a contrast that can often be found in one 
shape or the other. The specific words used to describe the two sides of the contrast are often 
different. On the one side there are actions that will be referred to in this text as self-generated 
(e.g. Passingham, Bengtsson, & Lau, 2010). They are also called endogenous (e.g., Pfister, 
Heinemann, Kiesel, Thomaschke, & Janczyk, 2012), intentional (e.g., Brass & Haggard, 
2008), internally generated (e.g., Obhi & Haggard, 2004), intention-based (e.g., Herwig et al., 
2007 or Keller et al., 2006) or voluntary. On the other side of this contrast, there are those 
actions that here will be called externally triggered actions (e.g., Jenkins, Jahanshahi, 
Jueptner, Passingham, & Brooks, 2000, or Obhi & Haggard, 2004), also referred to as 
stimulus-based (e.g., Herwig et al., 2007, or Keller et al., 2006) or exogenous actions (e.g., 
Pfister et al., 2012). 
These two types of actions are sometimes assumed to have two distinct types of motor 
control. This idea links up with arguments found in Passingham (1983). Here, Passingham 
argues that the arcuate premotor area is responsible for actions based on cues from outside the 
organism (the model organisms here being Macaca fascicularis and Macaca mulatta, two 
species of Old World monkeys) and that the supplementary motor area is responsible for 
actions based on proprioceptive cues, that is, cues from inside the organism. Similarly, some 
scholars theorized that there are two types of action control (or “two action control modes”), 
which are also claimed to be controlled by two (neuronally) distinct action control systems 
(Astor-Jack & Haggard, 2005; Goodale, Westwood, & Milner, 2004; Krieghoff, Waszak, 
Prinz, & Brass, 2011; Obhi & Haggard, 2004). 
16 
 
The core functional difference between the two systems is, by definition, that one is 
involved in enacting intentional actions with the goal of producing an effect in the 
environment and that the other is involved in actions that are prompted by stimuli that are 
encountered in the environment. One functional difference between these two systems, 
according to Herwig et al. (2007), is then that the stimulus-based action system enables 
stimulus-response (or sensorimotor) learning (cf. Hommel’s, 2000, concept of a prepared 
reflex, in which a perceptual antecedent is automatically and non-intentionally translated into 
a motor response). Meanwhile, the intention-based action system enables action-effect (or 
ideomotor) learning (cf. Elsner & Hommel’s, 2001, model of action control, in which, over 
time and automatically, bidirectional links between actions and their perceivable 
consequences are created). 
The arguments for this distinction come from both neuropsychological and behavioral 
observations. Astor-Jack and Haggard (2005) used what they called the ‘truncation paradigm’. 
They assumed that for intentional tasks, there is a preparatory gradual accumulation of 
activation of the motor system while there is no such process for reactive tasks. In the 
truncated condition, this preparatory build-up of activation is interrupted by the presentation 
of a stimulus that the participants are instructed to react to with the same response as the one 
they were already preparing. Note that for the intentional action tasks here, participants were 
asked to give a response with their right finger within 2-10 s of a trial start signal. Truncation 
was implemented by presenting a tone during such an intentional action trial, which indicated 
that the response was to be given immediately. They then compared the RTs in the truncation 
condition with those in the reactive action condition, observing that RTs in the truncation 
condition were longer than in the reactive action condition. Additional analysis of pupil 
dilation data confirmed that participants were indeed preparing an intentional action up until 
the truncation happened. These longer RTs, Astor-Jack and Haggard suggest, are due to a 
necessary switch between the two motor systems, which they claim are not normally active at 
the same time.  
Similarly, Obhi and Haggard (2004), also used a truncation paradigm. Here, 
participants were to flex a finger in response to stimuli, again either at a time of their choosing 
or immediately. For truncation trials, the former type of trial was interrupted by a tap to the 
neck of the participant by the unseen experimenter. They observed characteristic differences 
in the strength with which responses were given (in the form of EMG data) between the 
intentional and reactive actions. In truncation trials, the EMG signature of the strength of the 
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response was the same as that observed for reactive trials, which Obhi and Haggard 
interpreted as evidence that it was indeed a response of the stimulus-driven type that was 
given. As Astor-Jack and Haggard (2004), Obhi and Haggard also reported longer RTs in the 
truncation condition than in the stimulus-driven condition, which they interpreted to be 
evidence for two separate motor systems for the two types of actions. 
With regards to evidence from EEG and lesion studies (in addition to behavioral 
evidence and imaging studies), Krieghoff et al. (2011) reviewed the literature and, while there 
is still ambiguity in the literature, identified a medial-lateral dimension on which intentional 
action control varies. There, the fronto-medial cortex is identified with intentional action 
control while the fronto-lateral cortex is involved in stimulus-oriented action control. Within 
the former, they further specified that the more anterior regions of the fronto-medial cortex 
are responsible for more abstract aspects of behavior (which here map to the What and 
Whether aspects of Brass & Haggard’s, 2008, “What When Whether” model of intentional 
action) while the more posterior regions are responsible for specifying other crucial aspects of 
the intended behavior (which for example would include the When component of Brass & 
Haggard’s model). 
Note that it is somewhat unclear in the literature whether the amount to which actions 
are self-generated or externally triggered is meant in a dichotomous way or in a continuous 
way spanning the two extremes. The former is at least suggested by both the language of 
entirely different substrates for each and for example Astor-Jack and Haggard’s claim that 
normally the two systems are not active at the same time. The latter on the other hand is 
expressed explicitly in, for example, Krieghoff et al. (2011): “Human actions are rarely totally 
externally determined, nor are they ever completely internally guided. Rather, they almost 
always comprise external and internal components. Therefore, it might be more reasonable to 
assume that human actions exist along a continuum between the two extremes” (p.768). 
Similarly, Passingham et al. (2010) emphasize the interconnectedness of the neural systems 
(here: the supplementary motor area and the lateral premotor cortex) responsible for the two 
types of actions and write that this “would be expected given that the distinction between self-
generated and externally guided actions is rarely absolute, but often one of degree” (p. 20). 
Janczyk (2016) largely follows these views, describing the differences between self-generated 
and externally triggered actions as not qualitative in nature. An exception mentioned there is 
that of unconditioned reflexes, which appear to belong to a category entirely distinct from 
actions altogether (Janczyk, Pfister, Wallmeier, & Kunde, 2014). The specific commonality 
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between self-generated and externally triggered actions that is absent in unconditioned 
reflexes is whether action effects play a role in the behaviors. Action effects will be further 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this use of free choice tasks to operationalize 
self-generated actions is not without its criticisms. For example, Krieghoff et al. (2011) 
themselves say that „In contrast to most situations in everyday life in which an intentional 
decision is associated with a certain (personal) value, there is no such value in an 
experimental setting” (p.774). Schüür and Haggard (2011) express a similar criticism. They 
surveyed the literature and categorize operationalizations of self-generated actions into (1) 
operant actions, (2) underdetermined actions and (3) motor consequences of integration of 
different types of inputs. Within those categories, free choice tasks as understood here fall, 
according to Schüür and Haggard, into the second category, which is defined as “actions in 
the absence of cues” (p.1699). Schüür and Haggard view this conceptualization of self-
generated actions as problematic because, according to them, it recourses onto an 
agentic/reflective self, for which there, they say, is no empirical evidence. They view this 
conceptualization as, ultimately, sourced in introspective experience. While this is a more 
conceptual criticism, there also are some empirical challenges to some of the conclusions 
mentioned above. For example, Astor-Jack and Haggard (2005) claimed that the two motor 
control systems generally are not simultaneously active and therefore switching between them 
should incur switch costs. This was not observed when Janczyk, Nolden, and Jolicoeur (2015) 
reported on three experiment in which free and forced choice tasks were presented in 
homogenous single-task blocks, mixed single-task blocks and dual-task blocks, in which 
stimuli for both tasks were presented at the same time. The RTs increased from homogenous 
to mixed single-task to dual-task blocks and free choice tasks took longer compared to forced 
choice tasks. Most importantly, they did not observe any difference in dual-tasking costs 
between free and forced choice tasks, which Astor-Jack and Haggard’s claim would have 
predicted here.  
In a set of experiments using the psychological refractory period paradigm (Pashler, 
1994) and the additive factor logic (Sternberg, 1969), Janczyk, Dambacher et al. (2015) 
located the source of the mean RT difference where free choice tasks take longer than forced 
choice tasks within a phase of pre-central processing, specifically in perceptual processes. In 
the additive factor experiment, the experimental manipulation targeted stimulus brightness, 
effectively replicating the second experiment from Berlyne (1957). However, the results were 
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different: Stimulus brightness affected forced choice tasks, but not free choice tasks. With 
only two datasets directly investigating the different influence of stimulus brightness on free 
and forced choice tasks, however, it is hard to draw any firm conclusions. One potential 
explanation for the different results in these studies could be different differences in 
luminance between bright and dark stimuli. These cannot be directly compared, as the 
Janczyk, Dambacher et al. study does not report the luminances of the stimuli used. If the 
results of the Janczyk, Dambacher et al. study were to be replicated, this would speak for free 
choice tasks being less dependent on external information that forced choice stimuli. 
To summarize, while there is evidence in support of the general distinction between 
self-generated and externally triggered actions, these categories may not be as strictly 
dichotomized as they sometimes are portrayed, as there is overlap between the two tasks on 
both a neurological and a behavioral level. There will be a further examination on the 
similarities and differences between the two task types in Chapter 3. 
2.2 Conflict tasks and tasks with ambiguous stimulus-response links. 
The second and third use of free choice tasks, which will be showcased in this section, 
are (1) free choice tasks as conflict tasks and (2) free choice tasks as tasks without clear 
stimulus-response links. 
As already described in the previous chapter, Berlyne (1957) conceptualized free 
choice tasks as conflict tasks and used them to investigate the effects of different aspects of 
conflict ((1) the relative strength of response tendencies, (2) number of choice options, (3) 
absolute strength of response tendencies, and (4) the degree to which responses are 
incompatible to each other) on the speed of responses. His free choice stimuli were two 
different forced choice stimuli (lights in different colors), simultaneously presented, which 
also operationalized the (1) relative strength of response tendencies, with a more equal 
strength, that is, the free choice stimuli, resulting consistently in slower responses than with 
unequal response tendencies, that is, the forced choice stimuli. He operationalized the other 
aspects of conflict by (2) varying the amount of choice options, two or four options (more 
response options slowed down responses for both task types), by (3) varying the amount of 
forced choice stimuli presented simultaneously (doubling the presented stimuli sped up forced 
choice responses but slowed down free choice responses) or (3) their luminosity (the brighter 
the stimuli, the faster the responses, with a less pronounced effect on free choice responses), 
and by (4) whether responses were given by manipulating two separate switches, each only 
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going in one direction or by operating one single switch capable of being toggled in two 
directions (more mutual exclusivity only slowed down forced choice responses but did not 
affect free choice responses). Given these results, Berlyne proposed excluding physiological 
incompatibility as a potential source of conflict. Further, Berlyne discussed the relationship 
between conflict and RTs by examining both potential explanations for the longer RTs in free 
choice tasks and the prerequisites of making any choice at all in them. The four explanations 
he discussed are that (1) "some relatively improbable combination of events must come 
about" (p. 114) before a response can be given, (2) approach-approach conflict is resolved by 
random behavioral variation that tilts the participant towards one of the choices, similar to (1), 
(3) information for both responses is constantly collected but for a choice to be made, some 
information has to be discarded and some created, which takes time, and (4) cortical 
organization is disrupted by conflict. 
This was not the only instance in which free choice tasks were used to investigate 
conflict. Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen (2001) reviewed several studies which 
reported heightened anterior cingulate cortex activation when participants were performing 
free choice tasks, compared to when they were performing forced choice tasks (Deiber, 
Passingham, Colebatch, Friston, Nixon, & Frackowiak, 1991; Frith, Friston, Liddle, & 
Frackowiak, 1991; Jueptner, Frith, Brooks, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 1997; Playford, 
Jenkins, Passingham, Nutt, Frackowiak, & Brooks, 1992; for examples of more recent studies 
showing involvement of the cingulate cortex in free choice or free choice-like tasks, see Lau, 
Rogers, Ramnani, & Passingham, 2004; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008; Zapparoli et 
al., 2018). Note that in these studies participants were not instructed to respond freely or 
according to their own will but to respond randomly. Botvinick et al. argued that these 
"underdetermined responding tasks" (p. 628) result in the simultaneous activation of 
incompatible response tendencies (e.g., of only pressing a left button and only pressing a right 
button) which constitutes conflict. In this, they argue similarly to Berlyne (1957), specifically 
the aspect (4) of the incompatibility of response options. Another argument they used why this 
is evidence that conflicting responses being activated simultaneously are responsible for this 
increase in activity in the anterior cingulate cortex are the results reported in Raichle et al. 
(1994), who used a task in which participants were to respond to a noun with an appropriate 
verb. They reported an increased activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (compared to a 
task in which the nouns were to be simply repeated back) in the beginning, but this increase 
vanished quickly with repeated presentations of the same list of nouns. It reappeared when a 
new list of nouns was presented. This, Botvinick et al. argue, was, similarly to the free choice 
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tasks, due to a newly presented noun activating multiple mutually exclusive responses at the 
same time, also leading to conflict. 
Lastly, free choice tasks have also been used as tasks in which no clear stimulus-
response links exist. Elsner and Hommel (2001), for example, used free choice tasks in their 
investigation of their 2-phase model of action control. In this model, in a first phase 
associations between motor actions and their effects are learned and in a second phase these 
associations are used in intentional actions to achieve these learned effects in the 
environment. In all four experimental designs presented in their study, free choice tasks were 
used in the acquisition phase in the form of auditory tones following freely chosen left or right 
button presses. In the test phases of one of the experiments (Experiment 1), forced choice 
tasks and in the other three (Experiments 2, 3, and 4), free choice tasks were used. Stimuli in 
the test phase were the tones which in the acquisition phase were the effects of the left and 
right button presses. In the experiment with forced choice tasks in the test phase, participants 
responded faster when the button press that a tone instructed was the same as the button press 
that produced the same tone in the acquisition phase than when they were different. In the 
three experiments in which the test phase was comprised of free choice tasks (i.e. either 
response was considered correct to either tone), the choices made in response to each tone 
were robustly biased towards the button press that was associated with the respective tone in 
the acquisition phase. These results were replicated by Vogel, Scherbaum, and Janczyk 
(2018), who used a mouse tracking paradigm to be able to examine patterns over the course of 
free choice trials. They identified two groups of participants who use different and distinct 
strategies for choosing a response option: Early choosers and late choosers. Those who chose 
early in (or even before) a trial which response option they were going to pick were not 
affected in their choice of response option by the presented previous action effect, whereas 
those who picked their response option during the trial were.  
Overall, Elsner and Hommel’s (2001) results were taken as evidence that when a 
motor action is repeatedly followed by a perceived effect in the environment, an automatic 
association between the motor action and the effect is created, regardless of actual relevance 
of said association to the task at hand. This interpretation necessarily presupposes that, 
without the intervention of the acquisition phase, there would be no connection between the 
free choice stimuli and the responses given to them. As such, Elsner and Hommel used free 
choice tasks here as a type of task which would normally be ‘neutral’ unless a manipulation 
creates these links between stimuli and responses.  
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Another example of such a use is found in Naefgen, Caissie, and Janczyk (2017). The 
target of this study was to investigate the role of stimulus-response links in the genesis of the 
compatibility-based backward crosstalk effect (BCE) (e.g., Hommel, 1998, Hommel & Eglau, 
2002, Lien & Proctor, 2002). The BCE is an effect that occurs in dual-tasking situations. 
Models which posit a response selection bottleneck (for overviews, see Lien & Proctor, 2002; 
Pashler, 1994; or Pashler & Johnston, 1998) claim that the central processing of the first and 
the second task in such a situation happens strictly serially. This in turn means that the second 
task’s response selection should not influence the first task’s response selection whatsoever. 
Nonetheless, whether or not two tasks in a dual-tasking situation are compatible on some 
dimension (e.g., whether the sides on which the response to the two responses are to be given 
are the same or different) influences not only the speed of the performance in the second task, 
as general assumptions of priming would predict, but also that in the first task (with Task 1 
responses that are compatible to the Task 2 response as described above being faster than 
incompatible ones), hence the “backward” component of the BCE’s name. Hommel (1998) 
attributed this phenomenon to an automatic stimulus-response translation that is capable of 
running in parallel to other processes, which would enable crosstalk between the two 
processes (for an elaboration, see Janczyk, Renas, & Durst, 2018). To further test the role of 
such stimulus-response links in the Naefgen, Caissie et al. study, three experiments were run 
in which Task 1 or Task 2, in a dual-tasking situation, was either a free or a forced choice task 
(which task was a free or a forced choice task was varied between but not within experiments) 
while the respective other task was always a forced choice task. The logic here was based on 
the assumption that free choice tasks have either no or at least weaker stimulus-response links. 
If these stimulus-response links are necessary in both tasks for the BCE to occur, an absence 
(or weaker strength) of them should lead to an absence of the (or weaker) BCE. Stimulus-
response links in forced choice tasks are usually first instructed and then reinforced with 
repetition and feedback over the course of an experiment. This also occurs to some degree 
with free choice tasks, as, here, usually two responses are repeatedly given after one stimulus 
(albeit only one after each stimulus presentation), therefore plausibly also forming an 
association between the stimulus and the responses. However, these assumed associations 
would also only have roughly half as many chances to be reinforced as those in a forced 
choice task. Furthermore, there is evidence that such links can be formed rapidly (e.g., 
Wolfensteller & Ruge, 2011, reported evidence for response-effect learning after only 12 
trials). 
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The experimental setups in Naefgen, Caissie et al. (2017) allowed for checking the 
BCE impact on Response 1 in all three experiments and for checking its impact on the choice 
made in Task 1 when it was a free choice task. When both tasks were forced choice tasks, 
there was always a BCE. When Task 1 was a free choice task, the BCE was smaller than when 
it was a forced choice task and it was absent when Task 2 was a free choice task. Furthermore, 
in all experiments there was a bias to choose the same response in the free choice task as the 
forced choice task instructs. This was descriptively larger in the experiments in which Task 1 
was the free choice task than in the one where it was Task 2. These results overall suggest that 
the BCE relies at least to some extent on stimulus-response links. However, it is not possible 
to tell from this study whether (a) free choice tasks have no stimulus-response links but those 
links are not necessary (but sufficient) for the BCE, whether (b) stimulus-response links in 
free choice tasks are just weaker than for forced choice task and necessary for the BCE (thus 
limiting its strength) or (c) a combination thereof is true. 
Self-generated actions, conflict tasks, and tasks with ambiguous stimulus-response 
links: These are the three major ways in which free choice tasks are used. The observations 
reported above already suggest some specific ways in which free and forced choice tasks are 
similar and dissimilar. The next chapter will provide a systematic overview over these specific 
similarities and dissimilarities. 
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3 How similar are free and forced choice tasks?  
The goal of this chapter is to first review and then evaluate to what extent and in 
which specific ways free choice tasks and forced choice tasks are similar or different. 
Contrasting the tasks in that manner will by necessity be somewhat redundant to the previous 
chapters, as the differences and similarities become visible through the application of the 
tasks. One of the purposes of this chapter is to evaluate the claim that free and forced choice 
tasks are qualitatively different. This to-be-evaluated claim can, for example, be found in the 
form of an explication of Herwig et al.’s (2007) work in Pfister, Kiesel, and Melcher (2010). 
Herwig et al. replicated Elsner and Hommel’s (2001) experiments in which the stimuli in a 
test phase were, in a previous acquisition phase, the effects of specific free choice task 
choices. While Elsner and Hommel observed in a test phase in which these previous action 
effects were free choice stimuli that responses congruent with the acquisition phase 
association were more likely and faster than incongruent responses, Herwig et al. (p. 1540 and 
1549) reported that this effect “holds for endogenously driven actions only!” That is, it does 
not occur when the learning phase uses forced choice tasks. Pfister et al. (2010) interpreted 
the different action control modes posited by Herwig et al. as “fundamentally different 
systems” (p. 317). This interpretation (and its basis) appears especially plausible if one 
follows the arguments for different neural substrates governing these different kinds of actions 
cited by Herwig et al. (see also Chapter 2). 
Lastly, in order to investigate the differences between two task types, as is the purpose 
of the present work, it is necessary to first establish how closely the two tasks are related. 
How close they are related informs which questions are reasonable when comparing them. 
The focus of this chapter will be on behavioral evidence, as the evidence to the differences in 
the neurological substrates was already discussed in Chapter 2. 
3.1 How are free and forced choice tasks dissimilar? 
First, arguments and evidence speaking for a fundamental or qualitative difference 
between the task types will be collated in this section. 
The operational differences already described in Chapter 1 that define the two tasks in 
contrast to each other are perhaps the most obvious differences: In forced choice tasks, only 
one answer is correct in response to the stimulus while in free choice tasks, more than one 
answer is considered correct.  
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The next very consistently observed difference that is not part of their definitions, 
starting with Berlyne’s (1957) paper, is the RT advantage that forced choice tasks have over 
free choice tasks (e.g., Bodner & Mulji, 2010; Janczyk, Dambacher et al., 2015; Janczyk, 
Nolden et al., 2015; Naefgen, Caissie et al., 2017; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). There are 
some exceptions to this RT advantage. It can either vanish like in the dark stimuli condition of 
Experiment 3 in Janczyk, Dambacher et al. (2015) or even reverse like in Naefgen, Caissie et 
al. (2017) in the incompatible dual-tasking trials or in Experiments 1 through 4 in Wirth, 
Janczyk, and Kunde (2017). Strictly speaking, the observation in Janczyk, Dambacher et al., 
as an absence of differences, could be seen a result that belongs in the next section, but 
generally speaking these exceptions are rare and thus far have not been investigated 
systematically. One commonality might be that this reversal the RT advantage occurs mainly 
under dual-tasking conditions (but not always, see Janczyk, Nolden et al., 2015). 
As described in the previous chapter, Naefgen, Caissie et al. (2017) combined free and 
forced choice tasks in a dual-tasking situation and observed that the BCE was reduced when 
Task 1 was a free choice task instead of a forced choice task and absent when Task 2 was a 
free choice task instead of a forced choice task. This suggests that interference of this kind 
between the two task types is at the very least reduced. There is the alternative explanation for 
this reduction of the BCE that this reduction was due to immediate conflict adaptation which 
will investigated further in Chapter 5. However, the fact that the BCE persisted at all albeit in 
a reduced form when Task 1 was a free choice task also suggests similarities between the two 
tasks. 
Another type of difference that some researchers posit exists between the two task 
types is that free choice tasks allow for action-effect bindings to be formed while forced 
choice tasks do not or at least not to the same degree. 
Starting with the assumption that free and forced choice tasks are implemented by 
different neuronal substrates, Herwig et al. (2007) proposed that the two action control modes 
represented by the two task types are also associated with different modes of learning: Forced 
choice tasks (representing an externally-triggered action control mode) would be associated 
with stimulus-response/sensorimotor learning while free choice tasks (representing a self-
generated action control mode) would be associated with action-effect/ideomotor learning. In 
three experiments similar to Elsner and Hommel's (2001) experiments (see Section 2.2 for a 
summary), Herwig et al. changed (among other variables) whether the action control mode in 
the acquisition phase was self-generated or externally-triggered by using free and forced 
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choice tasks, respectively. Indeed, their results were compatible with their prediction that 
action-effect learning would only occur for the free choice task: Compatibility effects in the 
test phases with faster responses when the stimulus in the test phase was the same as the effect 
in the test phase only occurred when the acquisition phase used free choice tasks. These 
results were not entirely unambiguous, though. In the error rates of Experiment 2, there was a 
significant compatibility effect on the error rates, which was (numerically) larger when the 
acquisition phase consisted of forced choice trials. Herwig and Waszak (2009) tested an 
alternative explanation for these results: That the source of this difference is that for free 
choice task the attention is split between the response to be given and the effect that follows it 
(two elements) and for forced choice tasks the attention is split between these two elements as 
well as the stimulus (for a total of three elements). Thus, the lack of attentional resources 
would be the alternative explanation for action-effect associations not forming. In three 
experiments, they manipulated (1) the number of elements for free choice tasks to match that 
of forced choice tasks by introducing a stimulus discrimination task (action-effect learning 
happened), (2) the amount of attention drawn to the effects of forced choice tasks by adding 
'wrong' action effects that had to be detected by the participants (action-effect learning did not 
happen) and (3) doing the same as in (2), but with free choice tasks (action-effect learning 
happened). Their results were consistent with their original hypothesis of only free choice 
tasks leading to action-effect learning. Later, Herwig and Waszak (2012) also investigated the 
strength and durability of action-effect associations that result from free and forced choice 
tasks and observed that while for forced choice tasks there are short-term action-effect 
associations but there is no long-term action-effect learning while for free choice tasks both 
short-term associations and long-term learning happen between actions and their effects (see 
also Janczyk, Heinemann, & Pfister, 2012). This view of the hypothesized two action control 
modes is, however, not undisputed. As any evidence to the contrary will necessarily lead to a 
view of the task types as more similar. This evidence will be presented in the next section. 
 
3.2 How are free and forced choice tasks similar? 
In this section arguments and evidence for similarities between free and forced choice 
tasks will be reviewed. 
Again the most obvious similarities can be found in the descriptions of the task. In 
most regards, the two tasks can outwardly appear the same: The stimuli are interchangeable 
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and (mostly) just need to be instructed differently to be one or the other, the motor execution 
can be virtually indistinguishable (pressing a button, flipping a switch; but see Obhi & 
Haggard, 2004, for an example of distinguished motor responses) and so on. But of course 
there are other, less superficial similarities as well. 
Both task types can be influenced by masked primes (Bermeitinger & Hackländer, 
2018; Bodner & Mulji, 2010; Kiesel et al., 2006; Le Bars, Hsu, & Waszak, 2012; 
Schlaghecken et al., 2004), with the primes both biasing the choice of the free choice tasks 
and influencing the RTs: free choice responses congruent to the prime are faster than 
responses that are incongruent to the prime. This influence by primes seems to be somewhat 
qualitatively different between the task types in its specifics: Mattler and Palmer (2012) 
reported that free choice stimuli integrate information from both internal and external sources 
(here: primes) while the effect primes have on forced choice stimuli is dependent on the 
interaction between automatic processing of the prime and the target stimulus. 
Janczyk, Nolden et al. (2015) performed experiments in which either a free and a 
forced choice task or two forced choice tasks were presented simultaneously. If there are two 
distinct action control systems for the two tasks, this would imply that changing from using 
the one system to the other would require additional time. They reported that this was not the 
case and that both tasks are similarly affected by dual-task costs in such a dual tasking 
situation. This shows that any switch in action control systems does not show up in the form 
of different dual-task costs between the central processing of the two stimuli. Within the same 
central bottleneck framework, Janczyk, Dambacher et al. (2015) further reported that the RT 
difference between the two tasks arises in the pre-central stage, specifically that there is 
enhanced perceptual processing for forced choice tasks in comparison to free choice tasks. 
While this shows that the perceptual processing of these tasks might be different, it also 
shows that the central processing of the two tasks may be qualitatively the same. 
Similarly, the fact that the BCE occurs at all (albeit reduced) with a free choice Task 1 
(Naefgen, Caissie et al., 2017) is evidence for some kind of qualitative overlap in how the two 
tasks are processed. Bermeitinger and Hackländer (2018) applied motion primes to free and 
forced choice tasks and observed that, while the length of the stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA) influenced whether compatibility effects were positive (short SOA) or negative (long 
SOA), there was no difference between the tasks, again suggesting that interference works 
similarly with the two task types. 
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In a similar vein to Herwig and Waszak’s observation (2012, see Section 3.1 for a 
summary) that there is no difference in short-term action-effect associations between the two 
task types, Janczyk, Heinemann et al. (2012), in two experiments, demonstrated that short-
term action-effect bindings occur for both free and forced choice tasks. They investigated this 
by adapting a paradigm established by Dutzi and Hommel (2009) in which after a response is 
given to a first task, one of two tones was randomly selected and presented. Following this 
tone, a second tone was presented, which was either the same or the other tone. This second 
tone served as stimulus for the second task. Task 1 was either a free or a forced choice task 
(whereas Dutzi and Hommel only ever had Task 1 be free choice tasks) and Task 2 was 
always a free choice task. They observed that when the two presented tones were the same, 
there were also more repetitions of the Task 1 response in the Task 2 response than if the two 
presented tones were different. Critically, as this happened in both free and forced choice 
tasks (and numerically even stronger for forced choice tasks than free choice tasks), they 
interpreted this as evidence in favor of short-term action-effect bindings forming rapidly for 
both free and forced choice tasks. This contradicts the most extreme version of the claim that 
action effect learning only happens in an intentional action control mode (e.g., Herwig et al., 
2007; see also Herwig & Waszak., 2009), but is in line with, for example, the observation of 
Herwig and Waszak (2012) that while short-term action-effect bindings are formed for both 
task types, only free choice tasks will form more persistent, longer-term action-effect 
associations. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that long-term action-effect associations 
are also formed in free choice tasks. Pfister and Kunde (2013) for example investigated in two 
experiments the relative roles of anatomical features (here: which hand is used to respond) 
and spatial features (here: where the button that is to be pressed is located) of responses in 
response-effect compatibility phenomena. To this end they had participants give responses 
with their hands positioned either ‘normally’ or crossed over (the left hand pressing the right 
button and vice versa), which produced effects that were either on the left or the right. They 
presented both forced and free choice stimuli. In Experiment 1, the action effect compatibility 
effects were stronger in the forced choice task condition while in Experiment 2 they were the 
same across task types. While the results from Experiment 1 are, strictly speaking, evidence 
that speaks for a difference between the two task types, it is also evidence that contradicts a 
strong position claiming a difference going in the opposite direction, hence its inclusion here 
(for some other examples that run counter to the idea of only free choice tasks leading to 
longer-term action-effect learning see Gozli, Huffman, & Pratt, 2016, only forced choice 
tasks, no comparison with free choice tasks; Huffman, Gozli, Hommel, & Pratt, 2018, only 
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forced choice; Janczyk, Durchst, & Ulrich, 2017; Janczyk, Pfister, Crognale, & Kunde, 2012; 
Janczyk, Pfister, Hommel, & Kunde, 2014; Kunde, 2001, Experiments 1 and 2 forced choice 
tasks, Experiment 3 free choice tasks, but no direct comparison; Kunde, Pfister, & Janczyk, 
2012; Wolfensteller & Ruge, 2011). One potential limitation or moderating factor for some of 
these findings put forward by Pfister, Kiesel, and Melcher (2010) is that the mere presence of 
free choice tasks leads to a self-generated action control mode for both free and forced choice 
tasks. This would mean that when both tasks are presented together as opposed to in separate 
blocks, action-effect learning can happen for both. 
Lastly, there are also recent conceptual criticisms of the distinction between self-
generated and externally triggered action control expressed by Hommel and Wiers (2017), 
who argued that it would be better to view action control as a unitary system. In this view, 
virtually all human actions that have been investigated in psychological research are goal-
directed, as this unitary action control system would be responsible for all actions which 
fulfill any criteria the agent in question has. Sometimes those criteria would lead to relatively 
faster and well-rehearsed behavior (here: forced choice tasks) or relatively slower, more novel 
behavior (here: free choice tasks). 
 
3.3 Evaluation of similarities. 
Overall, there are differences between the tasks, but also marked similarities. While 
cognitive interference seems to show some differences between the two task types, priming 
works similarly on both and the central processing of both tasks is at least similar enough to 
not incur switch costs. In sum, the evidence suggests that the two tasks are similar enough to 
be investigated through common frameworks in order to identify their differences further. 
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4 Research questions 
Considering the similarities and differences described in Chapter 3 and the limits of what is 
currently known about those, the central question this dissertation concerns itself with is this: 
How are free and forced choice tasks similar and how are they different? 
Accordingly, this work is about specifying these similarities and differences between free and 
forced choice tasks further than has already been done in the literature and staking out the 
theoretical territory within which the two task types can be put into a common framework. 
This latter aspect also includes investigations into where exactly any remaining differences 
lie. 
Because an exhaustive answer to this question is outside the scope of this work, in the 
following three more specific research questions that follow from the larger question are 
named and attempts to answer them will be described in Chapters 5 through 7. 
Question 1: Is the reduced BCE when a free choice task is involved due to conflict 
adaptation? (Chapter 5) This question concerns the argument that free and forced choice 
tasks need to be somewhat similar because interference from one can affect performance in 
the other and concerns this alternative explanation of the reduction in the size of the BCE. If 
the reduction of the BCE is due to conflict adaptation, this would strengthen the argument for 
similarity from mutual interference, as this would mean that the conflict adaptation suppresses 
a usually even larger BCE. However, at the same time, it would speak for the specific 
difference that free choice tasks induce more conflict adaptation than forced choice tasks. 
Question 2: Are free choice tasks merely underdetermined tasks? (Chapter 6) This 
question is about the already observed mean RT differences between free and forced choice 
tasks and is about identifying this difference within the established theoretical framework of 
sequential sampling models. As such, this research question is similar in purpose and general 
approach to works like Janczyk, Dambacher et al. (2015) and Janczyk, Nolden et al. (2015).  
Question 3: Are free choice tasks random generation tasks? (Chapter 7) Question 3, in 
contrast to Question 2, is not concerned with placing the mean RT difference within an 
abstracted framework but aims to test a specific mechanical explanation of the mean RT 
difference. 
The answers to these questions as well as their implications will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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5 Smaller backward crosstalk effect for free choice tasks are not the 
result of immediate conflict adaptation 
 
The (compatibility-based) BCE is an interference effect that occurs in dual-task 
situations. Specifically, it refers to the observation that when the two tasks require responses 
that are on some dimension incompatible (e.g., a right response in Task 1 and a left response 
in Task 2) the performance in Task 1 is negatively affected (mostly in the form of longer RTs), 
compared to when the responses are compatible on the same dimension. This happens despite 
the fact that, at the time, Task 2 should not have been processed yet and thus not be able to 
influence Task 1 performance according to central bottleneck models (e.g., Pashler, 1984, 
1994). 
Naefgen, Caissie et al. (2017) observed that the BCE is reduced when Task 1 is a free 
choice task. These results have a plausible explanation alternative to the reduced stimulus-
response links assumed in this paper. It is possible that this reduction was due to conflict 
adaptation in reaction to the presence of the free choice task (see Section 2.2), which would 
result in reduced interference between tasks. As the BCE is an interference-based 
phenomenon, it is affected by such conflict adaptation. The general principle that interference 
is reduced under or after conditions of conflict has been known for a while. One example is 
the Gratton effect, which describes the sequential modulation of congruency effects, such as 
the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen 1974; sequential modulation thereof: Gratton, 
Coles, & Donchin 1992) or the Simon effect (Simon & Rudell, 1967; sequential modulation 
thereof: Akçay, & Hazeltine 2007; Dignath, Janczyk, & Eder 2017). This effect can come 
about when there is an overlap between the task and irrelevant additional information, for 
example when there are task-irrelevant flanking stimuli which are either similar or dissimilar 
to the task-relevant stimulus in the flanker task or whether the stimulus appears in a similar 
place to where the response is supposed to be given in the Simon task. Like in the BCE, 
performance is better when the stimulus and the irrelevant information are compatible than 
when they are incompatible. These effects are reduced in trials following incompatible trials 
compared to compatible trials. This means that, following incompatible trials, the 
performance in incompatible trials is closer to the performance in compatible trials. Some 
cognitive mechanisms that are assumed to be involved in this are the level of focus on task-
relevant features (Botvinick et al. 2001) and the suppression of irrelevant information 
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(Janczyk & Leuthold, 2018; Stürmer & Leuthold, 2003; Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, 
& Sommer, 2002). 
Janczyk (2016; see also Renas, Durst, & Janczyk, 2018, and Scherbaum, Gottschalk, 
Dshemuchadse, & Fischer, 2015) showed that sequential modulation generalizes to the BCE: 
In three experiments, the BCE was smaller in trials following incompatible trials compared to 
trials following a compatible trial. This shows that the BCE is, in principle, vulnerable to 
suppression by way of conflict adaptation. Critically, it has been shown that conflict 
adaptation can not only happen between two trials but also within one trial. Goschke and 
Dreisbach (2008) had participants perform a spatial compatibility task (arrows appearing in 
one of four locations, pointing in one of four directions) and (rarely) presented variations of 
these stimuli that indicated that an additional response is required of them. In those trials in 
which the location of the arrow was incompatible with the direction the arrow was pointing 
and, thus, conflict was present, more of these additional responses were not given than in non-
conflict trials, which the authors interpreted as evidence for additional recruited cognitive 
control within these trials. Scherbaum, Fischer, Dshemuchadse, and Goschke (2011) gathered 
frequency tagged EEG data while participants performed a flanker task to trace the amount of 
attention allocated to differentiating between flanker and central stimulus. The results here 
also indicated that conflict adaptation happened over the course of a single trial. Together, this 
suggests that the adaptation to the hypothetical conflict in free choice tasks could feasibly 
affect the tasks of which the free choice task is one. If free choice tasks are conflict tasks, this 
makes it plausible that the results from the Naefgen, Caissie et al. (2017) paper could be 
explained by conflict adaptation.  
However, these types of conflict adaptation do not generalize universally between 
types of interference. Sometimes conflict adaptation does not generalize between conflict 
tasks like in the case of Akçay and Hazeltine (2011), who observed conflict adaptation within 
the respective task type for both Simon and flanker tasks but did not observe it between them. 
Other times, there appears to be a global type of conflict adaptation or at least one that 
generalized across two types of task. One example for this is reported by Freitas, Bahar, Yang, 
and Banai (2007, Experiments 2 and 3), who interspersed flanker tasks and Stroop tasks and 
observed conflict adaptation between the two task types. For a review of conditions under 
which conflict adaptation was observed to generalize and under which it did not, see Braem, 
Abrahamse, Duthoo, and Notebaert (2014). As it is unclear whether conflict adaptation 
generalizes between free choice tasks and the BCE, it is necessary to empirically test whether 
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or not the BCE is affected by conflict adaptation brought on by free choice tasks. This study 
approached this goal with two dual-task experiments in which the amount of free choice task-
induced conflict was systematically varied and the effect this had on the BCE was observed. 
In Experiment 1, the dual-task trials were, unbeknownst to the participants, presented 
in pairs: A prime trial always preceded a test trial. While all test trials were a combination of 
two forced choice trials (in half of which Task 1 was compatible and in half of which Task 1 
was incompatible to Task 2), in half of all prime trials, Task 1 was a free choice task and in 
the other half a forced choice task (again, half of which were compatible and half 
incompatible). Task 2 was always forced choice. The trial course for both experiments is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of a pair of trials in Experiment 1. The red S is the prime trial stimulus and the blue X is the 
test trial stimulus. In this exemplary stimulus mapping, a red stimulus instructs the participant to give a right 
manual response (prime trial Task 1) and an S stimulus instructs the participants to give a right pedal response 
(prime trial Task 2). A blue stimulus on the other hand instructs a left response (test trial Task 1) and an X stimulus 
instructs a left pedal response (test trial Task 2). Therefore, this example illustrates a compatible forced choice test 
trial (as both responses are on the left side) following a compatible forced choice prime trial (as both responses are 
on the right side). Note that in Experiment 2 the general procedure was the same but there was no distinction 
between prime trials and test trials. (from Naefgen & Janczyk, 2018b)  
 
We1 predicted that the BCE should be smaller in test trials following incompatible 
forced choice prime trials than those following compatible forced choice prime trials, in a 
replication of the results from Janczyk (2016). Critically, we further predicted that, if free 
choice tasks lead to conflict adaptation, the BCE in test trials following compatible free 
choice prime trials should be smaller than in test trials following compatible forced choice 
trials. The restriction to compatible free choice trials (instead of including incompatible free 
choice trials) in the prediction was because the BCE following incompatible prime trials is 
                                                 
1 Owing to the collaborative nature of this research, in the summaries of the studies in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the 
first person pronoun was pluralized. 
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expected to be smaller regardless of the task type involved. Thus, if the BCE were to be 
smaller following such a trial, it would not be clearly attributable to either type of cognitive 
conflict. The results from Janczyk (2016) were replicated, there was a significant reversed 
BCE following incompatible forced choice prime trials. The critical results are visualized in 
Figure 3 and will be discussed together with the results of Experiment 2. 
While in Experiment 1 a type of conflict adaptation was induced that is analogous to 
the sequential modulation of interference, in Experiment 2 a list-wide proportion congruency-
based type was induced. Here, the amount of trials with a free choice Task 1 in a block was 
manipulated to be 25%, 50%, or 75%. There are multiple potential ways this could lead to 
heightened conflict in the critical trials with two forced choice tasks: There could be an 
accumulation of experienced conflict within the block or there could be a heightened 
expectation of conflict in any trial. If adaptation to free choice task-induced conflict were the 
cause of the reduced BCE in the Naefgen, Caissie et al. (2017) paper, a higher proportion of 
free choice tasks in Experiment 2 should also cause a reduced BCE. The results of this 
Experiment are visualized in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 3. Mean correct response times from Task 1 (RT1) of Experiments 1 and 2 as a function of prime trial 
conflict type (Experiment 1) or percentage of free choice trials in a block (Experiment 2) and Response 1-Response 
2 (R1-R2) compatibility. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals calculated separately for each 
prime trial conflict type in Experiment 1 and separately for each percentage level of free choice trials in a block in 
Experiment 2 (see Pfister & Janczyk 2013). (from Naefgen & Janczyk, 2018b) 
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In summary, in both experiments there was no evidence for a reduced BCE caused by 
free choice tasks, as neither a preceding free choice trial nor a rising proportion of free choice 
trials in a block reduced the size of the BCE. This suggests that the results in Naefgen, Caissie 
et al. (2017) were not due to conflict adaptation in reaction to free choice tasks. Additionally, 
the observation that in a dual-task situation a free choice Task 1 is biased towards a spatially 
compatible response (i.e. a left response following a left response and a right response 
following a right response) was replicated in both experiments, which might be an additional 
dimension on which Task 2 influences Task 1, that is, in which the BCE is expressed. 
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6 Free choices compared to forced choices: Just underdetermined or is 
there an additional process? (Why free choices take longer than forced 
choices: evidence from response threshold manipulations) 
 
Given that there is a consistently observed mean RT difference between free and 
forced choice tasks in which free choice tasks take longer (see Section 3.1), it is of theoretical 
interest to investigate the source of this difference. In order to investigate any specific 
differences between these tasks to which the mean RT difference could be attributed, it is 
necessary to first choose a common framework for the two tasks to make the differences 
tractable. In this study, we chose to investigate free and forced choice tasks through a 
sequential sampling lens, of which the drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) is probably the 
most prominent example. 
All of these approaches have in common that information is noisily accumulated over 
time until a threshold is reached and a response is initiated. While the resulting models vary in 
complexity, the model we assumed here is a minimal version reminiscent of Grice’s (1968) 
variable criterion model in which there are three parameters: a) the decision thresholds, b) the 
non-accumulation time and c) the drift rate. The decision thresholds indicate how much 
evidence has to be accumulated for one or the other response in order to initiate its emission. 
Higher thresholds lead to longer RTs but also lower error rates, while lower thresholds lead to 
the opposite. This is because errors in this framework occur when the random noise shifts the 
accumulated information to the wrong response. As the noise is random, when there is more 
time for the constant accumulation in the correct direction, the amount of wrong answers will 
become smaller. The non-accumulation time represents how much time in the process is spent 
on processes that are not devoted to the accumulation of information, that is, a constant length 
of time that needs to be added to the whole duration of the process. The drift rate represents 
the speed with which information is accumulated and thus how fast a given threshold is 
reached. The total RT is a composite of the length of the non-accumulation time on the one 
hand and a combination of the drift rate and the decision thresholds on the other hand. 
Within this model, there are at least two plausible explanations of how the mean RT 
differences between free and forced choice tasks come about. Those are that the two tasks 
differ in their 
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a) drift rates, with free choice tasks having lower drift rates. 
b) non-accumulation times, with free choice tasks having longer non-
accumulation times. 
Explanation a) maps to the idea expressed by for example Schüür and Haggard (2011) 
that the defining feature of free choice tasks, as they are understood in the present work, is 
that they are underdetermined, that is, that there is simply a dearth of information for the 
participants. Meanwhile, explanation b) is less specific in to which explanation it maps. It 
would make theoretically necessary at least one additional process, but would not give any 
information on what that process is, with the exception of an upper limit of how long it can 
take. Alternatively, one of the already existing non-accumulation processes could be slowed 
down/elongated. 
As both explanations predict longer RTs, it is necessary to identify what would make 
them distinguishable. Because the decision thresholds only interact with the drift rate but not 
with the non-accumulation time to determine the total RTs, this is theoretically fairly simple: 
If one of the drift rates is lower than the other, then increasing the decision thresholds should 
increase the difference between the two task types. Conversely, lowering the decision 
threshold should then reduce this difference. Should changing the decision thresholds not 
affect the size of the difference between free and forced choice tasks, this would suggest that 
the mean RT difference can be attributed to a difference in non-accumulation times. These 
two explanations as well as how the proposed manipulation would make them distinguishable 
are illustrated in Figure 4. If there is a difference in drift rates, there should be a significant 
statistical interaction between a manipulation of the decision thresholds and whether the task 
is a free or a forced choice task. 
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Figure 4. Two accounts of the mean RT difference between free and forced choice tasks. The 
continuous black line represents a medium decision threshold. The dashed line stands for a task in 
which there is an increased decision threshold and the dotted line for one in which it is lowered. Under 
the “different drift rates” account, the RT difference between forced and free choice tasks becomes 
smaller with lower thresholds (ΔRTa > ΔRTb > ΔRTc). In other words, task and threshold manipulation 
interact with each other. In contrast, with differences in non-accumulation times, the RT difference 
remains the same irrespective of the threshold (ΔRTa = ΔRTb = ΔRTc) and therefore reflects an 
additive relation between task and threshold manipulation. (from Naefgen, Dambacher et al., 2018) 
 
For the manipulation of the decision thresholds, we used two approaches in three 
experiments. In all experiments, participants fulfilled relatively simple free and forced choice 
tasks in which they had to react to differently colored circles with, depending on the color, 
either a left or right button press or a button press of their choice. In Experiment 1, we used 
varying amounts of so-called catch trials in a given block while in Experiments 2 and 3 we 
used varying amounts of time pressure. 
Catch trials are trials in which no stimulus appears and in which participants are 
instructed to not give a response. A higher proportion of these catch trials in a block increases 
the separation of the decision thresholds (e.g., Gordon, 1967; Näätänen, 1972). This is 
theorized to result from lowered expectations that the stimulus will appear, in turn leading to a 
heightened decision threshold (Brysbaert, 1994; Grice et al., 1982; Seibold, Bausenhart, 
Rolke, & Ulrich, 2011). For time pressure, it was demonstrated that higher time pressure (i.e. 
less time to react) leads to lower decision thresholds (e.g., Diederich, 1997; Dror, Basola, & 
Busemeyer, 1999; Forstmann, Dutilh, Brown, Neumann, Cramon, Ridderinkhof, & 
Wagenmakers, 2008). 
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For all three experiments, responses were manual button presses and participants were 
instructed to try to respond to the white free choice stimuli with both response options about 
equally often and to avoid patterns in their responses. All three types of trials (free choice, 
forced choice left, forced choice right) occurred equally often. 
In Experiment 1, the amounts of catch trials per block were 0%, 25%, 50%, and 75%. 
Experiments 2 and 3 both had measurement blocks in the beginning, where the mean and the 
standard deviation of the participant were measured, so that in subsequent blocks 
individualized time limits within which a response had to be given could be applied. Both 
experiments had a condition of low, medium and high time pressure, which was applied 
blockwise. The baseline for each condition was the mean RT, which was then modified by 
adding or subtracting a multiple of the SD of the RT. For Experiment 2, those modifiers were 
+1 SD for the low, +0 SD for the medium and -1 SD for the high time pressure condition and 
for Experiment 3 they were +0 SD, +0.5 SD and +1.5 SD, respectively. 
The results of the three experiments are illustrated in Figure 5. The slowing RTs in 
Experiment 1 with higher percentages of catch trials suggest that the decision thresholds were 
indeed influenced as intended. The critical results of Experiment 1 yield some ambiguity: 
While overall, there is a significant interaction between the amount of catch trials in a block 
and the task type, this is entirely driven by the condition in which there are no catch trials 
whatsoever. Here, the RT difference between free and forced choice task was reduced. 
Furthermore, while a higher decision threshold should result in slower responses with fewer 
errors, in Experiment 1 the conditions with the ostensibly higher decision thresholds had 
higher instead of the expected lower error rates. This could be indicative of the manipulation 
targeting the drift rates instead of the decision thresholds. This issue was not apparent, at least 
in terms of the RTs and PEs changing in the expected directions, in Experiments 2 and 3 (but 
for a discussion of the non-specificity of time pressure manipulations, including effects on 
drift rates, see e.g., Arnold, Bröder, & Bayen, 2015; Dambacher & Hübner, 2015; Rae, 
Heathcote, Donkin, Averell, & Brown, 2014; Rinkenauer, Osman, Ulrich, Müller-Gethmann, 
& Mattes, 2004). 
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Figure 5. Mean correct RTs from all three experiments as a function of task type and block type. Error 
bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals calculated for the difference between free and forced 
choice tasks collapsed across block types (see Pfister & Janczyk, 2013). (adapted from Naefgen, 
Dambacher et al., 2018) 
 
In Experiment 2, the results were again somewhat ambiguous: There was a significant 
interaction between the threshold manipulation and the task type on the RTs, but this result 
was driven by a collapse of the RT difference between free and forced choice tasks in the high 
time pressure condition. To check whether this was the result of a large proportion of fast 
guesses (as there were high error rates in this condition that, in part, reached almost chance 
level), we performed a median split categorization of the participants based on the error rates 
in the high time pressure condition. We then analyzed the two data sets separately, with a 
significant interaction between the threshold manipulation and task type only in the high-error 
rate subset of the sample. To gain more clearly interpretable data, a third experiment with less 
strict time limits was run. 
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In Experiment 3, the results were unambiguous: The threshold manipulation affected 
RTs and PEs as expected and there was no significant interaction between the threshold 
manipulation and the task type on the RTs. 
In sum, as there was no stable interaction between the decision threshold 
manipulations and the size of the mean RT difference between free and forced choice tasks in 
Experiments 1-3, it is reasonable to attribute it to different non-accumulation times. As 
previously mentioned, while this rules out mere underdeterminedness of free choice tasks, it 
does not, by itself, illuminate what the additional processes involved in free choice tasks are. 
An attempt to answer that question is described in the next chapter. 
One limitation of this study is that the assumed underlying parameters were not 
directly assessed for both types of tasks. Furthermore, when EZ (Wagenmakers, Van Der 
Maas, & Grasman, 2007) was used to extract the parameters of the forced choice tasks, in all 
three experiments the non-accumulation times were affected by the thresholds manipulation. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, the drift rates were affected by the threshold manipulation. In 
Experiment 2, this effect was largest between the high time pressure condition and the other 
two conditions, adding to the problems of interpretability here. Lastly, in Experiment 1, the 
response thresholds were not significantly affected at all, indicating potential problems with 
the interpretability of it. 
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7 Is the additional process a random generation task? (Free Choice 
Tasks as Random Generation Tasks: An Investigation through 
Working Memory Manipulations) 
 
Accepting the former chapter’s conclusion that free choice tasks are not merely 
underdetermined but involve an additional process all but spells out the next question when 
trying to understand free choice tasks: What is this additional process? 
This study aimed to answer this question. One specific potential mechanism was 
considered: whether the additional process is one of random generation. Frith (2013) noted 
that for free choice tasks as understood in the present work “in essence, the experimenter is 
asking her subjects to try to be unpredictable and random” (p. 291). The argument here is 
rooted in evidence that random choices are perceived as more free (Ebert & Wegner, 2011) 
and that, in neuroimagining studies, random generation tasks and free choice tasks activate 
similar brain regions (Jahanshahi, Dirnberger, Fuller, & Frith, 2000; Jenkins et al., 2000). 
This becomes especially apparent when inspecting the instructions usually 
accompanying free choice tasks. Even when they don’t explicitly mention randomness as a 
goal (e.g., Hadland et al., 2001, p. 1105; see also Waszak et al., 2005; Elsner & Hommel 
2001), they often still resemble instructions for randomness in that, for example, strategies or 
patterns in the responses ought to be (actively) avoided (e.g., Pfister & Kunde, 2013, p. 650; 
see also Linser et al., 2007). While this is often the case, there are exceptions to this. In those, 
often an emphasis is put on spontaneously choosing responses or acting freely (e.g., Pfister et 
al., 2010, p. 319; see also Herwig et al., 2007). For examples of these instruction types, see 
Table 1 in Section 1.1. 
To make the assertion that free choice tasks are random generation tasks testable, we 
wanted to replicate an observation from a random generation context with free choice task. 
The logic here was that if free choice tasks are random generation tasks, they should react 
similarly to manipulations with known consequences in the latter task type’s case. There are 
several types of findings to choose from, such as time constraints (Baddeley, 1962, as cited in 
Baddeley, 1966) or concurrently performed tasks (Baddeley, 1966). We chose a specific 
version of the latter: the relationship between random generation and working memory. This 
relationship has been pinpointed by Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, and 
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Wager (2000) using principal component analysis as being specifically located within the 
executive functions of inhibition and updating. In addition to that, it has been directly 
demonstrated that concurrent working memory-intensive tasks both increase RTs and reduce 
the randomness of responses on various measures of such (Cooper, Karolina, & Davelaar, 
2012). Overall, the literature suggests that the working memory plays a critical role in the 
generation of random responses and that manipulations of working memory load lead to 
according increases and decreases of randomness in responses. 
While there are many measures of randomness in behavioral experiments (see e.g., 
Towse & Neil, 1998, alone, for 14 different measures), most of them are more applicable in 
contexts where there are more than two response options to choose from. In this study we 
chose the so called local unevenness (LU), which has been used before in behavioral studies 
(e.g., Heuer, Janczyk, & Kunde, 2010; Heuer, Kohlisch, & Klein, 2005). 
The LU of a given sequence is calculated by first dividing the sequence into sub-
sequences of a chosen size (called the ‘window size’, as the sub-divided sequences can be 
thought of as being looked at through a window running along the total sequence). Then it is 
calculated how far the proportion of each response option deviates from the expected 
proportion of the respective response option under an assumption of randomness (here always 
0.5). These deviations are then squared, added together and divided by how many response 
options there are. The square root of the result of that number is the LU for the window. For 
an example of calculating the LUs and the mean LU for a sequence of choices in different 
window sizes see Figure 6. The formula for the LU can be found in Formula 1. 
(1) 𝐿𝑈𝑤 = √
(𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡−0.5)
2+(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡−0.5)
2
2
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Figure 6. The leftmost four panels show examples of (average) values of local unevennesses 
(LUs) in an example sequence for window sizes 2, 4, 6, and 8. The rightmost panel shows all 
sequences that can occur for window size 4 and the respective LUs. The resulting ideal LU 
value for this window size is then .1875. (adapted from Figures 1 and 2 in Naefgen & Janczyk, 
2018a) 
 
To arrive at a measure of randomness for a given window size, all possible 
combinations of responses and their respective LUs are calculated. Under assumptions of 
randomness, all of them are equally likely to appear. The mean LU of all possible 
combinations of choices, then, is the ideal LU. This is illustrated in Figure 6, rightmost panel. 
The distance between this ideal LU and the observed LU (LUD) is a measure for lack of 
randomness. This somewhat awkward phrasing is due to the fact that while a LUD farther 
away from 0 is indicative of certain kinds of patterns (i.e. more or fewer unbalanced 
sequences than expected), a LUD close to 0 is not proof positive of the presence of 
randomness. 
It is important to note that, while this measure’s goal is assessing randomness, we are 
using it not for this purpose but for the purpose of assessing whether responses in free choice 
tasks behave similarly to responses in random generation tasks. Whether humans are capable 
of creating truly random sequences is a question that does not directly touch upon the question 
we are trying to answer here. 
With this measure of randomness and the theoretical framework described above, we 
designed two experiments. In one, we supported the functioning of working memory and in 
the other we increased the load on it. If free choice tasks are random generation tasks, we 
45 
 
expected them to behave like random generation tasks: Working memory support should 
increase the randomness of responses, while increased working memory load should reduce 
the randomness of the responses. 
In Experiment 1, participants were instructed to give responses freely (and could do so 
at their own pace), to give both response options about equally often and to avoid patterns in 
their responses. The working memory support manipulation was implemented by displaying 
either zero, three or seven of the previous choices given above a constantly visible fixation 
circle (see Figure 7 for an illustration). This manipulation was chosen under the assumption 
that one of the ways in which working memory load decreases how random responses in a 
random generation task are is by hindering the formation of a memory trace of previous 
responses, thereby making it harder to monitor the chain of responses for patterns that would 
violate randomness. Conversely, then, making it easier to keep track of potential patterns 
should make it easier to avoid them.  
 
Figure 7. Examples of the different working memory support conditions. In the left panel, no 
working memory support is given, in the middle panel three previous choices are displayed, 
and in the right panel seven previous choices are displayed. Not visible here are the arrows that 
appear within the circle for 50 ms after a response. (from Naefgen & Janczyk, 2018a) 
 
The increase of working memory load in Experiment 2 was implemented by having 
participants alternatingly respond to a free choice tasks and then an n-back task (Kirchner, 
1958, for examples of this use of the n-back task see Jonides, Schumacher, Smith, & Lauber, 
1997; Mitchell, Macrae, & Gilchrist, 2002; Phillips, Tunstall, & Channon, 2007; Watter, 
Geffen, & Geffen, 2003). In the free choice task, participants were again instructed to choose 
freely between the two response options, choose both about equally often and to avoid 
patterns. In the n-back task, depending on the block, participants had to press a button when 
either the position or the color of the stimulus matched a pre-defined condition. Which 
condition this was also depended on the block: The stimulus could have to match a pre-
defined color/position shown at the beginning of the block (0-back) or it could have to match 
the color/position of the stimulus going back 1, 2, or 3 trials (1-, 2- or 3-back, respectively). 
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As this requires constantly monitoring the last n n-back stimuli, a higher n-back difficulty 
should induce higher working memory load and, thus, reduce the randomness of the 
responses. For an illustration, see Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. (A) Example of a sequence of displayed stimuli and fixation crosses on the screen. 
(B) Example of a sequence of n-back stimuli (free choice stimuli not displayed). In the color-
based 2-back condition, only panel (4) would require a response, while in the location-based 2-
back condition, panel (3) would require a response. (from Naefgen & Janczyk, 2018a) 
 
The LUD results of both experiments are illustrated in Figure 9. Overall, the LUDs all 
change in a manner consistent with predictions based on the assumption that free choice tasks 
are random generation tasks. That is, working memory support decreases the LUDs while 
working memory load increased LUDs. There were some contrasts in the results that did not 
reach significance, the most critical one being that more working memory support did not lead 
to a larger decrease of LUDs. Furthermore, the mostly positive value of the LUDs suggest a 
higher-than-expected proportion of unbalanced sequences (e.g., in window size 4 more 
sequences such as L-L-L-R, R-R-R-R, or R-L-R-R). This in turn could, for example, be 
indicative of more long sequences of repetition than would be expected. 
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Figure 9. Mean distances to ideal local unevenness (LUDs) for the window sizes 2, 4, 6, and 8 
in the free choice tasks in Experiments 1 and 2 for each level of working memory (WM) support 
and WM load, respectively. The dotted line indicates ideal local unevenness. Error bars are 95% 
within confidence intervals (separate for all window sizes) (Loftus & Masson 1994). 
 
These results are compatible with the assumption that free choice tasks are similar to 
random generation tasks. A careful interpretation of the results would be that free choice tasks 
are random-generation-like, while the strongest interpretation would be that they, in fact, are 
random generation tasks. What further reaching consequences, if any, this has for the 
literature on voluntary action largely depends on the assumptions one has about the 
relationship between freedom of choice and randomness and will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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8 Discussion 
 
The overall goal of the present work is to contribute to the total body of work that 
aims to describe and explain human action. It does so by reporting and examining evidence 
about free and forced choice tasks, two types of task that are used to operationalize self-
generated and externally triggered actions, respectively. One distinguishing feature of this 
work is that the focus is on the nature of free choice tasks itself instead of trying to investigate 
another question by using free choice tasks. In this chapter, the central results and conclusions 
will be summarized. Their implications for the literature on action will be discussed and 
potential directions for future research on free choice tasks will be laid out. 
 
8.1 Central results and conclusions 
These are the answers to the research questions from Chapter 4 that the major 
conclusions of the previous three chapters suggest: 
Question 1: Is the reduced BCE when a free choice task is involved due to conflict 
adaptation? 
Study 1 suggests that the answer to this is “no”. The reduced or vanished BCE in 
Naefgen, Caissie et al. (2017) when Task 1 or Task 2, respectively, is a free choice task cannot 
be explained by conflict adaptation induced by free choice tasks, providing indirect support 
for the conclusions put forward by Naefgen, Caissie et al. that this is due to weaker stimulus-
response links in free choice tasks. The fact that despite the reduction there was still a BCE 
present in Naefgen, Caissie et al. suggests some degree of similarity between the task types, 
as otherwise mutual interference would not be possible. 
Question 2: Are free choice tasks merely underdetermined tasks? 
Study 2 suggests that the answer to this is “no”. The mean RT difference between free 
and forced choice tasks can, within a sequential sampling framework, not be attributed to a 
difference in drift rates but rather to a difference in non-accumulation times. 
Question 3: Are free choice tasks random generation tasks? 
Study 3 suggests that the answer to this is “yes”. When working memory load is 
manipulated, free choice tasks are affected like random generation tasks. 
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The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate a potential alternative explanation for the 
results of Naefgen, Caissie et al. (2017). The results of that study were that when in a dual-
task situation one of the two tasks was a free choice task, the BCE was reduced compared to 
when it was a forced choice task (when it was Task 1) or that it vanished altogether (when it 
was Task 2). These results were interpreted in light of the hypothesis that stimulus-response 
links are what drives the BCE, given the assumption that stimulus-response links are weaker 
or absent in free choice tasks. Study 1 was an investigation of an alternative explanation of 
these results: That free choice tasks, given that they are assumed to be conflict tasks (e.g., 
Berlyne, 1957, or Botvinick et al., 2001), could lead to immediate conflict adaptation, thereby 
reducing the BCE. This hypothetical conflict was manipulated by changing (1) whether or not 
the prime (dual-tasking) trial before the target trial had a free or a forced choice Task 1 and (2) 
the amount of trials in a block that had one or the other task type as Task 1. As neither 
manipulation had an effect on the size of the BCE, there was no evidence for this alternative 
explanation. Another notable observation from Study 1 is that the choices in a free choice 
Task 1, as in Naefgen, Caissie et al., were biased towards the response required by the Task 2 
stimulus, which is potentially another way backward crosstalk can manifest.  
The purposes of Studies 2 and 3, in contrast, were more direct investigations of free 
choice tasks themselves. Study 2 viewed free and forced choice tasks through a sequential 
sampling lens and sought to attribute the on average longer RTs of free choice tasks compared 
to forced choice tasks to parameters within such a framework. The minimal framework (cf. 
Grice, 1968) used here relied on just three parameters: the non-accumulation time, the drift 
rate, and the decision thresholds. The manipulation of the decision thresholds, which was used 
to locate the RT difference within the other two parameters, was operationalized blockwise by 
changing the amount of catch trials (Gordon, 1967, Näätänen, 1972) and the time limits of 
trials (Diederich, 1997, Dror et al., 1999). As there was no reliable change in the mean RT 
differences, the main conclusion was that the mean RT difference between the task types can 
be attributed to a difference in the non-accumulation times. 
Study 3 sought to investigate the question whether free choice tasks have one specific 
mechanical quality previously (Frith, 2013) attributed to them: Are they (like) random 
generation tasks? As forced choice tasks obviously are not random generation tasks, this study 
did not take a comparative approach between the two task types. The way the question was 
investigated was by manipulating working memory load while free choice tasks were 
performed. In random generation tasks, it has been shown that this influences the randomness 
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of the responses (e.g., Baddeley, 1966, Cooper et al., 2012). Working memory load was 
experimentally decreased (by showing previous responses to a free choice task on screen) and 
increased (by having participants perform a simultaneous n-back task). The randomness of the 
responses was measured by their distance from ideal local unevenness (Heuer et al., 2005, 
2010), with a larger distance corresponding to less randomness. The results were consistent 
with the interpretation of free choice tasks as random generation tasks, that is, working 
memory support increased and higher working memory load decreased the randomness of the 
responses. 
 
8.2 Implications and outlook 
The purpose of this section is to place the results of the studies included in this work in 
a larger theoretical context and discuss their wider-ranging implications. 
Free choice tasks as conflict tasks. While the purpose of Study 1 was to investigate an 
alternative explanation for Naefgen, Caissie et al. (2017), it also has implications for the 
interpretation of free choice tasks as conflict tasks2. There are two basic interpretations with 
regards to the results as they presented themselves: Either free choice tasks produce no 
cognitive conflict or the type of conflict they produce does somehow not affect the BCE. The 
former appears unlikely, given that free choice tasks by definition involve conflict on an 
operational level, as at least two responses are connected to each stimulus. But this does not 
necessarily mean that conflict arises also on a level of cognitive mechanisms. To illustrate this 
point: While at all times we have a radical freedom to do anything we are physically capable 
of doing, we usually do not feel conflicted about all of these options. In order to perceive this 
conflict as conflict, we have to cognitively process our options in some specific ways, usually 
by restricting the space of possible actions in some way (e.g., by asking ourselves what we 
should eat for dinner3). However, the space of options in free choice tasks is both highly 
limited and highly salient, so it appears unlikely that the conflict is not perceived by 
participants. Furthermore, neuroimaging evidence (summarized in Botvinick et al., 2001) 
                                                 
2 Conflict is here to be understood differently than in Berlyne (1957). Berlyne assumed that free choice tasks are 
tasks involving conflict between response options a priori and then used them to investigate what effectively 
influences the strength of this conflict. As such, in Berlyne’s work it was never in question whether or not free 
choice tasks are conflict tasks, whereas here the question is more whether free choice tasks lead to cognitive 
conflict in the sense of, for example, Botvinick et al. (2001), or if there is another cognitive mechanism at work 
that does not involve conflict. 
3 Asking someone else what we should eat for dinner can also lead to conflict, albeit of a different kind than 
discussed here. 
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shows that similar brain regions are active when performing free choice tasks and other 
conflict-inducing tasks. It seems therefore more likely that there is cognitive conflict but that 
this conflict does not translate into increased task shielding from the BCE. One possibility can 
be found in the reported sensitivity of conflict adaptation to the types of conflict involved. 
According to a prediction by Braem et al. (2014), the strength of the transfer of congruency 
sequence effects has a U-shaped relationship with the (dis)similarity of the task contexts. If 
this is true, it could be that here the tasks contexts were neither sufficiently similar nor 
dissimilar to lead to conflict adaptation. 
There are two closely related venues for further research here: First, investigating to 
which, if any, conflict tasks the conflict created by free choice tasks generalizes for the 
purposes of conflict adaptation. Second, investigating the reverse, that is, finding out which 
conflict tasks can induce conflict adaptation that affects free choice tasks. The latter would 
potentially reap additional theoretical benefits, as it would simultaneously be an investigation 
into whether or not free choice tasks actually are conflict tasks. If a conflict task were to be 
identified that induces conflict adaptation that in turn increases response speed in free choice 
tasks, that would imply that a part of the mean RT difference between free and forced choice 
tasks is due to conflicting response activation. A straightforward design for investigating this 
generalizability similar to the design used in Study 1, Experiment 1, would be to have 
alternating prime and target trials. The target trials are either free or forced choice tasks while 
the prime trials are trials of conflict tasks that are either compatible or incompatible in any 
given prime-target pair of trials. Following an incompatible prime trial, free choice tasks 
should then be closer in their RTs to forced choice tasks, compared to when the two tasks are 
following a compatible prime trial. This leaves open the question of which conflict tasks are 
suitable candidates. Following Braem et al.’s (2014) guidelines, the task context should either 
be very similar to the assumed conflict in free choice tasks or very dissimilar. As the conflict 
in free choice tasks is assumed to arise from conflicting activated response options, a task that 
potentially is similar could be the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). In this task 
type, a central stimulus that indicates one response is flanked by either compatible or 
incompatible stimuli that either indicate the same response or the other response, respectively. 
Something to keep in mind when following this approach is that it is on some level 
exploratory, which here implies that negative results are not conclusive, as it could just be the 
wrong type of conflict task that was used. Note that according to Braem et al.’s overview, 
conflict adaptation is not only dependent on the type of conflict task but, possibly to a much 
larger extent, on the context and implementation of these tasks, like for example the types of 
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stimuli used or the respective response modes. This means that great care needs to be taken 
when selecting the specifics of both prime and target trial tasks. 
Backwards biasing of free choice task response choices — A new type of BCE? Study 
1 also replicated the observation from Naefgen, Caissie et al. (2017) that the choice made in a 
free choice Task 1 is significantly more likely to be the same as the choice instructed by a 
forced choice Task 2 than a different choice. In Naefgen, Caissie et al. the same congruency 
bias was reported when the free choice task was the second task. An open question here is if 
the process which brings rise to this bias has the same transmission mechanism as the BCE 
that affects the RTs.  
A possible general approach to answering this question could be to apply a 
manipulation that reduces the RT BCE and see if it also reduces the choice bias “BCE”. A 
potential candidate for this could be the sequential modulation reported in Janczyk (2016). 
Here, only forced choice tasks were used and when a trial followed an incompatible trial, 
there was no BCE while in trials following a compatible trial, there was a BCE. If, then, a trial 
in which Task 1 is a free choice trial follows a (forced choice-forced choice) trial that is 
incompatible, the RT BCE should vanish (assuming that the mechanism behind the free 
choice BCE is the same as the one in the forced choice BCE) and whether or not the bias 
vanishes would be evidence for or against, respectively, the same mechanism involved in the 
choice “BCE”.  
This was possible with the dataset of Experiment 1 in Naefgen and Janczyk (2018b). 
An analysis of the choices in the free choice prime trials indicated that when the previous 
forced choice-forced choice trial was a compatible trial, participants were more likely than not 
(71.0%) to choose the same response in the free choice Task 1 as instructed by the forced 
choice Task 2, one sample t-test against 50%: t(35) = 11.59, p < .001, d = 2.73. This effect 
was not present when the previous forced choice-forced choice trial was incompatible and 
even nominally in the opposite direction (46.0%), one sample t-test against 50%: t(35) = -
1.70, p = .098, d = -0.40. The difference in the percentages of same free choice Task 1 
answers between these two conditions was significant, t(35) = 12.65, p < .001, d = 2.98. This 
suggests that the same mechanisms are involved in this choice BCE and the BCE that affects 
RTs. While further research into this similarity between the kinds of BCE is necessary, this 
result supports claims of similarity between free and forced choice tasks, as there needs to be 
at least some similarity for crosstalk to be possible.  
53 
 
Locating the RT difference between free and forced choice tasks. If the RT difference 
results from pre-central perceptual processing advantages (Janczyk, Dambacher et al., 2015) 
and the rate of information accumulation is identified as the parameter where perceptual 
processing is located4, attributing the RT difference to a difference in non-accumulation time 
like Study 2 suggests leads to a contradiction. Also, the results of Study 3 suggest that free 
choice tasks involve the generation/selection of random responses. While it is conceivable 
that the additional non-accumulation time consists of additional encoding as well as the 
generation/selection of a random response, it would be necessary to investigate whether 
Janczyk, Dambacher et al.’s postulated perceptual advantage can be attributed to non-
accumulation times instead of drift rates. Resolving this issue certainly is a task for future 
research. Another open question here is why Berlyne (1957) reported an advantage for 
brighter free choice stimuli while Janczyk, Dambacher et al., in their Experiment 3, did not.  
Formal models of free and forced choice tasks. A potential way to learn more about 
free choice tasks would be to create a unified formal model of them. Such a model would 
have to incorporate the limitations set by the literature and would bring with it the potential 
for further predictions and insights. Mattler and Palmer (2012) for example applied an 
accumulator model to priming effects in free and forced choice tasks. Their accumulator 
model was based on the accumulator model described by Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, 
Schmidt, and Schwarzbach (2003), which in turn was an attempt to model priming in forced 
choice tasks. In this model, there are two accumulators of sensory evidence (one for each of 
the response options), inhibiting each other. As long as the stimulus from which these 
accumulators receive activation is present, even if it is just in a sensory buffer (like what a 
masked prime would cause), it will create activation in the corresponding accumulator. Once 
the difference between the activation of the accumulators is high enough, the response 
corresponding to the accumulator with the higher accumulation is emitted. Together with 
some other slight deviations from this model, Mattler and Palmer added two assumptions to 
adapt this model to free choice tasks. (1) That a free choice stimulus leads to “a randomly 
chosen activation of one of the two accumulators from some internal source with an activation 
rate that is independent from stimulus characteristics” (p. 356) and (2) that for free choice 
trials the evidence required to emit a response is reduced over time. In other words, the 
decision thresholds (see Chapter 6) are lowered once the free choice stimulus appears. While 
                                                 
4 For example Voss, Rothermund, and Voss (2004) who interpreted “the drift [rate] as a measure of perceptual 
sensitivity (in a between-person comparison) or as a measure of task difficulty (in a between-condition 
comparison)“ (p. 1208). 
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Mattler and Palmer’s data from three experiments fit this model quite well, there are some 
theoretical questions about the assumptions of the model that still need to be answered. While 
acceptable as a provisional assumption, it is entirely unclear how the activation of one of the 
accumulators is “chosen randomly” and needs to be specified further in the future. 
Furthermore, while the mathematical modeling-side of the falling decision thresholds is clear, 
it is somewhat unclear what they mean from a viewpoint of mechanistic explanations. 
Presumably, there would need to be some sort of encoding process that changes the behavior 
of the decision thresholds from static (in forced choice tasks) to dynamic (in free choice 
tasks). Lastly, there are phenomena that this model cannot predict yet, like for example the 
tendency for repeated responses in free choice tasks (i.e., giving the same response to multiple 
free choice stimuli in a row in a frequency above chance level, reported in Naefgen & 
Janczyk, 2018a).  
Another notable example of a mathematical model is the one presented by Devaine, 
Waszak, and Mamassian (2013). They reported on a two-stage model of action control where 
the two stages represent the dissociation in the first and the combination of two assumed types 
of action control in the second stage. In this model there are two variables, one for internal 
actions and one for external actions. In the first stage, they accumulate independently and 
constantly. The internal variable accumulates for a randomly chosen response option. Once 
both pass a first threshold, the second phase begins in which, depending on whether a trial is 
'congruent' (i.e. the two variables code for the same responses) or not, the internal variable is 
either facilitated (congruent) or inhibited (incongruent) by the external variable. Once one of 
the variables crosses a second threshold, the response it codes for is emitted. This model has 
the downside that it is somewhat specific in its application to the experimental setup on which 
it was tested, so some work would have to be done to generalize it to other contexts. It also is 
somewhat questionable to what extent this model applies to free choice tasks per se, as the 
internal generation in the experimental setup here is framed as an anticipation of a future 
(forced choice) response and not as a self-directed choice. However, despite the specificity, 
this model also provides a theoretical element that builders of a future models may want to 
consider using: Viewing the two types of action control not as incompatible systems but as 
systems that work in parallel. 
A potential further source for insights into what constraints are sensible for formal 
models of free choice tasks are dynamic measurements such as the mouse tracking used by 
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Vogel et al. (2018), as they provide insight into what happens between stimulus onset and 
emission of a response. 
The relationship between free choice tasks, voluntary action, and randomness. But 
what are the broadest implications of the results presented in this work? What would be the 
implications of free choice tasks only differing from forced choice tasks by an additional 
necessary step in which a random response is chosen, making them essentially random 
generation tasks? Does this completely invalidate any work on self-generated, voluntary 
actions in which free choice tasks are used as an operationalization?  
These are, of course, questions that cannot easily be decided. The answers largely 
depend on the assumptions one has about voluntary actions and freedom of choice: If one 
assumes that, at least, some randomness is necessary for choices to be truly free, these results 
and their strongest interpretation would not be problematic whatsoever, even expected and 
encouraging for this use of free choice tasks. If, on the other hand, one assumes that 
randomness is in contradiction with intentional actions, as it lacks any expression of directed 
will, it would render free choice tasks an untenable operationalization of this type of action. 
Either way it is necessary to be open about these assumptions, for reasons of both clarity of 
the theoretical constructs one is working with and of clarity of communication, so that readers 
of research can categorize the definitions for themselves.  
Another important point to keep in mind here is that while the present work, most 
specifically in Study 3, mainly investigated whether free choice tasks are random generation 
tasks, but not necessarily whether or not responses to these tasks are, in fact, random (or, in 
other words, unpredictable). However, the issue of randomness and predictability of free 
choices is one empirically touched upon both here and in other works. One example here are 
Lages and Jaworska (2012), who used multivariate pattern analysis, a type of machine 
learning, to predict free choice responses with better than chance accuracy (note that the 
timing for the responses was unspecific and instructed as “when participants felt the urge to 
do so” (p. 2), similarly to Libet et al. (1983)). If supposedly free choices can be predicted, 
they cannot be entirely random. But again, the deeper implications of this for the use of free 
choice tasks are entirely dependent on the assumptions one has about them. 
But maybe there is a criterion, at least for empirical psychologists, to decide between 
those premises: The endeavor of describing and explaining phenomena in a scientific manner, 
at its practical core, runs counter to the idea of fundamentally unpredictable phenomena (for a 
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similar discussion, see Prinz, 2004, which has a stronger focus on free will as opposed to free 
choice). The attempt may not succeed, but without the assumption that it is, at least in 
principle, even if not practically, possible to explain a phenomenon, it would be moot to even 
try. Therefore, people who try to do this, may be inclined towards deterministic ideas of 
voluntary action. Whether this is true, is, of course, an empirical question. 
Freedom of choice: Multiple concepts within one term? I will end this discussion with 
an appeal. I claim that the term freedom of choice is not a useful (or even clearly defined) 
psychological concept and should be abandoned and replaced with multiple other terms. I 
argue that this term actually refers to multiple, different concepts that fall under the umbrellas 
of (1) freedom as the presence of viable options and (2) freedom as expressions of one’s own 
will. While these two categories of concepts are not necessarily mutually exclusive, their 
focuses are distinct and they lead to different questions. For the former class, the amount of 
different response options (including the response but also potentially including the time of 
the response, such as in Libet et al., 1983) that fulfill a given goal are critical, be they the 
different buttons in a free choice task experiment, several brands of identical-seeming paper 
towels in a store or something else. It lends itself well to being operationalized in a laboratory, 
as its focus is on the environment in which an action is performed. The latter class, on the 
other hand, is not just about the context of an action but about a subjective experience, an 
attribution, of the goal of an action (see e.g., Chapter 2 of Prinz, 2004, for a discussion of 
related conceptualizations of the self and free will). Here it matters more, for example, how 
much a person identifies with the action goals that drive an action and how much the person 
attributes the action to themselves. 
It is important to be mindful and explicit about which type of concept one wants to 
investigate, as the two represent very different phenomena. Free choice tasks as understood 
here, for example, would clearly operationalize category (1) but it is dubious at best to what 
extent being allowed to press either a left or a right button represents the own will of the 
participants in the sense of category (2) better than being allowed only one of these options at 
a time. Similarly, it is difficult to gauge to what extent participants’ “urge” to give a response 
in Libet et al.’s (1983) study was their own or an artifact of the instructions given. Changing 
the focus away from freedom and towards these more specific definitions also entirely 
bypasses the discussion of randomness and how it relates to freedom of choice (or at least 
puts it in a framework founded on psychological theories instead of ontological assumptions, 
the former of which are much easier agreed upon). 
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8.3 Summary 
The aim of the present work was to investigate the nature of the free choice task and 
contrast it with that of the forced choice task. In three studies, it was shown that free choice 
tasks do not lead to a type of conflict adaptation that reduces the BCE, that within a sequential 
sampling framework the slower responses in free choice tasks than in forced choice tasks can 
be attributed to a longer non-accumulation time instead of a dearth of evidence for one 
response or the other and that free choice tasks are affected like random generation tasks by 
working memory load manipulations, suggesting that random response generation is a 
component of the free choice task. 
Future research should focus on integrating seemingly contradictory results in the 
literature, potentially by creating a unified formal model of free and forced choice tasks. 
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Abstract 
In dual-task situations, mutual interference phenomena are often observed. One particularly 
interesting example of such phenomena is that even Task 1 performance is improved if Task 2 
requires a compatible (e.g., both responses are given on the left side) instead of an incompatible 
response (e.g., one response is given on the right side, and the other on the left side). This is 
called the compatibility-based backward crosstalk effect (BCE). In a previous paper, we 
observed support for a critical role of stimulus-response (S-R) links in causing this effect: the 
BCE was smaller when one of the two tasks was a free choice task. However, an alternative 
explanation for this observation is that free choice tasks lead to immediate conflict adaptation, 
thereby reducing the interference from the other task. In the present two experiments, we tested 
this explanation by varying the amount of conflict assumed to be induced by a free choice task 
either sequentially (Exp. 1) or block-wise (Exp. 2). While we replicated a sequential modulation 
of the BCE with two forced choice tasks, we observed (1) no reduction of the BCE induced by 
(compatible) free choice trials nor (2) an effect of block-wise manipulations of the frequency 
of free choice trials on the size of the BCE. Thus, while the BCE is sensitive to sequential 
modulations induced by the (in)compatibility of two forced choice responses, which might 
point to conflict adaptation, the reduced BCE in dual-task situations involving a free choice 
task is likely due to its weaker S-R links. 
 
Keywords: conflict adaptation ; backward crosstalk effect ; free choice tasks ; dual-task 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Dual-Tasking and the Backward Crosstalk Effect. When humans work on two tasks 
simultaneously, performance in one or both tasks usually becomes worse. These dual-task costs 
can be influenced in various ways, depending on the tasks’ specific characteristics. In the case 
that characteristics of Task 2 performance influence even performance in Task 1, this is called 
a backward crosstalk effect (BCE). The example we investigate here is based on spatial 
compatibility between the responses required in both tasks: If both tasks require spatially 
compatible responses (e.g., a manual left button press in Task 1 followed by a left pedal button 
press or a “left” vocal response in Task 2), response times (RTs) in Task 1 are shorter in 
comparison to trials with spatially incompatible responses (e.g., a manual left button press 
followed by a right pedal button or a “right” vocal response). This is the compatibility-based 
BCE, which was first demonstrated by Hommel (1998; see also Ellenbogen & Meiran 2008, 
2011; Giammarco, Thomson, & Watter 2014; Hommel & Eglau 2002; Janczyk, Pfister, 
Hommel, & Kunde 2014; Janczyk, Renas, & Durst 2018; Lien & Proctor 2002; Renas, Durst, 
& Janczyk 2017; Watter & Logan 2006). 
Such observations are difficult to reconcile with the broadly accepted central bottleneck 
theory of dual-tasking. This theory assumes that task processing comprises three stages: A pre-
central perceptual stage, a central response selection stage, and a post-central motor stage. The 
central response selection stage is conceived as the only stage incapable of parallel processing 
and interaction with other stages of its kind, hence the term bottleneck (Pashler 1984, 1994). In 
other words, response selection in Task 2 can only start when response selection in Task 1 has 
finished and the bottleneck becomes again available. However, the existence of BCEs has 
challenged this idea. It was argued that some response selection related processes in Task 2 
must already be ongoing even during Task 1 response selection. Thus, some authors argued to 
split the response selection stage into two stages: (1) A first stage of response activation, capable 
of being processed in parallel with other stages and interacting with them (and thus being the 
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stage where the BCE results from) and (2) a bottleneck stage of (final) response selection 
(Hommel 1998; Hommel & Eglau 2002; Lien & Proctor 2002). Recently, other authors have 
argued, however, that automatic Task 2 response activation directly affects Task 1 response 
selection (Janczyk et al. 2018; Thomson, Danis, & Watter 2015).  
In most studies on the BCE, both component tasks were forced choice tasks, which 
means that for every presented stimulus exactly one response is considered correct. A different 
type of task is the free choice task, in which for one stimulus, two (or more) responses are 
considered equally valid (Berlyne 1957). Typically, these free choice tasks are accompanied by 
the instruction to try to respond with both responses about equally often and to avoid obvious 
patterns in the responses. A typical observation are longer RTs in free than in forced choice 
tasks. There are multiple explanations for this observation: Some have attributed it to different 
modes of sensorimotor integration (i.e., intention-based vs. stimulus-based actions; see Herwig, 
Prinz, & Waszak 2007). Others have ascribed this RT difference to implementation intentions 
(Gollwitzer 1999) that do not exist for free choice tasks, but only for forced choice tasks 
(Janczyk, Dambacher, Bieleke, & Gollwitzer 2015a). Implementation intention here means that 
participants form an “if-then” plan on how to achieve the goal in question. In the case of forced 
choice tasks, this may, for example, be “If I see a red stimulus, I press the left button”. Such 
plans are assumed to facilitate early perceptual processing for forced choice stimuli, resulting 
in the observed RT difference. Naefgen, Dambacher, and Janczyk (2017b) looked at the RT 
difference from a sequential sampling perspective. In such a framework, information is noisily 
accumulated at some speed over time until it reaches a threshold, which initiates giving a 
response. Within this framework, they manipulated the decision thresholds and provided 
evidence for longer phases in which no information is accumulated in free choice tasks when 
compared to forced choice tasks, which may be devoted to random generation in the free choice 
task (Naefgen & Janczyk 2018). Moreover, in line with these latter studies that attribute the RT 
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difference to a process outside response selection, both free and forced choice tasks are similarly 
affected by dual-task interference (Janczyk, Nolden, & Jolicoeur 2015b).  
In a recent study, we compared the size of the BCE between conditions in which one of 
the two tasks was either a free choice task or a forced choice task (Naefgen, Caissie, & Janczyk 
2017a). We assumed that free choice tasks entail weaker stimulus-response (S-R) links than 
forced choice tasks do: Even if in free choice tasks S-R links are formed, they would be less 
consistent and therefore weaker than in forced choice tasks. S-R links (or more precisely: 
automatic S-R translations occurring in Task 2) have been proposed as the mechanism leading 
to the BCE by various authors (Hommel 1998; Hommel & Eglau 2002; Janczyk et al. 2018; 
Lien & Proctor 2002). The general observation in the study by Naefgen et al. was a smaller 
BCE when one of the tasks was a free choice task – a result that would be consistent with the 
assumption of weaker S-R links in the free choice task.  
1.2 Cognitive Conflict and Control. Berlyne (1957) already conceptualized free choice 
tasks as response-response (R-R) conflict-laden tasks. Essentially, whenever a free choice 
stimulus is presented, the (two) response options compete with each other. In order to produce 
a response, some sort of conflict resolution needs to take place. This view suggests an 
alternative explanation for our earlier observation of a smaller BCE with free choice tasks as 
Task 1 (see also the General Discussion in Naefgen et al. 2017a): In particular, the smaller BCE 
may in fact also result from conflict adaptation. In other words, encountering a free choice task 
may result in (cognitive) conflict which then leads to immediate processes of conflict adaptation 
which reduce the impact of Task 2 on Task 1 performance.  
Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen’s (2001) conflict-monitoring theory posits 
that cognitive control is determined by conflict monitoring and arises whenever conflict is 
detected. In particular, it suggests that conflict arises and leads to increases in cognitive control 
mechanisms in conflict tasks (e.g., Stroop tasks), but also in underdetermined tasks (e.g., such 
as the free choice task investigated here; cf. Exp. 2 from Frith, Friston, Liddle, & Frackowiak 
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1991, who used a similar task and observed that it activates the anterior cingulate cortex, which 
Botvinick et al. identified as involved in cognitive control),. These mechanism can, for example, 
be an increased focus on task-relevant features (Botvinick et al. 2001) or a suppression of task-
irrelevant information (Janczyk & Leuthold 2018; Stürmer & Leuthold 2003; Stürmer, 
Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer 2002). 
One particularly important effect in support of this theory is the sequential modulation 
of the congruency effect observed in conflict tasks. For example, in the Eriksen flanker task 
(Eriksen & Eriksen 1974), a central stimulus is flanked by task-irrelevant stimuli that are either 
congruent (i.e., they suggest the same response option as the central stimulus) or incongruent 
(i.e., they suggest the other response option). Responses to congruently flanked stimuli are 
generally faster than responses to incongruently flanked stimuli (the congruency effect). 
Importantly, the size of this congruency effect depends on the congruency status of the 
preceding Trial n-1 with larger congruency effects following congruent than following 
incongruent Trials n-1; a sequential modulation sometimes referred to as the Gratton effect 
(Gratton, Coles, & Donchin 1992). Similar results are also obtained for other conflict tasks 
(Simon task: Akçay, & Hazeltine 2007; Dignath, Janczyk, & Eder 2017; Stroop: Mayr, & Awh 
2009; Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen, & Liefooghe 2006), and also occur for the BCE which 
is only observed following compatible Trials n-1 (Janczyk 2016; Renas et al. 2017; Scherbaum, 
Gottschalk, Dshemuchadse, & Fischer 2015; see also Schuch, Dignath, Steinhauser, & Janczyk 
2018). Importantly for the present purposes, it has been shown that adaptation to cognitive 
conflict can happen even within one trial (Goschke & Dreisbach 2008; Scherbaum, Fischer, 
Dshemuchadse, & Goschke 2011). Thus, it is in fact possible that R-R conflict occurring upon 
encountering a free choice task (Berlyne 1957) could have affected the size of the BCE by way 
of immediate conflict adaptation in our previous experiments (Naefgen et al. 2017a). For an 
illustration of how different kinds of conflict (could) affect the size of the BCE, see Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of possible different kinds of conflicts in the backward crosstalk paradigm. In the first row 
(a), conflict arises from incompatible Task 1 and Task 2 responses. In the second row (b), conflict arises from the 
free choice Task 1 (indicated by the double-headed arrow). In the third row (c), no conflict is present. In cases 
where conflict occurred in Trial n-1 a smaller BCE is expected in Trial n than when there was no conflict present 
in Trial n-1.  
 
With the present study we aim to address (and rule out) this alternative explanation. To 
this end, we manipulated the level of conflict in two BCE experiments. In Experiment 1, we 
manipulated the degree of conflict in a previous dual-task trial; that is, in Trial n-1, and focused 
on the size of the following BCE. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the conflict level block-
wise, by varying the proportion of trials in which the first task was a free choice task.  
 
2. Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 employed a standard BCE paradigm with the simultaneous onset of two stimuli 
(the color and the identity of a letter, see Figure 2 for an illustration). Task 1 responses were 
manual left/right key presses, and Task 2 responses were left/right foot pedal presses. 
Unbeknown to the participants, trials were presented in pairs of a prime and a test trial. We 
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systematically manipulated the type of Task 1 in the prime trials (free vs. forced choice) and, in 
case of forced choice Task 1s (50 % of the prime trials, 100 % of the test trials), the compatibility 
relation between both responses. Half of the forced choice prime trials preceding each 
compatible and incompatible test trials were compatible; the other half was incompatible. This 
experimental setup produced data that are similar in nature to Experiment 1 from Naefgen et al. 
(2017a). However, presenting the trials in pairs allowed us to achieve roughly equal numbers 
of trials in the relevant design cells. (Note that for free choice tasks some variance between 
participants regarding the proportions of compatible and incompatible trials is to be expected.) 
The critical analyses focused on the size of the BCE in test trials as a function of the nature of 
the prime trial. The first prediction concerns trials where Task 1 in the prime trial was a forced 
choice task. Here, we expect to replicate the observation of Janczyk (2016) that the BCE is 
smaller or absent following incompatible trials and large following compatible trials. The 
critical comparison is the one between these latter trials and trials where Task 1 in the prime 
trial was a free choice task and participants responded in a compatible way. If the free choice 
task in fact induces cognitive conflict that leads to initiation of adaptation processes, we expect 
a smaller BCE after compatible free choice prime trials than after compatible forced choice 
prime trials. If, however, differences in the strength of S-R links are important, the size of the 
BCE in the test trial is expected similar in test trials following compatible forced choice and 
compatible free choice prime trials. As there were no predictions concerning trials where the 
prime trials was a free choice and participants responded in an incompatible way, these trials 
were not included in the main analyses reported here. However, analyses of the full 2 × 2 × 2 
design are provided in the Appendix for completeness. 
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Figure 2. Illustration of a pair of trials in Experiment 1. The red S is the prime trial stimulus and the blue X is the 
test trial stimulus. In this exemplary stimulus mapping, a red stimulus instructs the participant to give a right 
manual response (prime trial Task 1) and an S stimulus instructs the participants to give a right pedal response 
(prime trial Task 2). A blue stimulus on the other hand instructs a left response (test trial Task 1) and an X stimulus 
instructs a left pedal response (test trial Task 2). Therefore, this example illustrates a compatible forced choice test 
trial (as both responses are on the left side) following a compatible forced choice prime trial (as both responses are 
on the right side). Note that in Experiment 2 the general procedure was the same but there was no distinction 
between prime trials and test trials. 
 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Participants. Thirty-six people from the Tübingen area participated (Mean age = 
22 years, 31 female) for course credit or monetary compensation. All participants reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve regarding the underlying hypotheses, and 
provided written informed consent prior to data collection. 
Data from participants who favored a left manual response in ≤ 15 % or ≥ 85 % of the 
free choice prime trials or whose Task 1 free choice prime trial response were ≤ 15 % 
compatible or ≥ 85 % compatible with the Task 2 response were discarded and replaced with 
data from new participants (n = 11). 
2.1.2 Apparatus and stimuli. Stimulus presentation and response collection were 
controlled by a PC connected to a 17-inch CRT monitor. Stimuli were colored letters, that is, 
the letters ‘X’ and ‘S’ presented in red, green, or blue color. In particular, Task 1 stimuli (S1) 
were the respective colors, and Task 2 stimuli (S2) were the letter identities. Stimuli were 
presented against a black background. Manual responses in Task 1 (R1) were collected with 
two custom-built response keys placed on a table to the left and right of the participants. Foot 
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pedal responses in Task 2 (R2) were given on response keys placed under the left and right foot 
of the participants in a position that allowed them to sit in a comfortable position.  
2.1.3 Tasks and procedure. Task 1 was either to give a predefined R1 in response to two 
of the possible colors (forced choice task) or to freely choose one of the possible responses in 
response to the third color (free choice task). Task 2 was to give R2 in response to the letter 
identity (thus Task 2 was always forced choice). A trial began with the presentation of a small 
fixation cross (250 ms), followed by a blank screen (250 ms) and the letter stimulus onset. The 
stimulus remained on screen until both responses were made. A trial was cancelled if no 
response was given within 2500 ms after stimulus onset. General errors (no response, response 
too early, wrong response order) and erroneous responses in one or both tasks were fed back 
(1000 ms), and the next trial started after an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1000 ms. Trials were 
(without the participants’ knowledge) presented in pairs, with the first trial in each pair being 
the prime and the second being the test trial. In half of the prime trials, Task 1 was a free choice 
task, in the other half a forced choice task. In test trials, Task 1 was always forced choice. 
 Following ten randomly drawn practice trial pairs (not analyzed), nine blocks of 32 trial 
pairs each were administered; the first two of these blocks were excluded from the analyses as 
practice. The 32 trial pairs per block represent the combination of the different stimuli that can 
occur in prime and the test trial, with the free choice stimulus appearing twice as the prime 
trial’s S1: 4 (Prime S1: free choice, free choice, forced choice left, and forced choice right) × 2 
(Prime S2: forced choice left and right) × 2 (Test S1: Forced choice left and right) × 2 (Test S2: 
Forced choice left and right). These trial pairs were presented in a random order. 
Participants were tested individually in one single session of about 45 minutes. Written 
instructions emphasized speed and accuracy and, for the free choice trials, an even distribution 
of left and right responses as well as avoiding patterns to maintain this distribution. Participants 
were also instructed to always give first R1 and then R2. The mappings of stimuli to 
tasks/responses were counterbalanced across participants.  
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2.1.4 Design and analyses. Only test trials following entirely correct prime trials were 
considered for analyses. A trial was considered compatible when both R1 and R2 were given 
on the same side; otherwise, a trial was incompatible. 
Test trials with general errors were excluded first (wrong response, no response, 
response too early, wrong response order). Further, to control for possible response grouping 
(e.g., Miller & Ulrich 2008; Ulrich & Miller 2008), only trials were analyzed where both 
responses were separated by an inter-response interval (IRI) of at least 50 ms (excluding 1.2 % 
of trials; using IRIs of 100 ms and 150 ms changed none of the significance patterns). For RT 
analyses, we considered only test trials in which both R1 and R2 were correct, and trials were 
further excluded as outliers if RTs deviated more than 2.5 SDs from the respective cell mean 
(calculated separately for each participant). 
The two independent variables of interest were: (1) R1-R2 compatibility in the test trial 
(compatible vs. incompatible) and (2) the conflict level in the prime trial (forced choice 
incompatible vs. forced choice compatible vs. free choice compatible). RT and error data were 
analyzed with two orthogonal Helmert contrasts on the variable conflict level and its interaction 
with the variable compatibility in the test trial. For the latter we expected a main effect. Contrast 
1 coded incompatible forced choice primes against the other two levels and we expected an 
interaction of this contrast with test trial compatibility (revealing the sequential modulation 
observed, e.g., in Janczyk 2016). Contrast 2 then coded compatible forced choice primes against 
compatible free choice primes. If the free choice prime induced some sort of conflict adaption, 
this should yield a decreased BCE in the test trial, and thus an interaction of this contrast with 
the test compatibility. Both RTs and percentages of errors (PEs) in Task 1 were analyzed with 
this approach. Task 2 results are provided in the Appendix. 
Lastly, analyzing the proportion of compatible (Task 1) response choices in prime trials 
involving a free choice task, gave the opportunity to replicate the observations in Naefgen et al. 
(2017a, Experiments 1 and 2) that the choice in a free choice task is influenced by the response 
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required in a subsequent forced choice task. In particular, participants’ choices were biased 
towards choosing a compatible response. 
2.3. Results and discussion 
In the free choice tasks, participants chose the left key on average 43.8 % of the time 
(Range 18.0-80.7 %), which is significantly different from 50 %, t(35) = -2.25, p = .031, d = -
0.53. 
 Mean correct RTs in Task 1 (2.14 % excluded as outliers) are visualized in Figure 3 and 
are summarized in Table 1. Responses were faster in compatible trials than in incompatible 
trials, t(35) = 6.47, p < .001, showing an overall BCE. Both contrasts were significant, Contrast 
1: t(35) = 5.50, p < .001; Contrast 2: t(35) = 7.60, p < .001. Most importantly, Contrast 1 
interacted with compatibility in the test trial, t(35) = 10.66, p < .001, whereas Contrast 2 did 
not, t(35) = 0.99, p = .328. 
Paired t-tests indicated significant BCEs for trials preceded by compatible free choice 
trials (129 ms), t(35) = 7.24, p < .001, d = 1.71, as well as preceded by compatible forced choice 
trials (146 ms), t(35) = 10.59, p < .001, d = 2.50. When preceded by incompatible forced choice 
trials, the BCE was reversed (-59 ms), t(35) = -3.96, p < .001, d = -0.93.  
Mean PEs are summarized in Table 1. The compatibility in the test trial, t(35) = 5.28, p 
< .001, had a significant influence on the PEs with – overall – fewer errors in compatible 
compared with incompatible trials. As in the RT analyses, Contrast 1, t(35) = 4.66, p < .001, 
Contrast 2, t(35) = 4.28, p < .001, and the interaction of Contrast 1 with compatibility in the 
test trial, t(35) = 5.47, p < .001, were significant. The interaction of Contrast 2 and compatibility 
was not significant, t(35) = 0.03, p = .974. Paired t-tests indicated significant differences in PEs 
between compatible and incompatible test trials when preceded by compatible free choice 
primes, t(35) = 5.57, p < .001, d = 1.31, and compatible forced choices primes, t(35) = 6.13, p 
< .001, d = 1.45, but not for trials preceded by incompatible forced choice primes, t(35) = -0.97, 
p = .339, d = -0.23.  
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The last analysis focused on prime trials involving a free choice Task 1 (2.86 % outliers). 
In these trials, participants chose the same response location as required in Task 2, thus a 
compatible choice, in 58.9 % of trials. This value is significantly different from 50 %, t(35) = 
4.72, p < .001, d = 1.11.  
 
Figure 3. Mean correct response times from Task 1 (RT1) of Experiments 1 and 2 as a function of prime trial 
conflict type (Experiment 1) and percentage of free choice trials in a block (Experiment 2) and R1-R2 
compatibility. Error bars are 95 % within-subject confidence intervals calculated separately for each prime trial 
conflict type in Experiment 1 and separately for each percentage level of free choice trials in a block in Experiment 
2 (see Pfister & Janczyk 2013). 
 
Table 1. Mean correct response times (RT1) in milliseconds and percentages of errors (PE1) from Task 1 of 
Experiment 1 as a function of prime trial conflict type and R1-R2 compatibility in the test trial. The BCE (backward 
crosstalk effect) row reports the difference between the mean of the compatible and incompatible trials. 
 Prime trial conflict Type 
R1-R2 com-
patibility 
Forced choice incom-
patible 
Forced choice compati-
ble 
Free choice compati-
ble 
 RT1 PE1 RT1 PE1 RT1 PE1 
incompatible 563 3.7 676 11.3 744 15.2 
compatible 622 5.4 530 1.2 615 5.2 
BCE -59 -1.7 146 10.1 129 10.0 
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In sum, this experiment yields two main results. First, we replicated the smaller (or even 
inversed) BCE following incompatible trials (Janczyk 2016), thus a sequential modulation 
revealing conflict adaptations. Second, however, the BCE in the test trial was not smaller 
following a compatible free choice than following a compatible forced choice prime trial. Such 
a reduction would have been predicted if the smaller BCEs with free choice tasks (Naefgen et 
al. 2017a) were due to (immediate) conflict adaptations triggered by the free choice task. Thus, 
from Experiment 1 we tentatively conclude that the diminished BCE observed with free choice 
tasks in Naefgen et al. did not arise from immediate conflict adaptation processes triggered 
upon encountering a free choice task. Experiment 2 further investigates this with a different 
approach.  
The choice results for the free choices in prime trials replicate the observations reported 
in Naefgen et al. (2017a) that the choice in a free choice task is biased by a subsequent Task 2 
forced choice response toward a compatible response. This lends additional credibility to the 
idea discussed there that free choice task choices are biased both by preceding primes (see also 
Kiesel, Wagener, Kunde, Hoffmann, Fallgatter, & Stöcker 2006, and Mattler & Palmer 2012) 
but also by subsequent ‘primes’ such as the forced choice Task 2 in the present study. 
 
3. Experiment 2 
In addition to the congruency status of the immediately preceding trial, the proportion of 
congruent trials modulates the size of congruency effects which become larger with an 
increasing proportion of congruent trials in a block. This observation is called the list-wide 
proportion congruency (LWPC) effect (Gratton el al. 1992; for a review, see Bugg & Crump 
2012). A variant of this effect is the context-specific proportion congruency (CSPC) effect 
(Crump, Gong, & Milliken 2006), where the proportion of congruent trials is manipulated as a 
function of context (e.g., location), while the overall proportion of congruent and incongruent 
trials is 50 % each. Fischer, Gottschalk, and Dreisbach (2014) reported that the BCE indeed is 
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sensitive to CSPC manipulations (see also Fischer & Dreisbach 2015, who used Task 1 stimuli 
that conveyed information about the stimulus onset asynchrony and reported a reduced BCE 
when Task 1 predicted a short SOA). Assuming that the reduced impact of incompatible 
information under conditions with high proportions of incongruent information is due to an 
adaptation of how much ‘irrelevant’ information (as this is in part determined by how irrelevant 
the information actually is) is used (see Botvinick et al. 2001; Schmidt 2013), a similar 
adaptation to varying proportions of free choice trials should be observed if free choice tasks 
also induce (R-R) conflict.  
Experiment 2 therefore employed the same BCE paradigm as Experiment 1 with the 
following differences: Trials were no longer presented in pairs. The critical variables 
manipulated were the proportion of free choice trials in a block (75 % vs. 50 % vs. or 25 %) 
and the compatibility of R1 and R2. Over the course of a block, participants should adapt to the 
proportion of free choice trials they are confronted with. In particular, a higher percentage of 
free choice trials should lead to higher perceived conflict, which in turn should strengthen 
conflict adaptation. In other words, if the reduced BCE in Naefgen et al. (2017a) was indeed 
due to R-R conflict-induced conflict adaptation, higher percentages of free choice trials in a 
block should lead to adaptation to this conflict, and thus to smaller BCEs in the trials where 
both Task 1 and 2 were forced choice of the same block. 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants. Thirty-six people from the Tübingen area participated (Mean age = 
23 years, 27 female) for course credit or monetary compensation. All participants reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve regarding the underlying hypotheses, and 
provided written informed consent prior to data collection. 
Data from participants who favored a left manual response in ≤ 15 % or ≥ 85 % of the 
free choice trials were discarded and replaced with data from new participants (n = 5). 
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3.1.2 Apparatus and stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 
1. 
2.1.3 Tasks and procedure. The general procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 
except that trials were not presented in pairs. Again, only Task 1 could be free choice. After a 
practice block of ten trials (excluded from the analysis), three sets of six blocks of 32 trials were 
presented. Each set of six blocks comprised one of the levels of the free choice frequency 
manipulation in Task 1 (25 % [or 8 per block] vs. 50 % [or 16 per block] vs. 75 % [or 24 per 
block]). The order of the three sets of blocks was counterbalanced across participants and trials 
within each block appeared in a randomized order. The 32 trials in each block result from the 
combination of even numbers of the types of forced choice trials and the respective percentage 
of free choice trials. 
Participants were tested individually in one single session of about 45 minutes. Written 
instructions emphasized speed and accuracy and, for the free choice trials, an even distribution 
of left and right responses as well as avoiding patterns to maintain this distribution. Participants 
were also instructed to always give first R1 and then R2. The mappings of stimuli to 
tasks/responses were counterbalanced across participants.  
2.1.4 Design and analyses. Only trials where both Task 1 and Task 2 were forced choice 
tasks were considered for the main analyses. 
Two independent variables were varied within participants: (1) R1-R2 compatibility 
(compatible vs. incompatible; for forced choice Task 1 trials this could be manipulated by the 
experimenters) and (2) the amount of free choice Task 1 trials in the block (25 % vs. 50 % vs. 
75 %). Accordingly, RTs and PEs from Task 1 were mainly analyzed in terms of a 2 × 3 ANOVA. 
Trials with general errors were excluded first (wrong response, no response, response too early, 
wrong response order). Again, only trials were analyzed where both responses were separated 
by an IRI of at least 50 ms (excluding 1.4 % of trials; using IRIs of 100 ms and 150 ms changed 
none of the significance patterns). For RT analyses, only trials in which both R1 and R2 were 
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correct were considered, and trials were excluded as outliers if RTs deviated more than 2.5 SDs 
from the respective cell mean (calculated separately for each participant). When the assumption 
of sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied and the respective ε is 
reported. Results for Task 2 are reported in the Appendix. 
In addition, the 50 % free choice blocks offered an opportunity to replicate the results 
from Naefgen et al. (2017a, Exp. 1 and 2), where we observed a smaller BCE when T1 was a 
free choice task. Accordingly, a 2 × 2 ANOVA with compatibility and task type as repeated 
measures was performed on RT1 for data from these blocks. As there cannot be errors in a free 
choice task, PEs in Task 1 were analyzed with a paired t-test for Task 1 forced choice trials. 
As in Experiment 1, we again took the opportunity to replicate the observations reported 
in Naefgen et al. (2017a, Experiments 1 and 2) that the choice in a free choice task is influenced 
by the required response in a subsequent forced choice task. 
2.3. Results and discussion 
In the free choice tasks, participants chose the left key on average 45.6 % of the time 
(Range 20.2-80.7 %), which is significantly different from 50 %, t(35) = -2.12, p = .041, d = -
0.50.  
Mean correct RT1s (2.43 % excluded as outliers) are visualized in Figure 3 (right panel) 
and are summarized in Table 2. Responses were faster in compatible trials than in incompatible 
trials, F(1,35) = 38.94, p < .001, ηp² = .53, showing an overall BCE. There also was a significant 
effect of the amount of free choice tasks in a block, F(2,70) = 7.92, p = .001, ηp² = .18 with 
more free choice tasks in a block leading to slower responses. Most importantly, there was no 
significant interaction between compatibility and the amount of free choices, F(2,70) = 0.17, p 
= .802, ηp² < .01, ε = .83.  
Mean PEs are summarized in Table 2. Compatibility had a significant effect on PEs with 
fewer errors in compatible trials, F(1,35) = 23.03, p < .001, ηp² = .40. The main effect of the 
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amount of free choices, F(2,70) = 1.14, p = .319, ηp² = .03, ε = .84, as well as the interaction, 
F(2,70) = 0.14, p = .830, ηp² < .01, ε = .84, were not significant. 
 
Table 2. Mean correct response times (RT1) in milliseconds and percentages of errors (PE1) from Task 1 of 
Experiment 2 as a function of block type and R1-R2 compatibility. The BCE (backward crosstalk effect) row 
reports the difference between the mean of the compatible and incompatible trials. 
 Block Type 
R1-R2 com-
patibility 
25 % Free Choices 50 % Free Choices 75 % Free Choices 
 RT1 PE1 RT1 PE1 RT1 PE1 
incompatible 708 11.3 742 12.4 786 13.2 
compatible 630 4.3 664 4.7 699 5.3 
BCE 78 7.0 78 7.7 87 7.9 
 
For the additional analysis on free choice trials (as done by Naefgen et al. 2017a), mean 
correct RT1s (2.50 % excluded as outliers) are summarized in Table 3. Responses were faster 
in compatible trials than in incompatible trials, F(1,35) = 20.48, p < .001, ηp² = .37, showing an 
overall BCE. RT1s in trials with free choices were shorter than in trials with forced choices, 
F(1,35) = 38.54, p < .001, ηp² = .52. In addition, there was a significant interaction between 
these two factors, F(1,35) = 11.85, p = .002, ηp² = .25, with a smaller BCE in trials with free 
choices. Paired t-tests indicated that there was only a significant BCE for trials with a forced 
choice Task 1, t(35) = 5.83, p < .001, d = 1.37, but not for trials with a free choice Task 1, t(35) 
= 1.21, p = .235, d = 0.28. Fewer errors were made in compatible than in incompatible trials 
(see Table 3), t(35) = 4.07, p < .001, d = 0.96. 
When analyzing data from the trials involving a free choice Task 1 (2.50 % outliers), 
participants chose the same response location as in Task 2, thus a compatible choice, in 59.9 % 
of the Task 1 free choice trials. This value is significantly different from 50 %, t(35) = 5.23, p 
< .001, d = 1.23. Thus, we could again replicate the respective observations reported in Naefgen 
et al. (2017a, Experiments 1 and 2). 
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Table 3. Mean correct response times (RT1) in milliseconds and percentages of errors (PE1) in % from Task 1 of 
Experiment 2 (50 % free choices block) as a function of task type and R1-R2 compatibility. The BCE (backward 
crosstalk effect) row reports the difference between the mean of the compatible and incompatible trials. 
 Trial Type 
R1-R2 compatibility Free Choice Forced Choice 
 RT1 RT1 PE1 
incompatible 624 742 12.4 
compatible 607 665 4.7 
BCE 17 77 7.7 
 
 
In summary, the non-significant interaction in the main analysis suggests that the BCE 
was of the same size irrespective of the amount of free choice trials in a block. In other words, 
a decreasing size of the BCE with increasing proportions of free choice trials (as predicted from 
a conflict adaptation account) was not observed. This result further supports the conclusion 
from Experiment 1. Furthermore, we replicated results reported by Naefgen et al. (2017a, Exp. 
1 and 2) with regards to the reduced BCE when Task 1 is a free choice trial as well as the 
influence of the forced choice Task 2 on the actual choice that is made in the free choice task. 
Interestingly, free choice RTs were also shorter than forced choice RTs. This has also been 
observed in our previous study as well as in other dual-task studies (e.g., Wirth, Janczyk, & 
Kunde 2018). Note, however, that the opposite was true in the dual-task study by Janczyk, 
Nolden et al. (2015).  
 
4. General Discussion 
The present study aimed at testing an alternative explanation for our recent observation 
that the compatibility-based BCE in dual-tasking is smaller when Task 1 is a free choice task 
(Naefgen et al. 2017a). We attributed this result to weaker S-R links in free compared with 
forced choice tasks, but suspected that it may alternatively result from immediate conflict 
adaptation when participants encountered a free choice Task 1. In two experiments, we 
examined the size of the BCE depending on the conflict level of the preceding trial (Experiment 
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1) or the amount of free choice Task 1 trials in a block (Experiment 2). If the alternative 
explanation were true, we expected smaller BCEs in cases with larger potential conflict. 
4.1. Summary of results 
In both experiments, we first replicated the standard R1-R2 compatibility-based BCE 
(e.g., Hommel 1998; Janczyk et al. 2018). Second, in Experiment 1 we also replicated the 
results reported in Janczyk (2016) that the BCE is large in trials following compatible trials and 
small/absent or even reversed following an incompatible forced choice trial. Third, we were 
also able to replicate the observation reported in Naefgen et al. (2017a) that the BCE was 
smaller in free choice Task 1 RTs, but that the actual choices were biased into a compatible 
direction by the forced choice Task 2 (Experiments 1 and 2). Most importantly, however, we 
observed no difference in the size of the BCE for trials following compatible free choice and 
compatible forced choice trials (Experiment 1), and the proportion of free choice trials in a 
block did not affect the size of the BCE. 
4.2. Limitations and theoretical implications 
Overall, our results replicated critical aspects of the Naefgen et al. (2017a) study and 
they offer support for our original conclusion: the smaller BCE in dual-task trials with one of 
the tasks being a free choice task is likely due to weaker S-R links in this kind of task, rather 
than by an immediate conflict adaptation upon encountering a free choice trial.  
One might object that we did not test for rapid within-trial conflict adaptation in 
Experiment 1 as described by Scherbaum et al. (2011). Perhaps, conflict adaptation occurs very 
rapidly and all consequences vanish immediately after the trial. This, however, is implausible 
as an explanation for the lack of conflict adaptation. While rapid conflict adaptation effects 
were reported for BCE tasks from mouse tracking experiments, nonetheless a sequential 
modulation of the BCE in the subsequent trial occurred (Scherbaum et al. 2015). A potential 
objection to the reasoning behind Experiment 2 is that thus far LWPC effects have not been 
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reported in the context of the BCE. However, Fischer et al. (2014) reported a CSPC modulation 
of the BCE, arguably even stronger evidence for its susceptibility to LWPC-like manipulations.  
The fact that we did not observe any hint of conflict adaptation induced by R-R conflict 
inherent in free choice tasks has theoretical implications. It is of course possible that free choice 
tasks do not create R-R conflict as originally assumed by Berlyne (1957). In this case, of course, 
no conflict adaptation (e.g., in the form of sequential modulations) should occur.  
Alternatively, it is possible that free choice tasks elicit R-R conflict and also conflict 
adaptation but that this conflict adaptation does not generalize to other tasks. This is plausible, 
because for standard conflict tasks a generalization of conflict adaptation from one task to 
another (e.g., from a flanker to a Stroop task) does not always occur (see Braem, Abrahamse, 
Duthoo, & Notebaert 2014, for a review). Further, one may conceive BCE trials with a free 
choice Task 1 as ones instantiating a different context than those with a forced choice Task 1. 
If this were true, a sequence with a prime trial that entailed a free choice Task 1 would mean a 
change of context to the test trial. Indeed, there is some evidence that sequential modulations 
(within dual-task settings) seem to depend on repetitions of task contexts (Fischer, Plessow, 
Kunde, & Kiesel 2010). 
4.3. Conclusion 
We investigated an alternative explanation to reduced S-R links for diminished BCEs in 
dual-task trials involving a free choice trial (Naefgen et al. 2017a). However, we observed no 
evidence supporting the idea that conflict adaptation induced by free choice tasks led to these 
smaller BCEs.  
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5. Appendix 
This Appendix reports the analyses of Task 2 performance in Experiments 1 and 2 (Sections 5.1 
and 5.2) and the full analyses of the 2 × 2 × 2 design employed in Experiment 1 (Section 5.3 
for Task 1 performance and Section 5.4 for Task 2 performance).  
5.1 Experiment 1: Task 2 results. Mean correct RT2s (2.61 % excluded as outliers) are 
summarized in Table A1. Responses were faster in compatible trials than in incompatible trials, 
t(35) = 6.05, p < .001, showing an overall forward crosstalk effect (FCE). Contrast 1 was 
significant, t(35) = 4.30, p < .001, as was Contrast 2, t(35) = 6.07, p < .001. Contrast 1 interacted 
with compatibility, t(35) = 11.61, p < .001 and so did Contrast 2, t(35) = 2.13, p = .040. The 
latter indicating a reduced FCE following compatible free (vs. compatible forced) choice Task 
1 trials. 
Paired t-tests indicated significant FCEs for trials following compatible free choice 
prime trials, t(35) = 7.14, p < .001, d = 1.68, as well as compatible forced choice prime trials, 
t(35) = 10.38, p < .001, d = 2.45. Following incompatible forced choice prime trials, the FCE 
was reversed, t(35) = -3.72, p = .001, d = -0.88.  
Mean PE2s are summarized in Table A1. The compatibility in the test trial, t(35) = 3.33, 
p = .002, had a significant influence on the PEs. Furthermore, Contrast 1 was significant, t(35) 
= 3.84, p < .001, while Contrast 2 was not, t(35) = 0.73, p = .469. Contrast 1 interacted with 
compatibility, t(35) = 6.30, p < .001, while Contrast 2 did not t(35) = 0.64, p = .523. For the 
differences in PEs between compatible and incompatible trials, paired t-tests indicated 
significant differences for trials following compatible free, t(35) = 4.13, p < .001, d = 0.97, and 
forced choice prime trials, t(35) = 5.41, p < .001, d = 1.27, as well as, in the other direction, 
those following incompatible forced choice prime trials, t(35) = -3.35, p = .002, d = -0.79.  
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Table A1. Mean correct response times (RT2) in milliseconds and percentages of errors (PE2) from Task 2 of 
Experiment 1 as a function of prime trial conflict type and R1-R2 compatibility. The FCE (forward crosstalk effect) 
row reports the difference between the mean of the compatible and incompatible trials. 
 Prime trial conflict Type 
R1-R2 com-
patibility 
Forced choice in-
compatible 
Forced choice 
compatible 
Free choice 
compatible 
Free choice in-
compatible 
 RT2 PE2 RT2 PE2 RT2 PE2 RT2 PE2 
incompatible 919 2.4 1065 13.1 1124 11.7 1098 8.6 
compatible 994 8.4 864 3.6 967 3.8 1041 5.0 
FCE -75 -6.0 201 9.5 157 7.9 57 3.6 
 
5.2 Experiment 2: Task 2 results. Mean correct Task 2 RTs (2.18 % excluded as outliers) 
are summarized in Table A2. There was a significant FCE, F(1,35) = 38.59, p < .001, ηp² = .97, 
as well as a significant effect of the block type, F(2,70) = 7.94, p = .001, ηp² = .18, but no 
significant interaction, F(2,70) = 0.46, p = .630, ηp² = .01. Paired t-tests indicated significant 
FCEs for all block types, 25 % free choices, t(35) = 5.99, p < .001, d = 1.41; 50 % free choices, 
t(35) = 5.34, p < .001, d = 1.26; and 75 % free choices, t(35) = 4.20, p < .001, d = 0.99. 
Mean PE2s are summarized in Table A2. The compatibility in the test trial had a 
significant effect on PE2s with fewer errors in compatible trials, F(1,35) = 10.53, p = .003, ηp² 
= .23. Neither the block type, F(2,70) = 0.01, p = .985, ηp² < .01, nor its interaction with 
compatibility, F(2,70) = 0.10, p = .905, ηp² < .01, were significant. 
 
Table A2. Mean correct response times (RT2) in milliseconds and percent error (PE2) from Task 2 of Experiment 
2 as a function of block type and R1-R2 compatibility. The FCE (forward crosstalk effect) row reports the 
difference between the mean of the compatible and incompatible trials. 
 Block Type 
R1-R2 com-
patibility 
25 % Free Choices 50 % Free Choices 75 % Free Choices 
 RT2 PE2 RT2 PE2 RT2 PE2 
incompatible 1114 8.2 1163 8.6 1214 8.6 
compatible 1009 4.8 1072 4.7 1102 4.6 
BCE 105 3.4 91 3.9 112 4.0 
 
5.3 Experiment 1, Full Design: Task 1 results. This section describes the Task 1 RTs 
(2.09 % excluded as outliers) and PEs of the full 2 × 2 × 2 (compatibility in the test trial × 
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compatibility in the prime trial × task type in the prime trial) design of Experiment 1. Only test 
trials were used in this analysis. Mean values are summarized in Table A3 There was a 
significant main effect of compatibility in the test trial, F(1,35) = 31.77, p < .001, ηp² = .48, and 
of task type in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 65.61, p < .001, ηp² = .65. There was no main effect of 
compatibility in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 0.03, p = .874, ηp² < .01. There were significant 
interactions between compatibility in the test and in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 92.87, p < .001, 
ηp² = .73, the compatibility in the test trial and the task type in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 4.76, p 
= .036, ηp² = .12, and between all three factors, F(1,35) = 17.75, p < .001, ηp² = .34. There was 
no significant interaction between task type and compatibility in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 2.81, 
p = .103, ηp² = .07. 
For the PE1s, there were main effects for the compatibility in the test trial, F(1,35) = 
12.44, p = .001, ηp² = .26, the compatibility in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 5.01, p = .032, ηp² = 
.13, as well as task type in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 25.69, p < .001, ηp² = .42. There was an 
interaction between compatibility of the test and the prime trial, F(1,35) = 28.71, p < .001, ηp² 
= .45. There was no interaction between the compatibility of the test trial and task type in the 
prime trial, F(1,35) = 0.04, p = .852, ηp² < .01, task type in the prime trial and compatiblility in 
the prime trial, F(1,35) = 0.48, p = .493, ηp² = .01, nor between all three factors, F(1,35) = 0.06, 
p = .815, ηp² < .01. 
 
Table A3. Mean correct response times (RT1) in milliseconds and percentages of errors (PE1) from Task 1 of 
Experiment 1 as a function of prime trial R1-R2 compatibility, prime trial task type, and test trial R1-R2 
compatibility. The BCE row reports the difference between the mean of the compatible and incompatible trials. 
 Prime trial conflict Type 
R1-R2 com-
patibility 
Forced choice 
incompatible 
Forced choice 
compatible 
Free choice 
compatible 
Free choice incom-
patible 
 RT1 PE1 RT1 PE1 RT1 PE1 RT1 PE1 
incompatible 563 3.7 676 11.3 744 15.2 704 7.3 
compatible 622 5.4 530 1.2 615 5.2 680 8.5 
BCE -59 -1.7 146 10.1 129 10.0 24 -1.2 
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5.4 Experiment 1, Full Design: Task 2 results. This section describes the Task 2 RTs 
(2.45 % excluded as outliers) and PEs of the full 2 × 2 × 2 (compatibility in the test trial × 
compatibility in the prime trial × task type in the prime trial) design of Experiment 1. Only test 
trials were used in this analysis. Mean values are summarized in Table A1. There was a 
significant main effect of compatibility in the test trial, F(1,35) = 32.48, p < .001, ηp² = .48, and 
task type in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 57.53, p < .001, ηp² = .62. There was no main effect of 
compatibility in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 0.91, p = .346, ηp² = .03. There were significant 
interactions between compatibility in the test and the prime trial, F(1,35) = 103.50, p < .001, 
ηp² = .75, the compatibility in the test trial and task type in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 5.97, p = 
.020, ηp² = .15, and all three factors, F(1,35) = 29.99, p < .001, ηp² = .46. There was no significant 
interaction between compatibility and task type in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 3.44, p = .072, ηp² 
= .09. 
For the PE2s, there were main effects for the compatibility in the test trial, F(1,35) = 
12.33, p = .001, ηp² = .26, and the compatibility in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 10.28, p = .003, ηp² 
= .23. There were significant interactions between compatibility in the test and in the prime 
trial, F(1,35) = 33.38, p < .001, ηp² = .49, the compatibility in the test trial and task type in the 
prime trial, F(1,35) = 10.43, p = .003, ηp² = .23, the compatibility and task type in the prime 
trial, F(1,35) = 6.08, p = .019, ηp² = .15, as well as all three factors, F(1,35) = 11.45, p = .002, 
ηp² = .25. There was no main effect for task type in the prime trial, F(1,35) = 0.37, p = .548, ηp² 
= .01. 
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Appendix B – Study 2 
 
The following represents the article described in Chapter 6. Springer Nature granted the 
license to reproduce the final author's accepted manuscript here.  
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Abstract 
Response times (RTs) for free choice tasks are usually longer than those for forced choice tasks. 
We examined the cause for this difference in a study with intermixed free and forced choice 
trials, and adopted the rationale of sequential sampling frameworks to test two alternative 
accounts: Longer RTs in free choices are caused (1) by lower rates of information accumulation, 
or (2) by additional cognitive processes that delay the start of information accumulation. In 
three experiments, we made these accounts empirically discriminable by manipulating decision 
thresholds via the frequency of catch trials (Exp. 1) or via inducing time pressure (Exp. 2 and 
3). Our results supported the second account, suggesting a temporal delay of information 
accumulation in free choice tasks, while the accumulation rate remains comparable. We propose 
that response choice in both tasks relies on information accumulation towards a specific goal. 
While in forced choice tasks, this goal is externally determined by the stimulus, in free choice 
tasks it needs to be generated internally, which requires additional time. 
 
Key words: Free choice ; Forced choice ; Sequential-sampling ; Response threshold  
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Why free choices take longer than forced choices: Evidence from response threshold 
manipulations 
In 1980 the New Wave band Devo claimed that “freedom of choice is what [we] got” and that 
“freedom from choice is what [we] want”. Indeed, it appears that a lack of freedom is what we 
want in order to speed up our decisions: an increase in choice options can slow down decisions, 
which has been shown in situations ranging from complex decision making contexts (e.g., 
Hanoch, Wood, Barnes, Liu, & Rice, 2011) to minimalist laboratory experimental setups (e.g., 
Merkel, 1885). A specific example of these latter setups are comparisons between so-called 
forced choice and free choice tasks (Berlyne, 1957). 
Forced choice and free choice tasks and their use in research. In the simplest version 
of forced and free choice tasks (see, e.g., Berlyne, 1957), participants have two response options 
(e.g., a left and a right key) and are confronted with three different stimuli (e.g., letters or color 
patches). Participants are instructed to respond to two of these stimuli with prescribed responses 
(e.g., red → left key press; blue → right key press) – the forced choice task. In case of the third 
stimulus (e.g., white), in contrast, they can choose “freely” from the two response options – the 
free choice task5.  
Notably, and of particular importance to the present study, the vast majority of studies 
comparing forced and free choice tasks report shorter response times (RTs) in forced choice 
compared with free choice tasks (e.g., Berlyne, 1957; Janczyk, Nolden, & Jolicoeur, 2015). It 
is the purpose of the present study to elucidate where this RT difference results from. 
One interpretation of the RT difference is that both tasks differ in terms of their 
underlying response/action selection systems or processes. In this vein, free and forced choice 
                                                 
5  It should be noted that this freedom of choice is often constrained to some degree by 
instructions such as “choose both response options about equally often”. 
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tasks have often been used to operationalize qualitatively different self-generated (or 
intentional, internally generated, intention-based, voluntary) and externally-triggered (or 
stimulus-based) actions (e.g., Brass & Haggard, 2008; Herwig, Prinz, & Waszak, 2007; 
Passingham, Bengtsson, & Lau, 2010; Keller et al., 2006; Waszak et al., 2005). Evidence for 
such a distinction comes, for example, from research on learning and using associations 
between bodily movements and their environmental consequences (i.e., their action effects), a 
field that was inspired by Ideomotor Theory (e.g., Harleß, 1861; Greenwald, 1970; Shin, 
Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010; Stock & Stock, 2004). In particular, when specific bodily movements 
are consistently followed by an auditory stimulus as an action effect (e.g., left key → low-pitch 
tone, right key → high-pitch tone), results from some studies suggested that associations 
between the movements and the effects are only learned in free choice tasks, that is, in an 
intention-based action control mode (Herwig et al., 2007; see also Gaschler & Nattkemper, 
2012; Herwig & Waszak, 2009, 2012; Pfister, Kiesel, & Melcher, 2010). 
This claim is, however, controversial. For example, Pfister, Kiesel, and Hoffmann 
(2011) reported learning of action effects even in forced choice tasks, and many other studies 
observed clear evidence for a role of action effects for performance in forced choice tasks (e.g., 
Janczyk, Pfister, Crognale, & Kunde, 2012; Janczyk, Pfister, Hommel, & Kunde, 2014; 
Janczyk, Pfister, & Kunde, 2012; Janczyk, Skirde, Weigelt, & Kunde, 2009; Kühn, Elsner, 
Prinz, & Brass, 2009, Exp. 3; Kunde, 2001; Kunde, Pfister, & Janczyk, 2012; Wolfensteller & 
Ruge, 2011). Furthermore, studies using the response-effect (R-E) compatibility paradigm 
(Kunde, 2001) reported R-E compatibility effects of the same size in forced and free choice 
tasks (e.g., Janczyk, Durst, & Ulrich, 2017), and the size of dual-task interference is also 
comparable for both tasks (Janczyk, Nolden, et al., 2015). In addition, Janczyk, Dambacher, 
Bieleke, and Gollwitzer (2015) used the Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) paradigm in 
combination with the locus of slack logic (Schweickert, 1978; see also Janczyk, 2013, 2017, or 
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Miller & Reynolds, 2003, for applications) to identify the source of the RT difference within 
the stream of processing. Based on Gollwitzer’s (1999) implementation intention account, they 
argued for a perceptual locus, and indeed reported evidence in support of this idea in their study. 
Essentially, their observations suggest that the RT difference actually results from facilitated 
perceptual processing of forced choice stimuli.  
In light of the evidence summarized in the last paragraph and the importance of forced 
and free choice tasks in contemporary research, we argue that effect or goal state anticipation 
drives response selection in both forced and free choice tasks, but that for the latter task the 
effect must be self-generated, which comes with additional demands. Here, we investigate 
further whether both tasks and their RT difference can be described within a common theoretical 
framework. This will help understanding the sources of the RT difference between the tasks. 
A sequential sampling account of the RT difference. Sequential sampling models offer 
tools to delineate the source(s) of the RT difference between free and forced choice tasks. These 
approaches assume that evidence for one or the other response is (noisily) accumulated until a 
decision threshold is reached and the corresponding response is initiated (for an overview, see 
Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016). The best-known model of this class is the drift-
diffusion model, proposed by Ratcliff (1978). While many sophisticated models from this 
family feature high complexity, the present study focuses on a very simple model with three 
parameters reminiscent of the features in Grice’s (1968) variable criterion model: (1) the 
decision thresholds that must be reached in order to count as a decision and to initiate emission 
of a response, (2) the non-accumulation time reflecting all the time before and after the 
accumulation time proper (i.e., early perceptual processing, motor execution, and perhaps other 
additional processes), and (3) the drift rate reflecting the strength of evidence for one particular 
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response, and thus the amount of evidence for each response added at each time-step.6 With 
higher drift rates, for example, a threshold is on average reached earlier resulting in shorter RTs 
and fewer errors (which occur when the incorrect threshold is reached, e.g., due to the noise in 
the accumulation process). Further, lowering the threshold (using a more liberal criterion) yields 
shorter RTs but more errors (because the chance of reaching the incorrect threshold increases), 
and augmenting the thresholds (using a more conservative criterion) yields longer RTs and 
fewer errors. Importantly, the exact kind of evidence that is accumulated is not further specified 
within this model. In a simple two-alternative forced choice task, one may think of an individual 
stimulus as the immediate cause of evidence accumulation into one or the other direction, but 
as already noted in the previous section, it is also conceivable that an anticipated effect or goal 
state is the source of evidence being accumulated. 
Assuming that effect or goal anticipation in the case of a free choice must happen 
endogenously (without the stimulus entirely determining the goal as in the case of forced choice 
trials), at least two scenarios can explain the RT difference between forced and free choice tasks 
within the framework described above: (1) Accumulation starts at the same time in both tasks, 
but the evidence driving the accumulation process towards one of the response thresholds is 
weaker in free choice tasks and thus the drift rate is lower (see Figure 1, left panel). (2) Longer 
RTs in free choice tasks can also result when drift rates are the same in both tasks, but additional 
time is needed before (or after) the start of accumulation in free choice tasks (for a more 
thorough description of the consequences of different onsets of information accumulation, see 
                                                 
6  Mattler and Palmer (2012) also used a sequential sampling approach to investigate how 
priming affects performance and choices in both types of tasks. They observed that while 
masked primes always influence forced choice RTs, free choices are not influenced when the 
stimuli (prime and target) are of arbitrary shape. They also specified an accumulator model to 
explain the data, with the notable assumption of rapidly shrinking threshold separations after 
onset of a free choice stimulus. In their paper, they conclude that forced choice priming is a 
result of the integration of the automatic processing of primes and evidence from the stimulus 
while free choice priming is based on the integration of “external stimulation by the prime and 
internal response tendencies”. 
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Bausenhart, Rolke, Seibold, & Ulrich, 2010). In this case, the additional delay would be 
reflected in the non-accumulation time (see Figure 1, right panel).  
Figure 1. Two accounts of the mean RT difference between free and forced choice tasks. The 
continuous black line represents a medium decision threshold. The dashed line indicates an 
increased decision threshold and the dotted line indicates a lowered threshold. Under the “drift 
rate” account, the RT difference between forced and free choice tasks becomes smaller with 
lower thresholds (ΔRTa > ΔRTb > ΔRTc). In other words, task and threshold manipulation 
interact with each other. In contrast, with differences in non-accumulation times, the RT 
difference remains the same irrespective of the threshold (ΔRTa = ΔRTb = ΔRTc) and therefore 
reflects an additive relation between task and threshold manipulation. 
 
Even though on the global level both accounts predict longer RTs in free than in forced 
choice tasks, there is a way to empirically distinguish them by manipulating the decision 
thresholds. Under the assumption of different non-accumulation times but equal drift rates, the 
RT difference between free and forced choice tasks should be independent of the actual 
threshold (see Figure 1, right panel) and therefore of the same size under liberal and 
conservative criteria. Thus, task type and the manipulation of the decision thresholds should 
combine additively because gathering the required additional information takes the same 
amount of time when both types of task have the same speed of information acquisition. To use 
a metaphor: If two horses in a horse race run at the same speed but one horse starts five meters 
closer to the goal than the other horse, the distance between the two horses when they cross the 
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finishing line will not change, even if the goal is moved closer to or farther away from the 
starting point of the race. In contrast, if there is a difference in the drift rates between the two 
tasks, the RT difference should become smaller the lower the threshold and bigger the higher 
the threshold is (see Figure 1, left panel). In other words, task type and the manipulation should 
statistically interact. In the horse race metaphor this means that one horse is faster than the other 
but they start in the same position. Over the course of the race, the distance between the two 
horses would increase. If the race is short (liberal criterion), there is less time for the distance 
to increase, whereas distance can increase in a longer race (conservative criterion) resulting in 
larger differences. 
Two previously established methods of manipulating decision thresholds are the amount 
of catch-trials in an experimental block and time pressure. Catch-trials are trials in which no 
stimulus appears at the time when a stimulus would normally appear. Participants are instructed 
not to react to this absence of a stimulus. Generally, the more catch-trials there are, the longer 
the reaction will take (e.g., Gordon, 1967; Näätänen, 1972). It has been theorized, that this is 
because a higher amount of catch-trials leads to a decreased stimulus expectancy, which in turn 
leads to a higher and thus more conservative decision threshold (e.g., Brysbaert, 1994; Grice, 
Nullmeyer, & Spiker, 1982; Seibold, Bausenhart, Rolke, & Ulrich, 2011). Another manipulation 
of the threshold is to vary the time available for responding, that is, varying the time pressure. 
Increasing time pressure has been repeatedly theorized and empirically shown to lower the 
decision criterion (e.g., Diederich, 1997; Dror, Basola, & Busemeyer, 1999; Forstmann et al., 
2008; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). 
The present experiments. The aim of the present study was to investigate the RT 
difference between forced and free choice tasks and to distinguish between the two accounts 
introduced in the previous section. In Experiment 1, we varied the amount of catch-trials in 
order to manipulate thresholds (Näätänen, 1972; Seibold et al., 2011). In Experiments 2 and 3, 
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we manipulated the response deadline (thus inducing time pressure) to manipulate the 
thresholds (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). 
 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, participants worked on forced and free choice tasks that were randomly 
intermingled. We expected longer RTs in the free than in the forced choice task (Berlyne, 1957). 
The critical manipulation was the proportion of catch-trials within a block (0, 25, 50, or 75%), 
in which no stimulus appeared and thus no response was to be given. If task type and the catch-
trial manipulation affect RTs additively, this would support the idea of comparable drift rates 
but longer non-accumulation times in free choice tasks. In contrast, if both interact in a way 
that the RT difference increases with the amount of catch-trials, this would favor an account in 
terms of different drift rates.  
Methods. 
Participants. Thirty-two persons from the Tübingen area participated (mean age = 24 
years; standard deviation = 3 years; 27 female; one unknown value for age) for monetary 
compensation or course credit. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
were naïve regarding the underlying hypotheses, and provided written informed consent prior 
to data collection. 
Apparatus and stimuli. Stimulus presentation and response collection were done via a 
standard PC connected to a 17-inch CRT monitor. Stimuli were red, green, and white circles, 
presented against a black background. Manual responses were collected with the two CTRL 
keys on a standard keyboard placed on the table in front of the participants. 
Tasks and procedure. The task was either to give a predefined response to two of the 
possible colors (forced choice task: red and green stimuli), or to freely choose one of the two 
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possible responses to the third color (free choice task: white stimulus). On catch-trials, where 
no stimulus appeared, the participants were instructed not to respond at all. Prior to each block, 
participants were informed about the percentage of catch-trials in this block. A trial began with 
the presentation of a small fixation cross (250 ms; see Figure 2). Following a blank screen (250 
to 350 ms), the stimulus appeared and remained on screen until the response was made. A trial 
was terminated if no response was given within 1500 ms after stimulus onset. General errors 
(i.e., no response in non-catch-trials within the time limit of 1500 ms and responses before 
stimulus appearance) and erroneous responses (response in a catch-trial or wrong key in forced 
choice trials) triggered respective feedback (1000 ms). The next trial started after an inter-trial 
interval (ITI) of 1000 ms. Eight blocks of 120 trials (all three stimuli appeared equally often in 
the normal non-catch-trials) were administered. The amount of catch-trials was varied across 
four block types (0%, 25%, 50%, 75%). The first four blocks (one of each type) were ordered 
by a Latin Square, and the order of the next four blocks was the reverse of the first four blocks.  
Figure 2. Time course of a trial. No feedback text was given if no error occurred. Feedback text 
was displayed in German and described the type of error made (“Wrong key!”, “Too slow!”, 
“No stimulus was given!”).  
 
Participants were tested individually in one single session of about 45 minutes. Written 
instructions emphasized speed as well as accuracy and, for the free choice trials, an even 
12 
115 
 
distribution of left and right responses as well as the avoidance of patterns in maintaining this 
distribution. The mappings of stimuli and responses in the forced choice task and the order of 
blocks were counterbalanced across participants. The data of participants whose free choice 
responses showed a strong bias towards one response option (>80% of choices) were discarded 
and new data were collected from new participants with the same block sequence (three 
participants in this experiment).  
Design and analyses. The experimental manipulations resulted in two independent 
variables of interest, namely (1) task type (forced choice vs. free choice) and (2) block type (0% 
vs. 25% vs. 50% vs. 75% catch-trials). Trials with general errors were discarded. For RT 
analyses only correct responses were considered (note that no erroneous responses can be made 
in free choice tasks). Trials with RTs deviating more than 2.5 standard deviations from the 
participants’ mean per condition were excluded. Data were then submitted to a 2 × 4 Analysis 
of Variance (ANOVA) with repeated-measures on task type and block type. Percentages of 
errors (PEs) were only analyzed for the forced choice task with an ANOVA with block type as 
repeated measures factor. The choice rates in the free choice task were analyzed similarly as a 
function of block type. p-values were Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted when the assumption of 
sphericity was violated. In these cases the respective ε is reported. 
Results. 
Participants chose the left response button in the free choice task about 48.7% of the 
time in the 0%, 48.0% in the 25%, 47.2% in the 50%, and 50.6% in the 75% catch-trials blocks. 
These differences were not significant, F(3,93) = 1.13, p = .331, ηp² = .04, ε = .69. 
Mean correct RTs (2.5% excluded as outliers) are shown in Figure 3 and are summarized 
in Table 1. As expected, responses in the forced choice task were faster than in the free choice 
task, F(1,31) = 55.50, p < .001, ηp² = .64, and responses slowed down with an increasing amount 
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of catch-trials in a block, F(3,93) = 102.59, p < .001, ηp² = .77, ε = .63. This latter result suggests 
that the manipulation worked as intended and increased the decision thresholds. Most 
importantly, there was a significant interaction between block type and task type, F(3,93) = 
3.15, p = .048, ηp² = .09, ε = .69. A closer look at Figure 3, however, suggests that this interaction 
is driven by the smaller RT difference in the 0% catch-trials blocks compared to the other 
blocks, and arguably the 0% blocks differ in an important aspect from the other blocks: While 
in the 0% condition participants knew that a response is always required, in the other blocks the 
additional demand of distinguishing normal from catch-trials was imposed. The drift rate 
account, however, predicts an increasing RT difference across all levels of increasing decision 
thresholds (with growing differences, as the amount of catch-trials increases). Therefore, we re-
analyzed the data but omitted the 0% catch-trial blocks. Again the two main effects were 
significant as expected, task type: F(1,31) = 47.33, p < .001, ηp² = .60, and block type: F(2,62) 
= 90.47, p < .001, ηp² = .74, ε = .87. Clearly, however, their interaction was not significant, 
F(2,62) = 0.36, p = .697, ηp² = .01.  
PEs in the forced choice task (i.e., wrong response keys pressed) increased with the 
amount of catch-trials (see Table 1), F(3,93) = 8.41, p = .001, ηp² = .21, ε = .57. Finally, there 
was a negligible amount (< 0.1%) of catch-trials in which a response was given.  
14 
117 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean correct RTs in milliseconds (ms) from all three experiments as a function of 
task type and block type. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals calculated for 
the difference between free and forced choice tasks collapsed across block types (see Pfister & 
Janczyk, 2013). 
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Table 1. Means (and standard deviations; SD) of response times (RTs) and percentages of errors 
(PEs) in forced choice tasks of Experiments 1-3 as a function of block type and trial type. 
Deadline conditions are denoted in SD steps from M (i.e., M+x*SD with x denoting the block 
type in the table.) 
  Experiment 1 
%Catch-trials 
Experiment 2 
Deadlines 
Experiment 3 
Deadlines 
Task type  0% 25% 50% 75% -1 0 1 0 .5 1.5 
Free choice  RT 446 
(66) 
493 
(77) 
521 
(83) 
582 
(106) 
246  
(39) 
325 
(39) 
353   
(36) 
315 
(36) 
337 
(39) 
348  
(40) 
 
Forced choice 
RT 421 
(66) 
452 
(73) 
480 
(79) 
536 
(93) 
246 
(46) 
316 
(35) 
343   
(35) 
305 
(35) 
324 
(41) 
340  
(42) 
PE 4.6 
(3.3) 
4.9 
(4.2) 
4.8 
(5.1) 
8.2 
(7.6) 
29.6 
(10.2) 
14.5 
(6.1) 
10.5 
(5.7) 
17.4 
(8.2) 
14.4 
(7.5) 
12.5  
(6.5)  
 
Discussion. 
The results of Experiment 1 are not in line with the drift rate account, but more 
compatible with differences in the non-accumulation time. Yet, they entail several aspects that 
complicate a straightforward interpretation.   
First, RTs increased with increasing amount of catch-trials, an observation that complies 
with the intended manipulation of increasing thresholds (see also Näätänen, 1972; Seibold et 
al., 2011). At the same time, though, more errors were made in the forced choice task as well. 
This is unexpected, since increasing thresholds should make errors less likely.7 We will get back 
to this in the General Discussion.  
Second, we replicated the common observation of longer RTs in the free than in the 
forced choice task, and task type interacted with the amount of catch-trials in the initial analyses, 
                                                 
7  A similar observation with PEs increasing descriptively with the amount of catch-trials can be seen in the 
condition with low intensity stimuli in the study by Seibold et al. (2011; see their Fig. 4). 
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which included the 0% catch trials condition. Straightforwardly, this would argue against the 
account of equal drift rates with the differences arising from different non-accumulation times. 
Yet, different drift rates should result in increasing RT differences across all amounts of catch-
trials, and clearly this was not the case. Rather, the interaction was driven by a smaller RT 
difference in the 0% catch-trial blocks, perhaps reflecting the absence of the additional demand 
of distinguishing normal from catch-trials in the other blocks. When considering only the 
comparable blocks with catch-trials, task type and block type combined additively. 
Tentatively, we therefore take the results as support for the account of different non-
accumulation times between the tasks (see Figure 1, right panel). At the same time,  we wish to 
avoid pre-mature conclusions on this single experiment. Accordingly, in the following 
experiments, we sought for converging evidence and employed time-pressure as a different 
means of manipulating response thresholds.  
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 followed the same logic as Experiment 1, but time pressure was used to 
manipulate response thresholds. To individually adjust time limits, the mean and the standard 
deviation of participants’ RTs in free and forced choice tasks were determined first. 
Subsequently, the same tasks were presented with three different levels of time pressure that 
were announced prior to each block and were varied block-wise. 
Methods. 
Participants. Thirty-six persons from the Tübingen area participated (mean age = 23 
years; standard deviation = 4 years; 31 female) for monetary compensation or course credit. All 
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve regarding the underlying 
hypotheses, and provided written informed consent prior to data collection.  
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Stimuli and procedure. Stimuli were adopted from Experiment 1. The task was largely 
the same, except that there were no catch-trials, and the blank screen interval between the 
fixation cross and the stimulus’ appearance was fixed to 250 ms. At the beginning, two pre-
experimental blocks with a response window of 1500 ms assessed mean (M) RTs  of each 
participant separately for free and forced choices. The respective Ms and their standard 
deviations (SDs) were then used to calculate three different response deadlines separately for 
the free and forced choice tasks: long (M+SD), medium (M), and short (M-SD). Then three 
experimental blocks, one of each deadline condition, followed. The order of these blocks and 
the S-R mapping within the forced choice task were fully counterbalanced. After these three 
blocks, another three blocks in reverse order followed. At the beginning of every block, the time 
limit of the task type with the shorter deadline (determined in the first two blocks, see above) 
was announced to the participants. After each block, participants were informed about how long 
their responses took on average (averaged across both free and forced choice trials). The same 
exclusion criterion as in Experiment 1 was used, and data from one participant were discarded 
and replaced by a new data set in the same condition. 
Design and analyses. The experimental manipulations resulted in two independent 
variables of interest, namely (1) task type (forced choice vs. free choice) and (2) block type (M-
SD vs. M vs. M+SD response deadline). Trials with general errors were discarded. For RT 
analyses, only correct responses were considered (note that no erroneous responses can be made 
in free choice tasks), and trials with RTs deviating more than 2.5 SDs from the participants’ 
mean per condition were excluded as outliers from analyses. Data from the experimental blocks 
were then submitted to a 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA on task type and block type. Error 
data were only analyzed for the forced choice task by means of an ANOVA with repeated 
measures on block type. The choice rates in the free choice task were analyzed similarly, but 
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included the pre-experimental blocks. p-values were Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted when the 
assumption of sphericity was violated. In these cases the respective ε is reported. 
Results 
Participants chose the left response button in the free choice task about 54.0% of the 
time in the M+SD blocks, 56.1% in the M blocks, 58.3% in the M-SD blocks, and 51.1% in the 
pre-experimental blocks, and the main effect of block type was significant, F(3,105) = 5.65, p 
= .004, ηp² = .14, ε = .72. In the pre-experimental blocks, mean RTs were 423 ms in the forced 
choice task and 444 ms in the free choice task, F(1,35) = 18.16, p < .001, ηp² = .34. 
Mean correct RTs (1.3% excluded as outliers) are shown in Figure 3 (middle panel) and 
are summarized in Table 1. As expected, there was a main effect of block type on RTs, F(2,70) 
= 363.32, p < .001, ηp² = .91, ε = .75, with higher time pressure induced by shorter response 
deadline resulting in shorter RTs, as well as a main effect of task type, F(1,35) = 5.72, p = .022, 
ηp² = .14, with longer RTs in the free choice task compared to the forced choice task. The 
interaction between block type and task type was also significant, F(2,70) = 4.50, p = .021, ηp² 
= .11, ε = .81. Inspection of the RTs revealed virtually no RT difference between both tasks in 
the high time-pressure (M-SD) block, which may point to a large proportion of fast guesses in 
this condition. Indeed, the PEs in this block ranged from 9.6% to 46.6%, that is, close to chance 
level. Thus, we performed a median split based on error rates in this condition (with mean PEs 
in the M-SD condition of 22% and 38% for the below- and above median groups, respectively), 
and ran an ANOVA that included this grouping variable. This ANOVA yielded an almost 
significant interaction between block type, task type, and the grouping variable, F(2,68) = 2.98, 
p = .068, ηp² = .08, ε = .84, and we continued to analyze both groups separately. As expected, 
for the participants with the above-median PEs, the interaction of task type and block type was 
significant, F(2,34) = 6.41, p = .004, ηp² = .27. In contrast, for the other group of participants 
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with lower PEs – and thus a performance not as close to chance level – the interaction was far 
from significance, F(2,34) = 0.23, p = .799, ηp² = .01. 
The PEs in the forced choice task increased with shorter response deadline, F(2,70) = 
52.16, p < .001, ηp² = .60, ε = .63 (see Table 1).  
Discussion. 
In this experiment, we manipulated the thresholds by inducing time pressure with a 
response deadline. First, and as expected, RTs were shorter the more time-pressure was induced 
in a block, and also the PEs (in the forced choice task) increased accordingly. This pattern 
suggests that the time pressure manipulation worked as intended. Secondly, the initial analysis 
revealed a significant interaction of task and block type. Taking into account PEs, however, 
post-hoc analyses indicated that this interaction likely resulted from a substantial proportion of 
fast guesses in the high time-pressure condition, which undermines the validity of the measured 
performance. When considering only the half of participants with below-median PEs, the 
interaction vanished, and results are compatible with our tentative proposal from Experiment 
1, favoring an account in terms of comparable drift rates but different non-accumulation times. 
Also, the RT difference in the other two blocks remained constant, whereas the drift rate account 
would predict an increase of the RT difference in the longer deadline.  
To further validate our conclusion that longer RTs in free than in forced choices are due 
to differences in non-accumulation times rather than in drift rates, we ran Experiment 3. This 
experiment was essentially a repetition of Experiment 2, but with less severe time pressure to 
avoid the high error rates that supposedly resulted from fast guesses. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 used the same setup as Experiment 2 except that we used response 
deadlines of M, M+0.5*SD, and M+1.5*SD to avoid fast guesses as in the very short time limit 
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in Experiment 2. We expected an additive combination of task type and block type in the present 
experiment. 
Methods. 
Thirty-six persons from the Tübingen area participated (mean age = 23 years, standard 
deviation = 4 years; 29 female) for monetary compensation or course credit. All participants 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve regarding the underlying hypotheses, 
and provided written informed consent prior to data collection. This experiment was identical 
to Experiment 2 in all regards with the exception of the time limits, which were set at M, 
M+0.5*SD, and M+1.5*SD. 
Results. 
Participants chose the left response button in the free choice task in about 55.6% of the 
time in the M blocks, 55.0% in the M+0.5*SD blocks, 55.6% in the M+1.5*SD blocks, and 
52.3% in the pre-experimental blocks. These differences were not significant, F(3,105) = 1.80, 
p = .164, ηp² = .05, ε = .82. In the pre-experimental blocks, mean RTs were 398 ms in the forced 
choice condition and 417 ms in the free choice condition, F(1,35) = 15.00, p < .001, ηp² = .30. 
Mean correct RTs (1.3% excluded as outliers) are shown in Figure 3 (right panel) and 
are summarized in Table 1. As expected, there was a main effect of block type, F(2,70) = 98.41, 
p < .001, ηp² = .74, ε = .96, with shorter response deadlines resulting in shorter RTs, as well as 
a main effect of task type, F(1,35) = 12.92, p = .001, ηp² = .27, with longer RTs in free choice 
tasks compared with the forced choice tasks. The interaction between block type and task type 
was not significant, F(2,70) = 2.07, p = .133, ηp² = .06.  
The PEs in the forced choice task decreased with increasing response deadlines, F(2,70) 
= 11.93, p < .001, ηp² = .25, ε = .88 (see Table 1).  
Discussion. 
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In Experiment 3 we observed no significant interaction between block type and task 
type and, if anything, the numerical decrease of the RT effect with longer deadlines was in a 
direction incompatible with the drift rate account (see Figure 1, left panel). Rather, the results 
are in line with predictions of different non-accumulation times between the tasks.  
 
General Discussion 
Three experiments were run to elucidate the source of the RT difference between forced 
and free choice tasks. We used the sequential sampling framework to derive two hypotheses 
(see Figure 1): First, the difference can arise from differences in the speed of evidence 
accumulation with drift rates being smaller for free choice tasks (see Figure 1, left panel). 
Second, the difference can arise from differences in the non-accumulation time with a later 
onset (but a similar rate) of accumulation in the case of free choice tasks (see Figure 1, right 
panel). To distinguish these two accounts we manipulated the response thresholds by varying 
the amount of catch-trials per block in Experiment 1 (Näätänen, 1972; Seibold et al., 2011) and 
by inducing time pressure via response deadlines in Experiments 2 and 3 (Ratcliff & McKoon, 
2008). 
Summary of results. First, in all experiments, forced choice stimuli were responded to 
faster than free choice stimuli. Second, the manipulations of catch-trials and response deadlines 
effectively changed the overall level of RTs as expected. However, evidence about the nature 
of interactions between these manipulations and task type was rather mixed. In Experiments 1 
and 2 we observed significant interactions, which seemingly argue against non-accumulation 
differences. In Experiment 1, though, this interaction was attributable to the block without any 
catch-trials, thus without an additional demand of distinguishing normal and catch-trials. In 
Experiment 2, no RT difference between forced and free choice tasks was evident in the high 
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time-pressure condition, and RTs were only about 250 ms. We suspected a large proportion of 
fast guesses in this case, and indeed only the participants with above-median PEs yielded a 
significant interaction. In the group with below-median PEs, and thus a performance not as 
close to chance level, the interaction vanished. Admittedly, excluding trials or reducing the 
number of participants lowers the statistical power for detecting an interaction. However, as a 
further aspect the drift rate account predicts increasing RT differences with increasing 
thresholds, and this was not even descriptively the case. The clearest evidence against the drift 
rate account, however, comes from Experiment 3. This experiment was a repetition of 
Experiment 2 without a very high level of time-pressure. In this experiment, no interaction was 
observed and the results are compatible with the predictions derived from assuming differences 
in the non-accumulation time. 
Overall, it seems that the drift rate account received little if any support from these 
results. In contrast, we did not observe evidence against the idea that there is a difference in 
non-accumulation times between free and forced choice tasks. Therefore, we suggest that the 
RT difference between free and forced choice tasks is at least partly caused by additional 
processes subsumed in the non-accumulation times of free choice tasks. 
Limitations. One odd result in Experiment 1 is that PEs increased with increasing 
proportions of catch-trials. Because a higher PE, especially together with a longer RT, is 
compatible with a lower drift rate, a possible explanation would be that the manipulation in 
Experiment 1 targeted the drift rates instead of decision thresholds. This would have broader 
implications for every argumentation that requires the assumption or concludes that the amount 
of catch-trials influences (only) the decision thresholds (e.g., in Brysbaert, 1994; Grice et al., 
1982; Seibold et al., 2011). Should the manipulation through catch-trials target the drift rates 
instead of or additionally to the decision thresholds, this of course complicates the interpretation 
of the results of Experiment 1. The mean RTs and PEs in Experiments 2 and 3, though, were in 
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line with our assumptions about the manipulation of decision thresholds as PEs increased while 
RTs became shorter with shorter response deadlines and thus increasing time pressure. It should 
be noted, though, that also for time pressure manipulations and speed-accuracy tradeoff 
instructions, concerns have been raised that not (only) decision thresholds but also other 
parameters such as the drift rate change (e.g., Arnold, Bröder, & Bayen, 2015; Dambacher & 
Hübner, 2015; Rae, Heathcote, Donkin, Averall, & Brown, 2014; Rinkenauer, Osman, Ulrich, 
Müller-Gethmann, & Mattes, 2004). 
To check which parameters our manipulations affected, we extracted the parameters for 
the forced choice trials with EZ (Wagenmakers, Van Der Maas, & Grasman, 2007) and 
compared the parameter estimates across the block types for each experiment (see the Appendix 
for a summary of these analyses). Notably, in Experiments 1 and 2 the drift rates were indeed 
affected by the manipulations (i.e., smaller drift rates for conditions which should only have 
higher decision thresholds in Experiment 1 and larger drift rates for conditions which should 
only have higher decision thresholds in Experiment 2). No such effect was observed for 
Experiment 3, which was also the one with the most straightforward and clear data pattern in 
RTs and PEs. Further, in Experiment 1, there was no significant effect on the extracted response 
thresholds, while for Experiments 2 and 3 the threshold pattern matched our theoretical 
assumptions. Finally, in all three experiments there was a significant influence on the non-
accumulation times, which increased with the decision thresholds.  
While the results from Experiments 1 and 2 must be interpreted with some caution, it is 
unclear whether the effects in drift rates are due to trade-offs in parameter estimation itself. If 
not, previous studies using similar manipulations may suffer from the same limitations, which 
potentially has broader implications for other research fields. Importantly, the results of 
Experiment 3 revealed no drift rate effect.  
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Another potential limitation is that our conclusion is based on retaining the null-
hypotheses of the critical (2×3) interaction effects. To facilitate interpretation of the results, we 
ran a power analysis using GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). To achieve a 
power of 1-β = .8 with α = .05 and ρ = .3 to detect a medium sized effect, the calculated required 
sample size was n = 20.8 
Potential additional processes. If we accept that RT differences in free and forced 
choices are due to differences in the non-accumulation time and assume that there are one or 
more additional cognitive processes involved in free choice task performance: what is known 
about them? They are most likely not or only minimally influenced in their duration by 
manipulations of stimulus features, because in Experiment 3 of Janczyk, Dambacher et al. 
(2015) stimulus brightness only affected forced choice RTs but not free choice RTs (both task 
types were intermixed in the same blocks). As there is an alternative explanation of the latter 
result (that participants only ruled out the presence of a forced choice stimulus instead of 
identifying free choice stimuli), this should be seen as a tentative conclusion. We discuss 
candidates for the additional processes in the following. 
(1) Memory processes triggered one or the other response (trial history bias): Part of 
the premise of free choice tasks is that participants are asked to respond roughly with the same 
amount with each response option and without a clear pattern, essentially asking the participants 
to act as (pseudo-)random number generators for the experiment. The breadth of the literature 
on random number generation alone suggests that this task is not trivial and can be approached 
in many different ways. Participants either really generate random numbers or they try to 
generate patterns that ‘feel’ random but are, in fact, not. Various biases in human random 
number generation are known see also Heuer, Janczyk, & Kunde, 2010, for an overview). 
                                                 
8  To correct the effect size entered into GPower, we used the method described by Rasch, Friese, Hofmann, 
and Naumann (2010). 
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Examples are a lack of symmetrical response sequences, a lack of long runs of the same 
response, or a balancing of responses across short sequences (Bar-Hillel, & Wagenaar, 1991). 
Both negative and positive recency effects (i.e., lowered and heightened chances of repetitions) 
can be observed under different circumstances (Ayton, & Fischer, 2004). We suggest that 
investigating what strategies, if any, are used to generate the pattern of decisions in free choice 
tasks could provide insight into the processes that are subsumed in the non-accumulation time. 
To shed some light on whether a free choice is affected by the immediate history of responses 
in the preceding trials, we ran a post-hoc analysis on choice frequencies. In particular, when 
comparing the ratios of left to right free choice responses with the ratios of the same type 
conditional on the previous response (left or right) and type of task (free or forced choice), there 
were significant differences for all three experiments (see Table 2) 9, Experiment 1: F(4,124) = 
6.11, p = .005, ηp² = .16, ε =.451; Experiment 2: F(4,140) = 8.16, p = .002, ηp² = .19, ε =.404; 
Experiment 3: F(4,140) = 16.39, p < .001, ηp² = .32, ε =.438. Interesting, the resulting pattern 
of choice frequencies bears similarities to reports in the task switching literature where a 
response repetition benefit (in RTs) is only observed when the task repeats but not when the 
task switches (e.g., Kleinsorge, 1999; Rogers & Monsell, 1995).  Whether or not the present 
result of fewer response repetitions following a switch from a forced choice to a free choice 
extends this effect is open to future research.  
In sum, these observations point to the idea that the responses in the immediately 
preceding trials were considered on a current free choice trial. In other words, participants seem 
to use systematic strategies to decide what response to give, which takes time and adds to the 
RTs in free choice tasks. 
 
                                                 
9  We thank one of the reviewers for this suggestion. 
26 
129 
 
Table 2. Percentage of left responses in free choice trials, both unconditional (column overall) 
and conditional on the previous trial being a free or forced choice task and a left or right 
response. 
 Overall Trial n-1 
forced choice, 
left 
Trial n-1 
forced choice, 
right 
Trial n-1 free 
choice, left 
Trial n-1 free 
choice, right 
Experiment 1 51.2% 43.5% 58.1% 58.6% 41.8% 
Experiment 2 45.5% 39.8% 48.1% 57.6% 44.2% 
Experiment 3 45.6% 42.0% 47.1% 61.3% 37.8% 
 
(2) Endogenous generation of stimulus/effect representations: Free choice tasks as used 
in this study are usually intermixed with forced choice tasks. In the introduction we stated that 
the exact basis of evidence accumulation is not fully specified in diffusion models. First, after 
having realized to be in a free choice trial, participants may endogenously generate a 
representation of one of the two forced choice stimuli and evidence is then accumulated for 
internal representations of these stimuli that are associated with one or the other response. 
Second, according to Ideomotor Theory (e.g., Greenwald, 1970; Harleß, 1861; Shin, Proctor, & 
Capaldi, 2010) bodily movements are always addressed via an anticipation of the sensorial 
consequences of these movements, that is, their action effects (see also Janczyk, 2016; Janczyk, 
Durst, & Ulrich, 2017; Kunde, 2001). Importantly, the possible action effects (depressed 
left/right response keys, visual and proprioceptive feedback from moving a left/right finger) are 
the same in forced and free choice tasks. A difference, however, is that for forced choice tasks 
the stimulus determines the desired action effect, while in free choice tasks this state must be 
generated again endogenously. Either way, such processes take time and would therefore be 
compatible with the results of this study.  
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The present data do not allow to distinguish between these two possibilities, and we do 
not claim that our list is exhaustive. For example, it is also possible that motor execution takes 
longer in free choice compared to forced choice tasks. Furthermore, these accounts are not 
mutually exclusive. It may well be that the choice of an effect is first driven by response history 
and then the action effect is endogenously generated, and thus both processes contribute to the 
non-accumulation time. 
Modeling free choice data. The present results can be used as constraints for future 
formal models of free choice behavior that assess their parameters more directly. We are 
currently aware of only one direct application of a sequential sampling model to data from 
priming experiments in free and forced choice tasks (Mattler & Palmer, 2012). The most 
important outcome of the experiments in this study was that the response in the free choice task 
was biased by a (subliminal) stimulus-preceding prime. In their model, the activity of two 
accumulator nodes mutually inhibit the response unit of the other accumulator. This inhibition 
may account for potential response-response conflicts in free choices, which slow down 
responses (Berlyne, 1957). Furthermore, when a free choice stimulus appears, an exponential 
drop of the decision thresholds is assumed. While this model fits the priming data, the threshold 
drop can generally be seen critically, because it is not assumed for the forced choice task 
because it is assumed to start immediately after the appearance of the stimulus, implying some 
sort of stimulus identification. Nevertheless, we believe that the approach by Mattler and 
Palmer (2012) is a valuable step towards the identification of similarities and differences 
between forced and free choice tasks.  
Conclusion. Applying a framework borrowed from diffusion models, we observed no 
evidence that the mean RT difference between free and forced choice tasks is attributable to a 
higher drift rate in forced than in free choice tasks. Our results are rather compatible with a 
delay of the information accumulation process in free compared to forced choice tasks. Future 
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work should aim at identifying the nature of this delay and the concurrent processes in more 
detail.   
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Appendix 
 
In this appendix we report the results from a diffusion model analysis on the forced choice data 
from Experiments 1-3.  EZ (Wagenmakers, Van Der Maas, & Grasman, 2007) was used to 
extract parameters for every participant and relevant experimental condition (i.e., excluding the 
0% catch-trial condition of Experiment 1 and excluding the pre-experimental blocks of 
Experiments 2 and 3) for each experiment. Tables A1-A3 summarize the resulting means and 
standard deviations for drift rates, response thresholds, and non-accumulation times. The 
parameters were submitted to ANOVAs with block type as a repeated measures factor. 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values are reported when the sphericity assumption was 
violated (in this case the respective ε is reported as well). In case a participant made no mistakes 
in a given condition, the edge correction proposed by Wagenmakers et al. (2007) was 
performed, in which, essentially, the sum of errors is changed from zero errors to half an error. 
 
Table A1. Extracted parameter means, standard deviations in parentheses per experimental 
condition for Experiment 1. In nine cases, edge corrections were applied because there were 
no errors in one or more conditions. n = 32. 
 Response thresholds Drift rates Non-accumulation 
times 
Block type F(2,62) =  2.40, p = 
.109, ηp² = .07, ε = 
.846 
F(2,62) =  9.90, p < 
.001, ηp² = .24 
F(2,62) =  33.21, p < 
.001, ηp² = .52, ε = 
.811 
25% catch-trials 3.45 (0.69) 0.0097 (0.0024) 294 (47) 
50% catch-trials 3.71 (0.85) 0.0092 (0.0024) 300 (56) 
75% catch-trials 3.47 (0.90) 0.0081 (0.0027) 352 (51) 
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Table A2. Extracted parameter means, standard deviations in parentheses per experimental 
condition for Experiment 2. n = 36. 
 Response thresholds Drift rates Non-accumulation 
times 
Block type F(2,70) =  123.37, p 
< .001, ηp² = .78, ε = 
.755 
F(2,70) =  62.90, p < 
.001, ηp² = .64, ε = 
.660 
F(2,70) =  146.79, p 
< .001, ηp² = .81, ε = 
.760 
M-SD 1.67 (0.20) 0.0057 (0.0035) 172 (50) 
M 1.94 (0.22) 0.0096 (0.0024) 238 (38) 
M+SD 2.25 (0.27) 0.0100 (0.0021) 253 (30) 
 
 
Table A3. Extracted parameter means, standard deviations in parentheses per experimental 
condition for Experiment 3. n = 36. 
 Response thresholds Drift rates Non-accumulation 
times 
Block type F(2,70) =   73.10, p 
< .001, ηp² = .68 
F(2,70) =   2.20, p = 
.118, ηp² = .06 
F(2,70) = 24.46, p < 
.001, ηp² = .41 
M 1.83 (0.25) 0.0091 (0.0030) 231 (32) 
M+0.5*SD 1.98 (0.33) 0.0097 (0.0027) 245 (33) 
M+1.5*SD 2.15 (0.30) 0.0095 (0.0023) 252 (35) 
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Appendix C – Study 3 
 
The following represents the article described in Chapter 7. Springer Nature granted the 
license to reproduce the final author's accepted manuscript here.  
 
Naefgen, C., & Janczyk, M. (2018a). Free choice tasks as random generation tasks: an 
investigation through working memory manipulations. Experimental Brain Research, 236(8), 
2263–2275. doi:10.1007/s00221-018-5295-2 
 
The published version can be found under: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00221-
018-5295-2 
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Abstract 
 Free choice tasks are tasks in which two or more equally valid response options per 
stimulus exist from which participants can choose. In investigations of the putative difference 
between self-generated and externally-triggered actions, they are often contrasted with forced 
choice tasks, in which only one response option is considered correct. Usually, responses in 
free choice tasks are slower when compared with forced choice task responses, which may 
point to a qualitative difference in response selection. It was, however, also suggested that free 
choice tasks are in fact random generation tasks. Here, we tested the prediction that in this 
case, randomness of the free choice responses depends on working memory (WM) load. In 
Experiment 1, participants were provided with varying levels of external WM support in the 
form of displayed previous choices. In Experiment 2, WM load was induced via a concurrent 
n-back task. The data generally confirm the prediction: In Experiment 1, WM support 
improved both randomness and speed of responses. In Experiment 2, randomness decreased 
and responses slowed down with increasing WM load as well. These result suggest that free 
choice tasks have much in common with random generation tasks. 
 
Keywords: free choice ; forced choice ; action selection ; working memory ; random 
generation 
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1. Introduction 
 
In everyday life we often have to make choices without having a clear criterion for 
which option is better: Choosing what to eat when we only care about whether we eat, which 
set of purpose-appropriate clothes to pick from our wardrobe, from which lane we want to 
take a shopping cart when they’re all equally far away and so on. Despite occasional 
assertions to the contrary10, we make such decisions with ease and swiftly. This type of choice 
devoid of almost all personal meaning, however, is also often used in laboratories when 
certain modes of action selection are investigated with so-called free choice tasks. 
1.1 Free Choice Tasks. In these tasks, participants are instructed to freely choose one 
of two (or more) response options that are considered equally correct. For example, consider a 
task in which whenever an ‘H’ is displayed on a screen, participants are supposed to press 
either a button to their left or a button to their right. Often, the participants are instructed to 
avoid obvious patterns in their choices (like left-right-left-right, for example) and to give all 
response options in equal proportions. We will discuss potential issues with this type of 
instruction in the subsequent Section 1.2, after we have introduced the task and important 
observations in the following. The experiments reported in this paper address critical aspects 
following from such instructions. 
Starting with Berlyne’s (1957) study, free choice tasks are often used in contrast with 
forced choice tasks, in which only one response is considered correct to a stimulus. One 
almost universal observation in the literature is that free choice response times (RTs) are 
longer than forced choice RTs (but see, e.g., Wirth, Janczyk, & Kunde 2018 for an exception). 
This RT difference might be taken to indicate qualitative differences with regard to response 
                                                 
10 For example, in the thought experiment of Buridan’s ass a hungry donkey has to choose between two piles of 
hay, resulting in the donkey’s death of hunger because there is no criterion by which to choose a pile (see also 
Rescher 2005 for more information). 
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selection. Accordingly, free choice tasks are often used to operationalize what has been 
termed self-generated (or intentional, internally generated, intention-based, voluntary, goal-
directed) action, while forced choice tasks are often used to operationalize externally-
triggered (or stimulus-based) actions (e.g., Brass & Haggard 2008; Herwig, Prinz, & Waszak 
2007; Passingham, Bengtsson, & Lau 2010; Keller, Wascher, Prinz, Waszak, Koch, & 
Rosenbaum 2006; Waszak, Wascher, Keller, Koch, Aschersleben, Rosenbaum, & Prinz 2005). 
In support of this, there is some evidence that associations between actions and their effects 
can only be learned in an intention-based action control mode as operationalized with free 
choice tasks (Herwig et al. 2007; see also Gaschler & Nattkemper 2012; Herwig & Waszak 
2009, 2012; Pfister, Kiesel, & Melcher 2010). However, Pfister, Kiesel, and Hoffmann (2011) 
reported that these associations are also learned in forced choice tasks. In addition, there is 
ample evidence that action effects play a role even when using forced choice tasks (e.g., 
Gozli, Huffman, & Pratt 2016; Huffman, Gozli, Hommel & Pratt 2018; Janczyk, Durst, & 
Ulrich 2017; Janczyk, Pfister, Crognale, & Kunde 2012; Janczyk, Pfister, Hommel, & Kunde 
2014; Janczyk, Pfister, & Kunde 2012; Kühn, Elsner, Prinz, & Brass 2009, Exp. 3; Kunde 
2001; Kunde, Pfister, & Janczyk 2012; Pfister & Kunde 2013; Wolfensteller & Ruge 2011). In 
sum, it appears that the majority of evidence argues for the same role of action effects in 
forced and free choice tasks. This conclusion received additional support from other lines of 
research. For example, Janczyk, Nolden, and Jolicoeur (2015) compared both task types with 
regards to their susceptibility to dual-task interference. While replicating the RT difference in 
all experiments, no differences in dual-task costs between free and forced choice tasks were 
observed, again pointing to similar “action control mechanisms” involved in both tasks. In 
line with this, the RT difference was attributed to a perceptual source in a further study 
(Janczyk, Dambacher, Bieleke, & Gollwitzer 2015). Coming from a different perspective, 
Bermeitinger and Hackländer (2018) observed that response priming effects induced by 
motion primes affected both free and forced choice tasks similarly. 
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If, then, both tasks do not differ regarding their response selection mechanisms, it 
appears helpful to identify further commonalities. As a step toward this, Naefgen, Dambacher, 
and Janczyk (2017) viewed the RT difference through a sequential sampling lens (e.g., Grice 
1968). In such a framework, evidence for or against a response option (or more precisely in 
the context of that study: the desired goal state, that is, the depressing of a left or right 
response key) is noisily accumulated over time. Once the total amount of this evidence 
surpasses one of the thresholds, a response is emitted. This results in three theoretically 
relevant parameters for a choice type: The speed of evidence accumulation, the thresholds for 
making a choice, and the time not spent accumulating evidence (such as, e.g., time needed for 
the motor execution of the choice made). Within this framework, Naefgen et al. then asked 
whether the RT difference can be attributed to differences in the speed of evidence 
accumulation or to differences outside the accumulation process. To this end, the amount of 
catch-trials (e.g., Bausenhart, Rolke, Seibold, & Ulrich 2010) and time pressure (e.g., Dror, 
Basola, & Busemeyer 1999) were used to manipulate decision thresholds. If differences in 
evidence accumulation were the reason, the RT difference should become smaller the lower 
the thresholds. As this was not observed, the cause is likely located in a process different from 
evidence accumulation, that is, in the non-accumulation time. The present study aims to 
address the nature of this process and focuses on the generation of random responses as one 
candidate. 
1.2 Free Choice and Random Generation Tasks. Frith (2013) argued that in free 
choice tasks, “in essence, the experimenter is asking her subjects to try to be unpredictable 
and random” (p. 291). He based this argument both on psychological evidence that 
participants associate randomness and the perception of choices as free (Ebert & Wegner 
2011) and on neuroimaging evidence that random choice tasks and free choice tasks activate 
similar brain regions (Jahanshahi, Dirnberger, Fuller, & Frith 2000; Jenkins, Jahanshahi, 
Jueptner, Passingham, & Brooks 2000). This becomes even more evident when looking at the 
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similarities between the instructions for free choice tasks and random generation tasks. The 
former appear in three variants: (1) Explicit instructions to choose responses at random, (2) 
instructions similar to random generation instructions (e.g., avoidance of patterns11), and (3) 
instructions emphasizing spontaneity or freedom of choice. Lastly, there are also studies in 
which no instruction as to the desired patterns was reported. Examples for these categories 
can be found in Table 1. Please note that this overview is meant as an illustration, and is not 
exhaustive. One thing illustrated by Table 1 is the prevalence of instructions to avoid patterns 
in the free choice responses. One reason for such instructions is that when they are not given, 
participants sometimes give responses with only one or almost only one of the response 
options. 
While this type of instruction could be argued to constrain the choices that participants 
can give, this is true of all tasks that could feasibly be observed in an experimental laboratory. 
However, free choice responses are still less constrained than forced choice responses. While 
free choice instructions and random generation instructions bear similarities, free choice 
instructions are used this way in the literature on self-generated action and are, as such, 
worthy of investigation. The next section will discuss the relationship between random 
generation tasks and how they are affected by working memory manipulations. 
 
  
                                                 
11  Indeed, the type of instruction used in free choice contexts bears similarities to a common mathematical 
definition of randomness derived from Kolmogorov complexity (Martin-Löf 1966). (Over-)Simplified, according 
to this definition, if a string of information can be described in a more concise manner than if it were simply 
written out, it is not random. For example, the number 4294967296 can be described much shorter as 2^32. 
Thus, the number would not be seen as very random. 
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Table 1. Illustrative examples of different instructions for free choice tasks as well as random 
generation tasks. 
Example of… Inclusion criteria Example 
Explicitly random responses Explicit mention of random-
ness as a goal 
“The subjects were in-
structed to choose the order 
of their movements at ran-
dom.” (Hadland, Rushworth, 
Passingham, Jahanshahi, & 
Rothwell 2001, see also 
Waszak et al. 2005; Elsner 
& Hommel 2001) 
Similar to random response 
instructions 
Overlap between instruc-
tions and definitions of ran-
domness 
No explicit mention of ran-
domness 
“[…] participants were in-
structed to decide spontane-
ously to produce one or the 
other action effect without 
relying on any specific strat-
egy. They were told to 
choose each alternative 
about equally often, but it 
was stressed that the focus 
should be on spontaneous 
decisions rather than on a 
perfectly even distribution of 
responses.“ (Pfister & 
Kunde 2013, see also Linser 
& Goschke 2007)  
Emphasizing spontane-
ity/freedom of choice 
No mention of randomness 
No particular overlap in in-
structions with definitions of 
randomness 
Mention of spontaneity or 
freedom of choice as goal 
“Participants were instructed 
to […] decide spontaneously 
between the two response al-
ternatives in free choice tri-
als” (Pfister, Kiesel, & 
Melcher 2010; see also Her-
wig, Prinz, & Waszak 2007) 
None reported No explication of instruc-
tions present in the text 
“When lights of both colours 
appeared, either response, 
but not both, was to be per-
formed.” (Berlyne 1957) 
Random generation task in-
struction 
Instructions explicitly aimed 
at eliciting theoretically ran-
dom generation behavior 
“It was pointed out explicitly 
that the sequence would be 
completely jumbled and 
should not be likely to con-
tain sequences such as 
“12345” or “98765”” 
(Azouvi, Jokic, Linden, 
Marlier, & Bussel 1996) 
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1.3 Random Generation and Working Memory. Baddeley reported that random 
generation performance can be influenced by various factors such as time constraints 
(Baddeley 1962, as cited in Baddeley 1966) or concurrently performed tasks (Baddeley 1966), 
suggesting that the capacity to create random information is limited in some way. As such, it 
stands to reason that adding a secondary task that involves WM to the random generation task 
would interfere with the random generation task. For example, Cooper, Wutke, and Davelaar 
(2012) used a dual-tasking paradigm in which a random digit (1-9) generation task was 
coupled either with a 2-back task or a go/no-go task. Indeed, performance in the random 
generation task as measured through RTs and different indices of randomness was worse 
when combined with the 2-back task.  
Additional evidence for a relationship between WM functions and random generation 
can be derived from principal component analyses. In particular, Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, 
Witzki, and Howerter (2000) reported correlations between the executive functions of 
updating and inhibition with measures of randomness (equality of response usage and 
inhibition of prepotent associates, respectively) as described by Towse and Neil (1998).  
In sum, the literature suggests that WM plays a critical role in random generation 
tasks. The assessment of randomness will be discussed in the next section. 
1.4 Measuring randomness. A difference between the aforementioned random 
generation tasks and free choice tasks is that in free choice tasks there are most often only two 
response options while for the random generation tasks there were usually nine response 
options. This renders several ways of how randomness of a choice sequence can be measured 
less informative. For example, it cannot be measured, as it can be with nine digits, whether 
two subsequent responses have adjacent values.  
As there is a plethora of different measures of randomness (Towse & Neil 1998 alone 
described 14 different measures in their review), it is necessary to choose which one(s) to use. 
For the purposes of the present paper, randomness will be measured through the local 
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unevenness (LU) measure (see, e.g., Heuer, Janczyk & Kunde 2010; Heuer, Kohlisch & Klein 
2005). While earlier studies used a more general form of LU, the following description is 
specific to a two-response-options situation with left and right responses. 
In essence, the LU is a measure of the deviation of empirical responses from an ideal 
random distribution of responses, as measured in running windows of predefined sizes. 
“Running window” here means that a sequence is divided into all possible sequential sub-
sequences of a predefined length and the formula is applied to all of these sub-sequences. For 
an illustration of what this looks like, see Figure 1. The formula for the LU in each segment is 
as follows:  
𝐿𝑈𝑤 = √
(𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 − 0.5)2 + (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 − 0.5)2
2
 
where p is the ratio of the respective response option given in the respective window. 
Because in the case of only two options the two ratios are complementary, this formula can be 
further simplified to: 
 
𝐿𝑈𝑤 =
√(2 ∙ 𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 − 1)²
2
 
The range of values for the LU lies between 0 and .5, where 0 means that in the given 
window, the distribution is perfectly in line with the expected ratios (i.e., both choices are 
represented equally often, that is completely evenly) and .5 means that only one of the two 
choices is present in the given window (i.e., the sequence is as uneven as possible). 
To illustrate, Figure 1 gives an example sequence of choices and the resulting LUs, for 
four different window sizes of 2, 4, 6, and 8 for each window, as well as the mean LU for the 
sequence. 
11 
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Figure 1. Examples of (average) LUs in an example sequence for window sizes 2, 4, 6, and 8. 
 
 
For an infinitely long random sequence, the expected mean value of the LU is 
however not 0.0, as this would imply that in every single segment the options are represented 
equally often, without e.g. any run-ons of the same choice. Instead, it is the average of all the 
potential combinations of the options when taking the order of the options into account. 
Figure 2 illustrates the potential response option combinations when using a window of the 
size 4. 
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Figure 2. All sequences that can occur for window size 4 and the respective LU. The resulting 
ideal LU value is then .1875. 
 
This results in an ideal LU of .1875, as all these potential sequences have the same 
chance to appear in a random sequence. The ideal values for the four window sizes mentioned 
above are .25, .1875, .15625, and .1367188 (for window size of 2, 4, 6, and 8, respectively). 
Mean LUs higher than those ideal values then mean that unbalanced segments were 
overrepresented in the whole sequence compared to what would be expected in a random 
sequence. Conversely, mean LUs below those ideal values imply that balanced segments were 
overrepresented. From this follows that the deviation from these ideal LU values in a 
sufficiently long sequence can be viewed as a deviation from (ideal) randomness. 
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1.6 The present study. Our prediction is that, if free choice tasks are random 
generation tasks, then WM manipulations should influence randomness (and also response 
speed) accordingly. We chose a complementary approach of both lowering and increasing 
WM load. WM support should then increase randomness (and LUs should be closer to ideally 
random LUs) and decrease RTs, while experimentally induced WM load should have the 
opposite effects. To achieve a decrease and an increase in WM load we (1) either displayed 
varying amounts of previous choices to reduce the need for participants to remember their 
choices (Experiment 1), or (2) introduced a concurrent n-back task of varying difficulty 
(Experiment 2). We then measured the (non-)randomness of the responses in a free choice 
task via the distance to the ideal LU and the speed of the responses. While analyses of LU are 
the theoretically most important ones, we also included an analysis of RTs to exclude any 
kinds of potential trade-offs. For example, it might be the case that participants change from a 
focus on more random responses to a focus on faster responses (similar to speed-accuracy 
tradeoffs, where faster responses come with committing more errors). Thus, additionally 
analyzing RTs makes it possible to rule out such phenomena. 
 
2. Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 used a paradigm in which the participants gave free choice responses while 
receiving different levels of WM support in the form of arrows that display previous choices 
(for a similar approach, see Hadland, Rushworth, Passingham, Jahanshahi, & Rothwell 2001). 
We used WM support because one potential way WM influences the ease with which 
participants generate random responses is by providing information (i.e., previous responses) 
that is used to decide which response would look more ‘random’ if chosen next. We predict 
that with growing WM support the distance from ideal LU will decrease and the RTs will 
shorten. 
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2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Participants. Thirty people from the Tübingen area participated for monetary 
compensation (Mean age = 23 years, 26 female, 4 male). All participants reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve regarding the underlying hypotheses, and provided 
written informed consent prior to data collection.  
2.1.2 Apparatus and stimuli. Stimulus presentation and response collection happened 
on a PC connected to a 17-inch CRT monitor. Stimuli were a fixation circle in the middle of the 
screen as well as arrows, appearing within the fixation circle and, depending on block type, 
above it. Stimuli were white, presented against a black background. The manual responses were 
given with the left and right Ctrl keys on a QWERTZ keyboard. 
2.1.3 Tasks and procedure. The task was to freely choose one of the two response 
options. The fixation circle was always visible during blocks slightly below the middle of the 
screen. After a response, an arrow indicating which response was given in the current trial 
appeared for 50 ms in the fixation circle. During these 50 ms, no new response could be given. 
In the two block types with WM support, the same arrow then appeared above the fixation 
circle, shifting all other already displayed arrows one slot upwards and, once three/seven 
responses were already given, displacing the oldest arrow at the top of the screen. This results 
in up to three or seven arrows indicating previous choices that are displayed above the fixation 
circle, as is illustrated in Figure 3. The 50 ms in which no new response could be given were 
the only inter-trial interval. There was no time limit for responses. 
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Figure 3. Examples of the different WM support conditions. In the left panel, no WM support 
is given, in the middle panel three previous choices are displayed, and in the right panel seven 
previous choices are displayed. Not visible here are the arrows that appear within the circle for 
50 ms after a response. 
 
Responses were collected in blocks of 500 trials with every participant performing all 
three block types twice, that is, in a total of six blocks. The order of the first three blocks was 
counterbalanced and the second set of three blocks was ordered in the reverse of the first three 
blocks. Participants were informed before each block how many of their previous choices would 
be displayed in this block. 
Participants were instructed to give about equal amounts of left and right responses and 
to avoid patterns (e.g., alternating left and right responses or repeating sequences). There was 
one test session per participant which lasted about 45 minutes. 
2.1.4 Design and analyses. The dependent variables were the distances from the ideally 
random LU (LUD) and the RTs. The independent variable was the level of WM support (0 vs. 
3 vs. 7). For analyses of LUDs, however, we also analyzed four different window sizes (2 vs. 4 
vs. 6 vs. 8). Accordingly, two main analyses were performed: LUDs were analyzed with a 3 × 
4 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with WM support and window size as repeated-measures. 
RTs were analyzed with an ANOVA with WM support as a repeated-measure. Because we 
predicted decreasing RTs and LUD approaching zero with increasing WM support, we 
calculated Helmert contrasts on WM support (Contrast 1: no support vs. three and seven 
previous displayed choices; Contrast 2: three vs. seven displayed previous choices). In case of 
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interactions between window size and the Helmert contrast, separate Helmert contrasts for each 
window size were calculated and are reported in the Appendix. 
LUDs were calculated on the whole data set once sufficient responses were given for 
the respective window size. For the subsequent analyses, trials were excluded as outliers if their 
RTs deviated more than 2.5 SDs from the respective cell mean (calculated separately for each 
participant). 
2.3. Results 
The LUDs and average RTs (1.79% outliers) are visualized in Figure 4 and are 
summarized in Table 2. For LUDs, Contrast 1 was significant and indicated a difference 
between conditions with and without memory support, t(29) = 3.79, p = .001, without 
interacting with window size, t(29) = 1.70, p = .100. However, there was no significant 
difference between the two memory support conditions according to Contrast 2, t(29) = 0.36, p 
= .551. While this contrast interacted with window size, t(29) = 2.68, p = .012, when tested 
separately, all contrasts were not significant, all ps ≥ .217 (for more details, please see 
Appendix). 
Responses were significantly slower in the condition without WM support compared 
with the two other conditions, Contrast 1: t(29) = 2.63, p = .013, but there was no significant 
difference between the two WM support conditions, Contrast 2: t(29) = -0.14, p = .886. 
2.4. Discussion. In sum, response patterns were more random and RTs shortened with 
the presence of WM support. No such difference was detectable between the different levels of 
WM support. These results can be taken as first evidence that WM plays a similar role in free 
choice tasks as it does for random generation tasks. 
There is one potential confound in this particular experimental design: The presence of 
the arrows employed as WM support can be interpreted as a type of action effect (or action 
outcome), which conceivably differs between the no-support and the two support condition. 
Furthermore, the last presented arrow was always spatially compatible with the selected 
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response. Importantly, RTs are shorter when the responses produce compatible action effects 
compared with incompatible ones (Kunde 2001; see also Janczyk & Lerche 2018; Janczyk, 
Durst & Ulrich 2017; Koch & Kunde 2014). At first glance, this might have contributed to the 
shorter RTs in the two WM support conditions. However, we believe that this argument does 
not pose serious problems for several reasons. First, it is important to note that in all conditions 
an immediate and compatible arrow appeared in the center of the fixation circle. Second, in the 
two WM support conditions, always multiple arrows were present on the screen. Thus, there 
would most of the time (unless the participants repeated responses multiple times) be a mixture 
of compatible and incompatible action effects be present what would weaken a potential impact 
on RTs. Third, the RT difference we observed (roughly 70 ms) is larger than the usual effects 
of action effect compatibility (e.g., between 20 and 50 ms in Kunde, 2001). Hence, if this 
confound played a role in the RT results, it likely would account only for a part of the difference. 
Lastly, and potentially most important, it is not clear how the theoretically more important LUD 
results would be affected by compatible or incompatible action effects. 
 A further objection might be that the presence of the previous choices on the screen 
turned the free choice task into a “cue-dependent task”. Of course, we cannot exclude that 
participants’ used different strategies between conditions. It is the case, though, that the 
information about the previous choices were actually always available to the participants in 
form of a memory trace. The presence of the WM support arrows merely made it more 
accessible. 
To attain more and converging evidence from a different kind of experimental 
manipulation, we experimentally increased WM load through an n-back task in Experiment 2.12 
 
                                                 
12  Another experiment was performed in which the same type of WM support was given except the 
previous, 0, 1, 2, and 3 choices were displayed and a block in which three symbols unrelated to the task were 
shown instead of previous choices. As the results were largely compatible with the others results, the experiment 
is not reported here. 
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Table 2. Means (and SD) of RTs in ms and LUDs for Experiment 1 for each WM support 
condition. 
 WM support: number of displayed choices 
Dependent 
variable 
0 3 7 
LUDs .045 (.220) .027 (.213) .030 (.215) 
RTs 481 (289) 410 (208) 414 (266) 
 
Figure 4. Mean LUDs (for the window sizes 2, 4, 6, and 8) and RTs in Experiment 1 for each 
level of WM support. Error bars are 95% within confidence intervals (separate for all window 
sizes in case of the LUDs) (Loftus & Masson 1994). 
 
3. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we paired a free choice task with a WM-intensive task to induce WM load. 
Specifically, we alternated a free choice task with an n-back task for this purpose (Kirchner, 
1958). In all n-back conditions, participants had to react only under specific circumstances: For 
0-back, whenever a stimulus (colored circles that were displayed left/right and above/below 
center on the screen) with a pre-specified color or location appeared, and for 1-, 2-, and 3-back 
whenever the stimulus color or location in a given trial matched that n trials ago. The two 
relevant stimulus features (color vs. location) were chosen to generalize the results and 
counteract potential modality-specific influences. Furthermore, this experiment completely 
avoids the potential confound of compatible action effects from Experiment 1. Conversely to 
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the previous experiment, we predict that with an increasing WM load, the LUDs should deviate 
more from zero and the RTs should increase. 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants. Thirty-two people from the Tübingen area participated for monetary 
compensation or course credit (Mean age = 24 years, 22 female, 10 male). All participants 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve regarding the underlying hypotheses, 
and provided written informed consent prior to data collection. 
3.1.2 Apparatus and stimuli. Stimulus presentation and response collection happened 
on a PC connected to a 17-inch CRT monitor. Stimuli were a white fixation cross in the middle 
of the screen, circles that could be red, green, blue, and yellow and that could appear in the top 
left, top right, bottom left, and bottom right location of the screen as well as a white double-
headed arrow. Stimuli were presented against a black background. The responses were given 
with the left and right Ctrl keys on a QWERTZ keyboard (free choice task) and foot pedals 
placed under the feet of the participants (n-back task). 
3.1.3 Tasks and procedure. Participants performed two tasks in alternation (for an 
illustration, see Figure 5). In the free choice task, they were to freely choose one of the two 
manual response options in response to the appearance of the double-headed arrow. In the n-
back task they were to compare the current stimulus with a specific one or one that occurred n-
trials back. A trial (with both tasks) started with the appearance of a fixation cross for 250 ms, 
followed by a blank screen for 250 ms, followed by the appearance of an n-back stimulus for 
up to 1500 ms or until a response was given, followed by another fixation cross and blank 
screen, which in turn was followed by the double-headed arrow appearing for 1500 ms or until 
a response was given. After this, the inter-trial interval was 250 ms. 
n-back level was manipulated block-wise. Every level appeared four times, with the task 
either requiring attention to the color or the location of the stimulus. A participant performed 
all of the color n-back blocks first or all of the location n-back tasks first, followed by the other 
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block-type. The order of the block-types was balanced according to a Latin square for the first 
half and then mirrored for the second half of the experiment. 
Participants performed in 16 blocks of 61 responses each for n-back conditions 1, 2, and 
3, and 60 responses each for the 0-back condition. They were informed before each block which 
criterion needed to be fulfilled for the n-back task in order to press the foot pedal and which 
foot pedal to use. Half of the participants used the left foot pedal in the first half of the 
experiment and the right foot pedal in the second half and vice versa for the other half of the 
participants. The criterion was fulfilled when either a specific color or a specific location 
appeared for the 0-back task, or when the color/location in the current trial matched the 
color/location 1, 2, or 3 trials before the current one. The course of a trial as well as an example 
for the n-back task are illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. (A) Example of a sequence of displayed stimuli and fixation crosses on the screen. 
(B) Example of a sequence of n-back stimuli (free choice stimuli not displayed). In the color-
based 2-back condition, only panel (4) would require a response, while in the location-based 2-
back condition, panel (3) would require a response. 
 
Participants were instructed to give about equal amounts of right and left responses and 
to avoid patterns (e.g., alternating left and right responses or repeating sequences) in the free 
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choice task. There was one test session per participant which lasted about 45 minutes. In cases 
where the distribution of free choice responses skewed too far in one direction (> 80%) data of 
the participant was discarded and new data collected (1 case). 
3.1.4 Design and analyses. As in Experiment 1, the two dependent measures were the 
LUDs and the RTs. The independent variables were the WM load condition (0 vs. 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 
in the n-back task). For analyses of LUDs we again analyzed four different window size (2 vs. 
4 vs. 6 vs. 8). Accordingly, two main analyses were performed: LUDs were analyzed with a 4 
× 4 ANOVA with WM load and window size as repeated-measures. RTs (and error rates for the 
n-back task) were analyzed with an ANOVA with WM load as a repeated-measure. Because we 
predicted LUDs increasingly deviating from zero with increasing WM load and increasing RTs 
(and error rates in the n-back task), we calculated Helmert contrasts on WM load (Contrast 1: 
0-back vs. higher difficulties; Contrast 2: 1-back vs. higher difficulties; Contrast 3: 2-back vs. 
3-back). In case of an interaction between the window size and the Helmert contrast, separate 
Helmert contrasts for each window size were calculated and are reported in the Appendix. 
LUDs were calculated on the whole data set once sufficient responses were given for 
the respective window size. For the subsequent analyses, trials were excluded as outliers if their 
RTs deviated more than 2.5 SDs from the respective cell mean (calculated separately for each 
participant). 
3.3. Results  
In a preliminary analysis, we included the relevant stimulus feature (location vs. color; 
2.86% outliers based on free choice RTs). With LUDs as the dependent variable, this additional 
variable did not yield a significant main effect, F(1, 31) = 3.94, p = .056, ηp² = .11, and the 
three-way interaction WM load × window size × stimulus feature was also not significant, F(9, 
279) = 0.96, p = .421, ηp² = .03, ε = .36 (Greenhouse-Geisser estimate). With RTs as the 
dependent variable, also no significant main effect was observed, F(1, 31) = 3.75, p = .062, ηp² 
= .11, and the interaction WM load × stimulus feature was also not significant, F(3, 93) = 2.74, 
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p = .063, ηp² = .08, ε = .78. To simplify the main analyses, we thus dropped this variable from 
further analyses.  
3.3.1 Manipulation check: Performance in the n-back task. We excluded 2.35% of trials 
as outliers (based on only the n-back task), and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3. 
Contrast 1 yielded no significant result for the RTs, t(31) = 1.91, p = .065, but did yield a 
significant result for the error rates, t(31) = 12.60, p < .001. Contrast 2 was significant for both 
the RTs, t(31) = 2.35, p = .025, and the error rates, t(31) = 13.51, p < .001. Contrast 3 also was 
significant for both the RTs, t(31) = 2.19, p = .036, and the error rates, t(31) = 13.10, p < .001. 
Thus, the n-back task induced a load as expected.  
3.3.2. Free choice task. Average LUDs and RTs (2.81% outliers) for the free choice task 
are visualized in Figure 6 and are summarized in Table 3. LUDs increased with WM load for 
all window sizes and all contrasts were significant and in the same direction. Contrast 1 was 
significant, t(31) = 3.42, p = .002, but it interacted with window size, t(31) = 3.36, p = .002. 
Contrast 2 was also significant, t(31) = 3.15, p = .004, and it interacted with window size, t(31) 
= 2.41, p = .022. Finally, Contrast 3 was significant, t(31) = 3.835, p = .001, but did not interact 
with window size, t(31) = 1.65, p = .110. Note, however, that the descriptive pattern was the 
same for all window sizes despite the interactions (for more details on separate analyses per 
window size, please see Appendix). For RTs, Contrast 1 was not significant, t(31) = 1.68, p = 
.104, but RTs increased for the following levels and both Contrast 2, t(31) = 4.94, p < .001, and 
Contrast 3, t(31) = 2.33, p = .026, were significant. 
3.4. Discussion. In summary, for the critical analyses, all contrasts were in the predicted 
direction and significant except for the difference in RTs and LUDs for the window size 2 for 
the contrast between the 0-back condition and higher n-back conditions. Thus, in line with our 
predictions, randomness (and RTs) in the free choice task decreased with increasing WM load. 
These results again suggest that free choice tasks are similar to random generation tasks. 
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Table 3. Means (and SDs) of RTs in ms, LUDs, and percentage of errors (PE) for Experiment 
2 for each WM load condition. 
  n-back condition 
Task Dependent 
Variable 
0 1 2 3 
n-back RT 560 (90) 600 (112) 685 (112) 753 (113) 
 PE 4.60 (3.15) 6.62 (6.12) 13.69 (7.68) 26.64 (8.44) 
Free Choice LUD .025 (.197) .027 (.199) .048 (.206) .069 (.204) 
 RT 340 (94) 329 (93) 358 (98) 386 (118) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean LUDs (for the window sizes 2, 4, 6, and 8) and RTs in the free choice task in 
Experiment 2 for each level of WM load. Error bars are 95% within confidence intervals 
(separate for all window sizes in case of the LUDs) (Loftus & Masson 1994). 
 
 
4. General Discussion 
In this study, our participants performed free choices combined with either a WM 
support manipulation (Exp. 1) or a WM load manipulation (Exp. 2). This was done to 
investigate whether the impact of these manipulations on the patterns in free choices is the same 
as the impact of such manipulations on random generation tasks. To support WM, we displayed 
the previous choices that the participants made. To increase WM load, we used a concurrent n-
back task. 
4.1. Summary of results 
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In both experiments, the direction of the results was consistent with the idea that free 
choice tasks are related to random generation tasks: Overwhelmingly, lack of WM support as 
well as higher WM load led to responses in which the LUDs were farther away from what 
would be expected in a random sequence of choices, which were also slower. More specifically, 
the absolute values of the LUDs moved in a more positive direction with less support/more WM 
load, suggesting that the proportion of sequences that are less balanced increased (e.g. L-L-R-
L, R-R-R-R for a window size of 4).  
4.2. Theoretical implications  
In light of these results, we tentatively suggest that free choice tasks (as they are used in 
contemporary research) are at the very least related, if not outright identical, to random 
generation tasks, giving support to ideas expressed, for example, by Frith (2013) or Schüür and 
Haggard (2011): That free choice tasks are not what they are often thought to be. Frith claimed 
that free choice tasks are essentially random generation tasks, while Schüür and Haggard 
claimed that free choice tasks are either underdetermined or determined by uncontrolled internal 
cues like the preceding choices. Both ideas are compatible with our results: Hindering the 
maintenance of a memory trace of previous choices leads to responses that are ‘less random’ 
and also slower. 
This potentially has wide-reaching implications for the literature on self-generated 
action. Assume that free choice tasks are in fact random generation tasks (as our results 
suggest). At least two cases can be distinguished: First, if one commits to the idea that self-
generated-ness of actions must exclude all aspects of random generation, our results imply that 
free choice tasks do not operationalize self-generated action. Second, and in contrast, if one 
assumes that random-ness is an inherent component of self-generated actions, then 
unfortunately the role of free choice tasks is even more unclear, because even without any extra 
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cognitive load it is unclear whether the resulting sequence of actions is truly random.13 This 
assumption seems not be universal among researchers though. Passingham, Bengtsson, and Lau 
(2010, p. 18), for example, mention as a condition for self-generated action that “One action 
can serve as a cue for the next action”. In other words, one action is not independent from 
previous actions.  
The present study may also speak to the results reported in Naefgen, Dambacher et al. 
(2018). There, in Experiments 2 and 3, a time pressure manipulation was used to induce changes 
in threshold separation in a sequential sampling framework. However, in Experiment 2, this 
manipulation also affected drift rate, in addition to the (intended) effect on threshold separation. 
Thus, given that time pressure is known to affect random generation tasks and reduce 
randomness (e.g., Baddeley 1966), the effects in drift rate may in fact not be an issue solely of 
parameter estimation but rather reflect differences in the random generation process. The same 
might apply to Experiment 1 of Naefgen, Dambacher et al., but it is less clear how the frequency 
of catch-trials would affect random generation tasks.  
4.3 Limitations 
An intrinsic limitation for every investigation into randomness of responses is the 
requirement to choose which measure of randomness to use. This choice effectively determines 
which kinds of patterns can be detected. It is always possible though that participants chose a 
different non-random production strategy for choosing responses that the researchers in 
question did not take into account. In our case, we chose a measure of (non-)randomness that 
essentially measures the proportion of different levels of balancedness in the response strings 
and whether they skew more towards balanced or unbalanced strings. Two weaknesses of this 
measure are that it cannot detect the order of responses within one window nor their identity. 
The string L-L-R-L looks, from a LU perspective, the same as the strings R-R-L-R and L-R-L-
                                                 
13 In fact, LUD was significantly different from zero in most of the conditions of our experiments. 
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L: all result in LU = .25. However, this limitation would only pose serious problems if we had 
observed no differences in randomness between our different conditions.  
Another issue is that WM manipulations affect the RTs of tasks involving higher 
cognitive processes of any kind. This makes a pure RT analysis not diagnostic with regards to 
whether a task is a random generation task. However, there is no reason to assume that the 
detected randomness of a task that is not a random generation task would suffer from WM load 
or benefit from WM support. This supports the interpretation of the present results as indicative 
of free choice tasks being random generation tasks. While this interpretation relies on drawing 
an analogy between free choice tasks and random generation tasks, we can at present only 
speculate about the specific mechanisms behind our results. One example of a plausible 
candidate mechanism known from the random generation literature, is the inhibition of 
prepotent associates (e.g., Towse & Neil, 1998). Easier monitoring of ongoing choices could 
make it easier to identify and suppress these stereotypical responses (e.g., fewer repetitions than 
would be appropriate for a random sequence). 
4.4. Conclusion 
We investigated whether LU, as a measure of randomness, based on responses from free 
choice tasks and RTs in this task are affected by WM support and load in a similar way as 
random generation tasks are. In short, we observed that they are and conclude that free choice 
tasks are related to or identical to random generation tasks. This potentially casts doubt on some 
types of investigations into self-generated action. The present study also provides evidence that 
random (response) generation is one of the processes that contribute to the mean RT difference 
between free and forced choice tasks, a difference that was tentatively attributed to the non-
accumulation time by Naefgen et al. (2017). It is an open question whether this is the full extent 
of what makes up this difference or if there are other, additional processes that differentiate free 
and forced choice tasks. 
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6. Appendix 
For completeness, we report the Helmert contrasts separately for each window size in 
this appendix. 
Experiment 1. The descriptive results of the following analyses are summarized in Table A1.  
Contrast 1: 
• Window Size 2: t(29) = 4.44, p < .001 
• Window Size 4: t(29) = 3.48, p = .002 
• Window Size 6: t(29) = 3.11, p = .004 
• Window Size 8: t(29) = 2.82, p = .009 
Contrast 2: 
• Window Size 2: t(29) = 1.26, p = .217 
• Window Size 4: t(29) = 0.96, p = .344 
• Window Size 6: t(29) = 0.00, p = .997 
• Window Size 8: t(29) = 0.04, p = .963 
 
Table A1. Means (and SDs) of LUDs for window sizes 2, 4, 6, and 8 for Experiment 1 for each 
WM support condition. 
 WM support: Number of displayed choices 
Window size 0 3 7 
2 .062 (.306) .037 (.066) .044 (.067) 
4 .052 (.213) .032 (.057) .038 (.059) 
6 .039 (.174) .024 (.053) .024 (.056) 
8 .028 (.152) .015 (.051) .015 (.052) 
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Experiment 2. The descriptive results of the following analyses are summarized in Table A2.  
Contrast 1: 
• Window Size 2: t(31) = 1.99, p = .056 
• Window Size 4: t(31) = 3.35, p = .002 
• Window Size 6: t(31) = 3.77, p = .001 
• Window Size 8: t(31) = 4.23, p < .001 
Contrast 2: 
• Window Size 2: t(31) = 2.18, p = .017 
• Window Size 4: t(31) = 2.88, p = .007 
• Window Size 6: t(31) = 3.51, p = .001 
• Window Size 8: t(31) = 3.85, p = .001 
Contrast 3: 
• Window Size 2: t(31) = 3.95, p < .001 
• Window Size 4: t(31) = 3.84, p = .001 
• Window Size 6: t(31) = 3.92, p < .001 
• Window Size 8: t(31) = 2.81, p = .008 
Table A2. Means (and SDs) LUDs for window sizes 2, 4, 6, and 8 for Experiment 2 for each 
WM load condition. 
 n-back 
Window size 0 1 2 3 
2 -.003 (.116) -.004 (.123) .007 (.131) .031 (.123) 
4 .018 (.124) .023 (.126) .043 (.135) .064 (.128) 
6 .030 (.127) .034 (.130) .059 (.138) .081 (130) 
8 .060 (.118) .065 (.119) .094 (.125) .109 (.121) 
 
 
